(July 19, 2026)
Für den einigermaßen wachen Beobachter erscheint es, als ob Mossad, CIA, MI6 und BND in Teheran an der Macht wären und sich einen ihren üblichen grausamen Scherze erlauben.
(July 19, 2026)
Für den einigermaßen wachen Beobachter erscheint es, als ob Mossad, CIA, MI6 und BND in Teheran an der Macht wären und sich einen ihren üblichen grausamen Scherze erlauben.
(March 22, 2026)
Despite the expectations of CIA and Mossad for a traditional New Year’s speech, Mojtaba Khamenei remained out of sight, issuing only a text-based statement on Telegram for Nowruz.
Sources cited by The Jerusalem Post indicate that the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) may currently hold the reins of the country, with one source suggesting the Guard is controlling Mojtaba rather than following his lead.
This included a media campaign in the Wall Street Journal, Associated Press, The Guardian and latterly CNN; private warnings by David Cameron, then foreign secretary, who told him Britain would defund the ICC and withdraw from the Rome Statute if the warrants were issued; Republican senators who told him: „Target Israel and we will target you“, and being named publicly as a suspect before he had even had the chance to defend himself by the president of the Assembly of State Parties (ASP), Finland‘s Paivi Kaukoranta.
Danon threatened Mamdani with the same fate as Khan. „@NYCMayor Zohran Mamdani, take note: using Israel as a political weapon will not shield you from accountability,“ Danon posted.
(May 23, 2023)
Amid reports that the US is mediating a normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia, Channel 12 reports on apparent Saudi and US demands for the deal to go ahead.
The report says that Saudi Arabia is demanding the Biden administration unfreeze several major arms deals, a military alliance with the US and a full nuclear program.
7:11 PM · Jul 21, 2026
12:49 AM · Jul 22, 2026
The House on Tuesday approved a procedural vote to advance the $1.15 trillion 2027 National Defense Authorization Act, which includes a section to further integrate the US and Israeli militaries, a plan that Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has said was his idea.
The rule to allow floor debate and a vote on the NDAA and several pieces of legislation passed in a 214-211 vote, and a final vote on the House’s version of the NDAA is expected to take place on Wednesday. The procedural step came after the House Rules Committee denied a vote on an amendment introduced by Rep. Thomas Massie (R-KY) to strip Section 219, the Israeli integration plan, from the bill.
Senate Democrats on Tuesday blocked the advancement of the 2027 National Defense Authorization Act, citing President Trump’s war with Iran, which continues to rage following the collapse of the US-Iran Memorandum of Understanding.
The NDAA would provide the Pentagon with over $1.1 trillion in funding as part of the White House’s plan for a $1.5 trillion military budget for 2027, a nearly 50% increase from this year. The bill also includes an amendment, Section 1217, to further merge the US and Israeli militaries under a plan being pushed by Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu.
A procedural vote of 50-46 fell well short of the 60 votes that it needed to advance the NDAA. Every Democrat, except two who weren’t present for the vote — Senators Jon Fetterman (PA) and Alex Padilla (CA) — voted against advancing the sprawling military spending bill.
(July 13, 2026)
The House provision, which has a Senate version known as Section 1217, would also forbid the president of the United States from limiting intelligence collaboration with Israel over its human rights abuses. If the President ever wants to limit such collaboration, he or she must tell Congress and can only cite American national security as a basis.
In other words, these bills would connect the US and Israeli militaries in unprecedented ways and make it exceedingly difficult for any future president to unwind this partnership with a foreign government.
(June 16, 2026)
Buried in the US$1.15 trillion National Defense Authorization Act is a provision that would deepen US military cooperation with Israel while walling that cooperation off from further congressional oversight.
Section 219 (formerly section 224) creates the role of an “executive agent” focused on folding Israeli technology into US weapons programs, and vice versa, including in missile and air defense technologies as well as artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cyberwarfare, and autonomous systems. Once implemented, the provision would speed efforts to embed Israeli technologies into US weapons systems in ways almost never codified into law, even for allies. As the protracted experience with unwinding Turkish participation in the F-35 program shows, practically, integration binds the United States to rely on producers in ways that become next to impossible to walk back later, even if lawmakers want to.
