An open and Free DNS service for security and high privacy.
Block over 3.2M ads, tracking, malware, scam and phishing domains.
No Logging, dns0x20, No ECS, DNSSEC, DNS Cookies.
DNS IPv4: 174.138.21.128 / 188.166.206.224 – port 53 or port 5003
DNS IPv6: [2400:6180:0:d0::5f6e:4001] – port 53 or port 5003
DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH/DoH3 A+): How to
DNS-over-TLS (DoT): How to
Finlandiya‘da bulunan, hafif reklam engelleme ve zararlı alan adlarına karşı koruma sağlayan özyinelemeli bir DNS sunucusu. Çocuk sunucusu ayrıca çocuklar için zararlı olan siteleri de engeller. Kayıt verilerini 24 saat boyunca saklıyoruz. [ gizlilik politikası ]
خادم DNS تكراري موجود في فنلندا، يوفر حجبًا خفيفًا للإعلانات وحماية من النطاقات الضارة. كما يحجب خادم الأطفال المواقع الضارة بهم. نحتفظ بسجلات البيانات لمدة 24 ساعة. [ سياسة الخصوصية ]
A recursive DNS server located in Finland that offers lightweight ad blocking and protection against harmful domains. The Kids server also blocks sites that are harmful to children. We retain log data for 24 hours. [ privacy policy ]
PUBLIC
Filters ads and blocks access to phishing, spam, and malware sites.
DoH: https://public.ns.nwps.fi/dns-query
DoT: tls://public.ns.nwps.fi
DoQ: quic://public.ns.nwps.fi:853
IPv4: 95.217.11.63
IPv6: 2a01:4f9:c012:25a0::1
KIDS
Filters ads and blocks access to all adult, pornographic, and explicit websites. Malicious and phishing websites are also blocked.
DoH: https://kids.ns.nwps.fi/dns-query
DoT: tls://kids.ns.nwps.fi
DoQ: quic://kids.ns.nwps.fi:853
IPv4: 135.181.103.31
Pv6: 2a01:4f9:c011:aa31::1
PROTECTIVE
Protects against phishing and malware sites, but does not block ads.
DoH: https://protective.ns.nwps.fi/dns-query
DoT: tls://protective.ns.nwps.fi
DoQ: quic://protective.ns.nwps.fi:853
UNFILTERED
No filters. Allows all queries.
DoH: https://unfiltered.ns.nwps.fi/dns-query
DoT: tls://unfiltered.ns.nwps.fi
DoQ: quic://unfiltered.ns.nwps.fi:853
DoT (DNS over TLS) is a protocol that encrypts DNS queries using TLS (Transport Layer Security). It allows name service queries to travel over a separate, encrypted connection, preventing outsiders from seeing what websites a user is trying to access. DoT uses port 853 and provides strong privacy protection, especially on mobile devices and routers.
Your IP addresses: (…)
Your DNS resolvers: (…)
(Updated on March 12, 2022)
Change DNS Server on Linksys
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(August 12, 2022)
By default, your home network likely relies on a DNS server provided by your internet provider. However, these servers aren’t always the fastest and, in some cases, may even allow your ISP to maliciously track your online behavior. To that end, if internet speed and privacy matter a lot, you should perhaps consider changing your DNS server.
The best way to change your DNS server is at the router level, which will affect every single device connected to it.
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
American Samoa
Andorra
Angola
Anguilla
Antarctica
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bermuda
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Cayman Islands
Chile
China
Colombia
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
French Polynesia
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Greenland
Grenada
Guadeloupe
Guam
Guatemala
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macao
Macedonia
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Martinique
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Niue
North Korea
Norway
Pakistan
Palestine
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Qatar
Reunion
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Samoa
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Turks and Caicos Islands
U.S. Virgin Islands
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Wallis and Futuna
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
(Updated on March 12, 2022)
Change DNS Server on Linksys
Change DNS Server on a NetGear Router
Change DNS Server on D-Link
Change DNS Server on Asus
Change DNS Server on TP-Link
Change DNS Server on Cisco
Change DNS Server on TRENDnet
Change DNS Server on Belkin
Change DNS Server on Buffalo
Change DNS Server on Google Wifi
(20.01.2024)
A Domain Name System (DNS) matches human-friendly domain names to computer-friendly IP addresses.
When you type in a domain name like cyberghost.com, for example, your web browser sends the request to your ISP via your router. Your ISP refers the request to its default DNS server. The DNS server then supplies the relevant IP address so your browser can load the appropriate page.
A DNS also saves a local copy or cache of sites you’ve recently visited on your device for quick and easy reference.
It seems like a streamlined service; what could go wrong? Check the following reasons why you should change your DNS.
(…)
Incorrect network configurations or faulty VPN/proxy software can lead to your device sending DNS requests directly to your ISP‘s server, potentially enabling ISPs or other third parties to monitor your online activity.
The DNS Leak Test is a tool used to determine which DNS servers your browser is using to resolve domain names. This test attempts to resolve 50 randomly generated domain names, of which 25 are IPv4-only and 25 are IPv6-only.
(January 16, 2026)
Everyone is equal on the Internet; at least that’s what many people optimistically thought at the beginning of the millennium. When it gradually found its way in the late 1950s from military think tanks into academia and then initially a small public sphere, the Internet was considered a utopia. Hidden behind the mask of anonymity, all users would be equal and therefore would all have equal rights. There would be no hierarchies – not even among users in different countries.
Yet this hope that the Internet would be a non-discriminatory space remains an illusion to this day. Quite to the contrary, power structures are already firmly established in its technical infrastructure. They continue the history of colonialism in the virtual sphere in the form of “digital” or “electronic colonialism.”
(January 16, 2026)
Im Internet sind alle gleich, so dachten noch zu Beginn des Millenniums viele Menschen hoffnungsvoll. Als es Ende der 1950er-Jahre von militärischen Thinktanks aus nach und nach in die Wissenschaft und eine zunächst noch kleine Öffentlichkeit fand, glich das Internet einer Utopie. Hinter der Maske der Anonymität sollten alle Nutzer*innen gleich sein und somit alle die gleichen Rechte haben. Keine Hierarchien – auch nicht zwischen den User*innen in verschiedenen Ländern.
Doch diese Hoffnung vom Internet als einem diskriminierungsfreien Raum bleibt bis heute eine Illusion. Im Gegenteil: Machtstrukturen sind schon in der technischen Infrastruktur fest angelegt. Sie führen die Geschichte des Kolonialismus auch in der virtuellen Sphäre fort: in Gestalt des „digitalen“ oder „elektronischen Kolonialismus“.
Der „Gesetzentwurf zur Stärkung digitaler Ermittlungsbefugnisse in der Polizeiarbeit“, der „Gesetzentwurf zur Stärkung digitaler Ermittlungsbefugnisse zur Abwehr von Gefahren des internationalen Terrorismus“ und der „Gesetzentwurf zur Änderung der Strafprozessordnung“ legen die Grundlage dafür, dass Ermittlungsbehörden Gesichtsbilder mit Aufnahmen aus dem Internet abgleichen können und automatisierte Datenanalysen durchführen dürfen. Warum sie das brauchen? Unter anderem wegen der „hohen abstrakten Bedrohungslage“, erklärt der Vorspann der Entwürfe.
(April 22, 2026)
Das Gesetz verpflichtet Internet-Zugangs-Anbieter, IP-Adressen und Port-Nummern sämtlicher Nutzer drei Monate lang zu speichern, ohne Anlass und ohne Verdacht auf eine Straftat.
Behörden dürfen ohne Richtervorbehalt auf die Vorratsdaten zugreifen. Mit dem Gesetz gegen digitale Gewalt sollen auch Privatpersonen in Zivilverfahren auf die Vorratsdaten zugreifen.
(April 16, 2026)
Besonders alarmierend: Die geplanten Regeln würden sogar erlauben, solche Gesichter-Suchen an private Firmen im Ausland auszulagern. Damit wäre praktisch nicht mehr kontrollierbar, was mit den Daten passiert und bei wem sie letztendlich landen.
Gleichzeitig wird das Ganze mit einer Erlaubnis zur automatisierten Datenanalyse verknüpft, wie sie der US-Konzern Palantir anbietet:
(April 22, 2026)
The manifesto published by Palantir Technologies is neither a technical document nor an economic vision. It is an explicit political document announcing a new phase in the trajectory of digital capitalism, a phase in which it has abandoned its claim to neutrality and decided to unmask itself, revealing its full ideological face. Palantir is not an isolated case in the global technological landscape. It is one of several major technology companies that sell their technologies to systems of repression and human rights violations, and has been condemned by international human rights organizations, including Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, for its role in enabling forced deportations, mass surveillance, and the persecution of dissidents.
Most damning of all, documented reports have revealed a direct partnership between this company, alongside other Western technology companies such as Google, Amazon, and Microsoft, and the Israeli military, providing data and targeting systems that were used in military operations on Gaza, making it an actual partner in documented war crimes against Palestinian civilians.
Die Deutungen der vermeintlichen Vorzüge dieser KI-Überwachung finden sich insbesondere prominent im Mediendiskurs, der von Akteur*innen der inneren Sicherheit und ihren Bewertungen geprägt ist. Kritische Positionen kommen vor, aber werden nicht zum Anlass der Berichterstattung. Was sich da im Diskurs zeigt, nennen wir eine Purifizierung, eine rituelle Läuterung also, durch die bisherige zentrale Kritiken an Formen der Videoüberwachung direkt adressiert und gleichzeitig abgestreift werden. Die Purifizierung erhöht die Durchsetzbarkeit der Maßnahme, weil die Bewegungsmusteranalyse jetzt als sozusagen gute Überwachung erscheint.
(April 7, 2026)
Grundlage dieser Dokumentation ist eine der bislang größten Recherchen dieser Art: Ein Team aus Bayerischem Rundfunk, netzpolitik.org, Le Monde und weiteren Partnermedien hat rund zehn Milliarden Standortdaten ausgewertet. Eine Spurensuche, die um die halbe Welt führt: zu einer ägyptischen Exiljournalistin in Berlin, die bedroht wird. Nach Brüssel, wo hochrangige Mitarbeiter der EU-Kommission betroffen sind. Nach Washington, wo Politiker ein Sicherheitsrisiko für US-Agenten in Europa sehen. Oder an die ukrainische Front, wo Soldaten in den Datensätzen ihre eigenen Stellungen wiedererkennen.