(…)
Section 219 also calls for “data fusion.” In defense doctrine, data fusion means combining feeds from many sensors and intelligence sources into a single targeting picture. The United States would be absorbing Israeli data, which may have been collected under problematic mass surveillance programs. Moreover, section 219 would be reinforced by section 622 of the intelligence appropriations bill, which mandates intelligence sharing and would further promote combining US intelligence streams with Israeli ones that could then be used by the Israeli military for targeting.
(March 1, 2026)
The timing of the assassination was determined by information the CIA gleaned about a meeting of top Iranian officials at a leadership compound in the heart of Tehran scheduled for Saturday morning. Most critically, the CIA was able to tell Israeli counterparts that Khamenei would be at the site and the timing of the meeting, according to the New York Times.
Israeli spies had also been tracking Khamenei for many years, building a minutely detailed file on his daily routine and those of his family members, associates, allies and those charged with keeping him safe.
(October 16, 2025)
When Israel launched its attacks on Iran in the early morning of June 13, many news reports marvelled at the quality and ingenuity of its intelligence agencies in enabling the Israel Defense Forces to strike with such precision. But one element was not talked about in any detail: Israel’s network of relationships with other countries’ intelligence agencies and their contribution to these covert operations.
(…)
While searching the Swiss national archives, I found a large cache of encrypted telegrams that had been shared in a network called Kilowatt. This network involved 18 countries and shared information such as the movements of specific Palestinian people identified as terrorists, including the safe houses and vehicles they used. Mossad was part of Kilowatt and could use the intelligence it received from European partners to plan and carry out its targeted assassinations in Europe. There is also ample evidence in the cables that western governments knew what Mossad was using the intelligence for.
(05.03.2020)
Das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz arbeitet im „Berner Club“ mit den Auslandsgeheimdiensten Mossad und CIA zusammen. Mit weiteren Behörden tauscht der deutsche Inlandsgeheimdienst Informationen zu „nicht-islamistischem Terrorismus“ sowie „Rechts- und Linksextremismus“. Wegen des „Staatswohls“ hielt die Bundesregierung diese Details bislang geheim.
The secret deployment to Azerbaijan, reported by CNN for the first time, was one of several military positions Israel maintained across the Middle East that gave its military unprecedented reach, highlighting the role Iran’s neighbors played — some with permission, some likely without — in facilitating operations against Tehran and becoming entangled in the conflict.
The locations in Azerbaijan were among numerous covert military sites and bases in multiple countries, the sources told CNN, including in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, and Somaliland. The forces, initially planned as potential rescue teams in the event of an emergency, expanded in scope to become military and intelligence gathering positions.
(April 23, 2026)
Die Studie untersucht die deutsch-israelische Militärkooperation seit dem Verkünden der „Zeitenwende“ durch
Bundeskanzler Olaf Scholz, die für eine massive Aufstockung der deutschen Militärausgaben steht. Angesichts
der israelischen Aggressionen und dem Genozid in Gaza seit dem 7. Oktober 2023 stellt der Beitrag fest, dass die Militärkooperation mit Israel einen Verstoß gegen das Völkerrecht darstellt. Sie zeigt weiter auf, wie deutsche Gesetzgeber und Militärvertreter Verbindungen zur IDF und zur israelischen Rüstungsindustrie suchen, sei es beim Erwerb von Militärtechnologie, beim Informationsaustausch über Wirtschaftswachstum durch die Waffenproduktion oder um Erkenntnisse über die effiziente Integration von Frauen
und der Reserve in die Armee zu gewinnen. Die Studie untersucht zudem die Interessen der Akteure, die die Militärkooperation vorantreiben, und skizziert die Folgen des Militarismus für die deutsche Zivilgesellschaft im Hinblick auf die Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Staaten.
(Artikel 23, 2026)
In einer neuen Studie der Informationsstelle Militarisierung e.V. untersucht Melchior Grabowski die militärische Zusammenarbeit zwischen Israel und Deutschland seit dem Verkünden der Zeitenwende. Sie zeigt auf, dass trotz massiver Völkerrechtsbrüche Israels umfangreiche Militärkooperationen zwischen den beiden Ländern stattfinden, die tief in Politik, Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft eingreifen. Damit deckt die Studie auf, welche deutschen Interessen abseits der „Staatsräson“ in der militärischen Kooperation mit Israel bestehen.
(February 23, 2026)
4. Macht das Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz (BfV) derzeit von seiner Befugnis nach § 22c des Bundesverfassungsschutzgesetzes (BVerfSchG) Gebrauch, um gemeinsame Dateien mit israelischen Nachrichtendiensten zu betreiben, und wenn ja, in welchem Umfang?
5. Sofern gemeinsame Dateien betrieben werden, sind an diesen Dateien weitere ausländische Nachrichtendienste beteiligt, und wenn ja, welche?
6. Macht das BfV derzeit von seiner Befugnis nach § 22d BVerfSchG Gebrauch, sich an gemeinsamen Dateien mit israelischen Nachrichtendiensten zu beteiligen, und wenn ja, in welchem Umfang?
7. Sofern gemeinsame Dateien betrieben werden, sind an diesen Dateien weitere ausländische Nachrichtendienste beteiligt, und wenn ja, welche?
8. Sofern gemeinsame Dateien betrieben werden, wie viele personenbezogene Datensätze waren und sind in den vergangenen zehn Jahren jeweils in diesen gemeinsamen Dateien mit israelischen Nachrichtendiensten gespeichert gewesen (bitte nach Jahren, ggf. mit Stichtag 31. Dezember, und der einspeichernden Stelle auflisten)?
9. Wenn keine solchen gemeinsamen Dateien betrieben werden, was sind die Gründe dafür?
Die Fragen 4 bis 9 werden gemeinsam im Sachzusammenhang beantwortet.
Die Beantwortung der Fragen zur Nutzung gemeinsamer Dateien insbesondere mit den israelischen Nachrichtendiensten, aber auch mit ausländischen Nachrichtendiensten allgemein kann trotz der grundsätzlichen verfassungsrechtlichen Pflicht, Informationsansprüche des Deutschen Bundestages zu erfüllen, aus Gründen des Staatswohls nicht erfolgen, da Arbeitsmethoden und Vorgehensweisen der Sicherheitsbehörden des Bundes, hier des Bundesamtes für Verfassungsschutz (BfV), im Hinblick auf deren künftige Aufgabenerfüllung besonders schutzbedürftig sind. Durch eine Beantwortung der Fragen nach Nutzung gemeinsamer Dateien zwischen dem BfV und ausländischen Nachrichtendiensten könnten Rückschlüsse auf die Arbeitsweise des BfV gezogen werden. Eine Konkretisierung hinsichtlich eines gegebenenfalls stattfindenden Austausches mit anderen Behörden könnte betroffene Personen oder Gruppen in die Lage versetzen, Abwehrstrategien zu entwickeln und somit die Erkenntnisgewinnung des BfV zu erschweren oder in Einzelfällen sogar unmöglich machen. Dies würde die Funktionsfähigkeit des BfV nachhaltig beeinträchtigen und damit einen erheblichen Nachteil für die Interessen der Bundesrepublik Deutschland bedeuten.
Ferner können die erbetenen Auskünfte aufgrund der Restriktionen der sog. Third-Party-Rule nicht erteilt werden. Die Bedeutung der „Third-Party-Rule“ für die internationale nachrichtendienstliche Zusammenarbeit hat das Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG) in seinem Beschluss 2 BvE 2/15 vom 13. Oktober 2016 (Rn. 162-166) gewürdigt. Die „Third-Party-Rule“ betrifft den internationalen Austausch von Informationen der Nachrichtendienste. Diese Informationen sind geheimhaltungsbedürftig, weil sie sicherheitsrelevante Erkenntnisse enthalten, die unter Maßgabe der vertraulichen Behandlung von ausländischen Nachrichtendiensten an das BfV weitergeleitet wurden. Eine Freigabe durch die ausländischen Nachrichtendienste liegt nicht vor. Die Zusammenarbeit von Nachrichtendiensten setzt die Einhaltung von Vertraulichkeit voraus. Erfahrungen haben gezeigt, dass die Partnerdienste aufgrund der meist hoch eingestuften und sensiblen Inhalte äußerst restriktiv bzgl. der Freigabe ihrer Informationen verfahren. Dies gilt umso mehr, da es sich im Kontext parlamentarischer Anfragen zumeist nicht um lang zurückliegende Ereignisse handelt. Im Rahmen von Prognoseentscheidungen unterbleiben Nachfragen, auch unter Berücksichtigung von Zweckmäßigkeitsgesichtspunkten, wenn die Datenübermittlung bereits mit einer ausdrücklichen und umfassenden Verwendungsbeschränkung durch die übermittelnde ausländische Behörde versehen wurde. Bei der Einschätzung außenpolitisch erheblicher Sachverhalte wie der Zweckmäßigkeit möglichen Verhaltens gewährt das Grundgesetz den Organen der auswärtigen Gewalt einen weiten Spielraum, um es zu ermöglichen, die jeweiligen politischen