(April 7, 2026)
Es geht um Milliarden Standortdaten von ahnungslosen Handy-Nutzer*innen, oftmals metergenau. Angeblich nur zu Werbezwecken erhoben, fließen die Daten über populäre Handy-Apps auf teils verschlungenen Wegen in die Hände von Databrokern. Potenziell betroffen sind alle Menschen, die ein Smartphone nutzen.
(…)
Zur Erinnerung: Das Recherche-Team hat die Daten kostenlos von einem Databroker im Netz erhalten. Prinzipiell zugänglich sind solche Daten für alle, die Datenhändler danach fragen. Für einen vierstelligen Betrag im Monat können Interessierte ein Abonnement abschließen.
(April 24, 2026)
Background
The Supreme Court last weighed in on the digital Fourth Amendment in 2017. In Carpenter v. United States, the court addressed whether the police had to get a warrant before accessing a certain kind of digital location data, cell-site location information. Cell phones generate CSLI anytime they are on by scanning for the nearest cell tower with strong service. When a cell phone connects to a tower, that tower then records that connection in CSLI logs. A phone’s location can be tracked across time and space by reviewing those logs.
Writing for a 5-4 majority, Chief Justice John Roberts’ Carpenter opinion held that the police must get a warrant before reviewing seven or more days of CSLI for a person’s phone. (…)
Enter: geofence data
Among these unsettled questions is whether police need a warrant to access geofence data, another kind of digital location data. Geofence data generally refers to location information collected by cellphone apps. If you have encountered a prompt on your phone that asks you whether you’d like to allow an app to use your location, you’re likely generating the kind of data at issue in Chatrie. Chatrie specifically involved data generated by a Google service called Location History. In Google’s case, this location information was created by combining information from cell towers but also on GPS, Wi-Fi, and Bluetooth signals.
(August 22, 2020)
Datendiebe zapfen das Stromnetz des Gebäudes spurlos an, um IT-Daten als Rauschsignale aufzuzeichnen. Die geraubten Signale werden anschließend von den Datendieben mit Analysegeräten sehr professionell wieder in die digitalen Ursprungsdaten zurückgewandelt.
So können am PC eingegebene oder an IT-Peripheriegeräten verarbeitete Daten von Datendieben ausgewertet, mit anderen Datenquellen verknüpft und missbraucht werden. Diese Art des Datendiebstahls ist nicht erkennbar und nicht rekonstruierbar. Der einzige wirksame Schutz gegen solche Cyberangriffe ist das technische Vermeiden von ins Stromnetz abfließenden Daten.
(April 2018)
In this paper we provide an implementation, evaluation, and analysis of PowerHammer, a malware (bridgeware [1]) that uses power lines to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers. In this case, a malicious code running on a compromised computer can control the power consumption of the system by intentionally regulating the CPU utilization. Data is modulated, encoded, and transmitted on top of the current flow fluctuations, and then it is conducted and propagated through the power lines. This phenomena is known as a ‚conducted emission‘. We present two versions of the attack. Line level powerhammering: In this attack, the attacker taps the in-home power lines1 that are directly attached to the electrical outlet. Phase level power-hammering: In this attack, the attacker taps the power lines at the phase level, in the main electrical service panel. In both versions of the attack, the attacker measures the emission conducted and then decodes the exfiltrated data. We describe the adversarial attack model and present modulations and encoding schemes along with a transmission protocol. We evaluate the covert channel in different scenarios and discuss signal-to-noise (SNR), signal processing, and forms of interference. We also present a set of defensive countermeasures. Our results show that binary data can be covertly exfiltrated from air-gapped computers through the power lines at bit rates of 1000 bit/sec for the line level power-hammering attack and 10 bit/sec for the phase level power-hammering attack.
(8th May 2018)
Hot on the heels of exploits that use fan noise, infra red cameras, heat, LED lights and drones, magnetic fields and smartphones, and a multitude of other hacks to gain access to sensitive air gapped computer systems, the researchers from Israel’s Ben Gurion University have shown once again that air-gapped networks are not safe from a determined and patient attacker.
The researchers have already devised several devious techniques to extract data from isolated or air-gapped computers that store highly sensitive data and now their latest technique, dubbed PowerHammer, exploits current fluctuations flowing through the power lines supplying electricity to air-gapped computers.
The researchers have been able to exfiltrate data at a rate of 1,000 bits per second for lines connected to the target computer and 10 bits per second from the grid.
(September 2024)
Smart meters, being a vital component in the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), provide an opportunity to remotely monitor and control power usage and act like a bridge between customers and utilities. The installation of millions of smart meters in the power grid is a step forward towards a green transition. However, it also constitutes a massive cybersecurity vulnerability. Cyberattacks on AMI can result in inaccurate billing, energy theft, service disruptions, privacy breaches, network vulnerabilities, and malware distribution.