Ziele der Bundesrepublik Deutschland im Rahmen des völkerrechtlich und verfassungsrechtlich Zulässigen durchzusetzen (BVerfGE 143, 101 [153, Rn. 170]; BVerfGE 55, 349 [365]). Das parlamentarische Fragerecht hat für die Bundesregierung einen äußerst hohen Stellenwert. Daraus lässt sich aber nicht ohne Weiteres ein entsprechend umfassender Anspruch an ausländische Partnerbehörden ableiten, da für sie keine Rechts- oder Auskunftspflicht gegenüber ausländischen Abgeordneten besteht. Es ist vor diesem Hintergrund zu bedenken, dass jedenfalls ein systematisches und hochfrequentes Abfragen von Informationen anlässlich von parlamentarischen Anfragen durch deutsche Sicherheitsbehörden bei ausländischen Partnerdiensten bei diesen nahe legen könnte, dass in Deutschland das parlamentarische Informationsrecht gegenüber den Grundlagen der internationalen Zusammenarbeit im Rahmen einer Interessensabwägung von vornherein und in allen Fällen überwiegt. Es bestünde hierdurch die Möglichkeit einer Erschütterung der internationalen, vertraulichen Zusammenarbeit von Nachrichtendiensten bzw. Sicherheitsbehörden und damit einhergehenden Einschränkungen bei der Informationsweitergabe. Würden in der Konsequenz eines Vertrauensverlustes Informationen von ausländischen Stellen entfallen oder wesentlich zurückgehen, hätte dies wiederum eine erhebliche Schwächung der den Nachrichtendiensten des Bundes zur Verfügung stehenden Möglichkeiten der Informationsgewinnung und damit empfindliche Nachteile für die Auftragserfüllung der Nachrichtendienste zur Folge. Oftmals ist kein Ersatz durch andere Instrumente der Informationsgewinnung möglich. Eine Bekanntgabe der Informationen kann demzufolge einen Nachteil für das Wohl des Bundes bedeuten, da durch die Missachtung einer zugesagten und vorausgesetzten Vertraulichkeit die künftige Erfüllung der gesetzlichen Aufgaben des Verfassungsschutzes einschließlich der Zusammenarbeit mit anderen Behörden, zumal mit Nachrichtendiensten anderer Staaten, erschwert würden. Die
(zugesagte) Vertraulichkeit erstreckt sich dabei auch auf Hinweise von Geheimdiensten und Ermittlungsbehörden anderer Staaten. Dies beinhaltet stets auch die Information, ob solche überhaupt vorliegen. Selbst die Bekanntgabe unter Wahrung des Geheimschutzes birgt das Risiko des Bekanntwerdens, welches unter keinen Umständen hingenommen werden kann. Das Bekanntwerden von Informationen, die nach den Regeln der „Third-Party-Rule“ erlangt wurden, würde als Störung der wechselseitigen Vertrauensgrundlage gewertet werden und hätte eine schwere Beeinträchtigung der Teilhabe des BfV am internationalen Erkenntnisaustausch zwischen Nachrichtendiensten zur Folge. Die notwendige Abwägung zwischen dem Geheimhaltungsinteresse einerseits und dem grundsätzlich umfassenden parlamentarischen Fragerecht andererseits ergibt daher, dass auch die eingestufte Übermittlung der Informationen an die Geheimschutzstelle des Deutschen Bundestages vorliegend nicht in Betracht kommt. Insofern muss ausnahmsweise das Fragerecht der Abgeordneten gegenüber den Geheimhaltungsinteressen der Bundesregierung zurückstehen.
(July 2, 2025)
The first pillar involves establishing a joint German-Israeli cyber research centre, which would serve as the intellectual foundation for developing advanced defensive technologies. This collaboration leverages Israel’s established expertise in cybersecurity innovation with Germany’s robust technological infrastructure and research capabilities.
Strengthening cooperation between intelligence services forms the second component, specifically enhancing collaboration between Germany’s BND (Bundesnachrichtendienst) and Israel’s Mossad. This intelligence-sharing framework aims to provide early warning systems for emerging cyber threats and coordinate responses to state-sponsored attacks.
The third element focuses on expanding Germany’s anti-drone defence capabilities, addressing a growing concern as unmanned aerial vehicles become increasingly weaponised and accessible to hostile actors.
(November 30, 2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
(December 16, 2023)
Israeli leaders believed that Hamas was more interested in governing than fighting. By the time the agents discovered the ledgers in 2018, the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was encouraging the government of Qatar to deliver millions of dollars to the Gaza Strip. He gambled that the money would buy stability and peace.
Mr. Levy recalled briefing Mr. Netanyahu personally in 2015 about the Hamas portfolio.
“Not only is it contentious in itself, what remains even more contentious is the fact that no one seems to agree about what everyone agreed about, or didn’t agree about,” Pinfold told Al Jazeera.
“We don’t know what Iran agreed to, we don’t know what both sides think they agreed to,” he added, noting the further complication that various parties which were either attacked or involved in the fighting were not represented.
Iran says they have 10 points. The US says it has 15 points. The problem here is a dilemma that there is no single document that anyone can refer to for what both sides are going to discuss.
The black S.U.V. carrying Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu arrived at the White House just before 11 a.m. on Feb. 11. The Israeli leader, who had been pressing for months for the United States to agree to a major assault on Iran, was whisked inside with little ceremony, out of view of reporters, primed for one of the most high-stakes moments in his long career.
U.S. and Israeli officials gathered first in the Cabinet Room, adjacent to the Oval Office. Then Mr. Netanyahu headed downstairs for the main event: a highly classified presentation on Iran for President Trump and his team in the White House Situation Room, which was rarely used for in-person meetings with foreign leaders.
„Viele Details der Mossad-Pläne bleiben zwar geheim, doch ein Element beinhaltete die Unterstützung einer Invasion iranisch-kurdischer Milizen aus dem Nordirak. Der Mossad unterhält langjährige Verbindungen zu kurdischen Gruppen, und amerikanische Beamte haben erklärt, dass sowohl die CIA als auch der Mossad in den letzten Jahren Waffen und andere Unterstützung an kurdische Kräfte geliefert haben. Die CIA hatte bereits Befugnisse zur Unterstützung iranisch-kurdischer Kämpfer und hatte schon lange vor dem aktuellen Krieg Waffen und Beratung geleistet. In den ersten Kriegstagen bombardierten israelische Kampfflugzeuge und Bomber iranische Militär- und Polizeiziele im Nordwesten Irans, unter anderem um den kurdischen Streitkräften den Weg zu ebnen.“
Within days of the war’s beginning, said David Barnea, the Mossad chief, his service would likely be able to galvanize the Iranian opposition — igniting riots and other acts of rebellion that could even lead to the collapse of Iran’s government. Mr. Barnea also presented the proposal to senior Trump administration officials during a visit to Washington in mid-January.
Mr. Netanyahu adopted the plan.
Previous attacks have included the assassination of a top Iranian nuclear scientist travelling at high speeds in a car on an isolated road with a remote-controlled automatic machine gun; malware attacks on computers running key parts of Iran’s nuclear programme; and the theft of an archive of nuclear documents.
Another Iranian source told MEE that amid the latest attacks, Iran had „made a clear statement“ to Saudi Arabia that it was not behind the strikes on Saudi Aramco‘s Ras Tanura, which houses the kingdom‘s largest domestic refinery and is a key crude export terminal.
„This is an Israeli effort to sabotage regional peace and alliances between neighbours,“ the source added.
A Foreign Ministry official told Middle East Eye that Israel was behind strikes against Saudi Arabia and at least one attack on Oman, asserting: „I can categorically say that some of the attacks were not carried out by us [Iran].“
The claims follow at least five drone and missile strikes on Saudi facilities, including the Ras Tanura oil refinery and the US embassy in Riyadh, alongside two targets at Oman‘s Duqm Port.
(July 15, 2020)
Though Israeli intelligence found obvious use for the steady stream of sensitive and classified information, their biggest prize was yet to come – top secret government laboratories in the United States. Eitan tasked Maxwell with selling PROMIS to US labs in the Los Alamos complex, including Sandia National Laboratory, which was and is at the core of the US nuclear weapons system. Notably, the eventual sale of PROMIS to these laboratories by Maxwell occurred during the same period in 1984 when Eitan tasked one of Israel’s top experts in nuclear targeting with supervising Jonathan Pollard’s espionage of U.S. nuclear secrets on Israel’s behalf.
In order to plot how he would accomplish such a feat, Maxwell would meet with none other than Henry Kissinger, who told him that – in order to sell PROMIS to these sensitive laboratories – he needed to enlist the services of then-Senator for Texas John Tower, who was the head of the Senates’ Armed Services Committee at the time.
(…)
Not long after his failure to secure the nomination as Pentagon chief, Tower died in a suspicious plane crash soon after the equally suspicious death of Robert Maxwell.
(…)
In early August 1984, FBI headquarters and other higher-ups in the Ed Meese-led Department of Justice, which itself was complicit in the whole sordid PROMIS affair, ordered the New Mexico office to halt its investigation into Information on Demand, Maxwell and PROMIS. The cover-up, oddly enough, continues today, with the FBI still refusing to release documents pertaining to Robert Maxwell and his role in the PROMIS scandal.
(2004)
Only the legends of Excalibur, the sword of invincible power, and the Holy Grail, the chalice from which Christ took his wine at the Last Supper begin to approach the mysterious aura that has evolved in the world of secret intelligence around a computer software program named PROMIS. Created in the 1970s by former National Security Agency (NSA) programmer and engineer Bill Hamilton, now President of Washington, DC’s Inslaw Corporation, PROMIS (Prosecutor’s Management Information System) crossed a threshold in the evolution of computer programming.
(…)
The social research, which included pioneering mathematical work — apparently facilitating the creation of artificial intelligence — postulated that a similar remote hypothetical position would eliminate randomness from all human activity. Everything would be visible in terms of measurable and predictable patterns — the ultimate big picture.
(…)
As voluminously described by Inslaw attorney, the late Elliot Richardson, the Israeli Mossad under the direction of Rafi Eitan, allegedly modified the software yet again and sold it throughout the Middle East. It was Eitan, the legendary Mossad captor of Adolph Eichmann, according to Hamilton, who had masqueraded as an Israeli prosecutor to enter Inslaw’s DC offices years earlier and obtain a firsthand demonstration of what PROMIS could do.
Not too many Arab nations would trust a friendly Mossad agent selling computer programs. So the Mossad provided their modified PROMIS to flamboyant British publishing magnate Robert Maxwell, a World War II Jewish resistance fighter who had assumed the Anglo name and British citizenship after the war. It was Maxwell, capable of traveling the world and with enormous marketing resources, who became the sales agent for PROMIS and then sold it to, among others, the Canadian government. Maxwell drowned mysteriously in late 1991, not long after investigative reporter Danny Casolaro was “suicided” in West Virginia.
(August 7, 2019)
Almost one year to the day after the “Mega” spy scandal broke, the Wall Street Journal was the first outlet to report on the existence of a little-known organization of billionaires that was “informally” called the Mega Group and had been founded years prior in 1991. The report made no mention of the spy scandal that had spread concerns of Israeli espionage in the U.S. only a year prior. However, the group’s distinctive “informal” name and the connections of its members to the Mossad and to high-ranking Israeli politicians, including prime ministers, raise the possibility that “Mega” was not an individual, as the FBI and NSA had believed, but a group.
In 1997, when the “Mega” spy scandal broke, Netanyahu had recently become prime minister of Israel after an upset victory, a victory that was largely credited to one well-connected Netanyahu backer in particular, Ronald Lauder.
(…)
Some have taken Maxwell’s funeral held in Israel as the country’s “official” confirmation of Maxwell’s service to the Mossad, as it was likened to a state funeral and attended by no less than six serving and former heads of Israeli intelligence. During his funeral service in Jerusalem, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir eulogized him and stated: “He has done more for Israel than can today be said.”
“Jeffrey Epstein’s unusual close relationship with Ehud Barak doesn’t suggest Epstein worked for Israel. It proves the opposite,” wrote Netanyahu, in English, on X.
“Stuck on his election loss from over two decades ago, Barak has for years obsessively attempted to undermine Israeli democracy by working with the anti-Zionist radical left in failed attempts to overthrow the elected Israeli government,” Netanyahu claimed.
(November 30, 2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
The documents describe preliminary discussions with international law firms to work on the case on a contingency-fee basis, meaning they would be paid only if they won.
Former officials of British intelligence service MI6 and Israel‘s Mossad expressed willingness to contribute to efforts to identify and recover the assets, according to the documents.