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24.07.2023 - 12:10 [ PrivacyTools.io ]

Privacy RSS Feed Readers

Privacy-focused RSS feed readers to help you stay up-to-date while preserving your privacy. Get the latest news and stories without compromising your personal information.

29.09.2022 - 19:09 [ Patrick Breyer #JoinMastodon / Nitter ]

@Senficon erklärt euch in 7 Minuten die fünf größten Gefahren der geplanten #Chatkontrolle, u.a. #Massenüberwachung, #ChillingEffects, #Uploadfilter, #Netzsperren, #Altersverifikation.

29.09.2022 - 19:03 [ Freiheitsrechte.org ]

Freiheit im digitalen Zeitalter – Chatkontrolle: Mit Grundrechten unvereinbar

Die EU-Kommission hat einen Entwurf für eine Verordnung vorgelegt, die Vorschriften zur Prävention und Bekämpfung sexueller Gewalt an Kindern (Chatkontrolle-Verordnung) festlegen soll. Die geplanten Regelungen werfen so erhebliche
grundrechtliche Bedenken auf, dass die GFF sich bereits vor einer Verabschiedung des Entwurfs in die Debatte einschaltet. Die wichtigsten Kritikpunkte
im Überblick.

24.09.2022 - 23:55 [ Euractiv.com ]

EU’s contempt for encryption puts all Europeans at risk

Every Internet user will find themselves more easily surveilled by the state and other actors. For Central and Eastern Europeans, where analogue surveillance and political retaliation were conducted within their lifetimes, the proposal would be a depressing rollback of the freedoms hard-won by previous generations.

Members of the LGBTQ+ community, abuse survivors, refugees, and minority groups that are the targets of discrimination or attack, will no longer find refuge on the Internet. Professions such as journalists, who depend upon encryption to keep themselves and their sources safe, will be less able to investigate corruption and criminality. The murders of Slovak journalist Ján Kuciak and Maltese journalist Daphne Caruana Galizia in recent years are a reminder of the high stakes for reporters who are exposed.

21.09.2022 - 12:05 [ UN.org ]

The right to privacy in the digital age – Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

56. With this in mind, OHCHR recommends that States:

(a) Ensure that any interference with the right to privacy, including hacking, restrictions to access and use of encryption technology and surveillance of the public, complies with international human rights law, including the principles of legality, legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality and non-discrimination, and does not impair the essence of that right;

(b) Conduct human rights due diligencesystematically, including regular
comprehensive human rights impact assessments, when designing, developing, purchasing, deploying and operating surveillance systems;

(c) Take into account, when conducting human rights due diligence and
assessing the necessity and proportionality of new surveillance systems and powers, the entire legal and technological environment in which those systems or powers are or would be embedded; States should also consider risks of abuse, function creep and repurposing, including risks as a result of future political changes;

(d) Adopt and effectively enforce, through independent, impartial and well-resourced authorities, data privacy legislation for the public and private sectors that complies with international human rights law, including safeguards, oversight and remedies to effectively protect the right to privacy;

(e) Take immediate measures to effectively increase the transparency of the use of surveillance technologies, including by appropriately informing the public and affected individuals and communities and regularly providing data relevant for the public to assess their efficacy and impact on human rights;

(f) Promote public debate of the use of surveillance technologies and ensure meaningful participation of all stakeholders in decisions on the acquisition, transfer, sale, development, deployment and use of surveillance technologies, including the elaboration of public policies and their implementation;

(g) Implement moratoriums on the domestic and transnational sale and use of surveillance systems, such as hacking tools and biometric systems that can be used for the identification or classification of individuals in public places, until adequate safeguards to protect human rights are in place; such safeguards should include domestic and export control measures, in line with the recommendations made herein
and in previous reports to the Human Rights Council;

(h) Ensure that victims of human rights violations and abuses linked to the use of surveillance systems have access to effective remedies. In relation to the specific issues raised in the present report, OHCHR
recommends that States:

Hacking

(a) Ensure that the hacking of personal devices is employed by authorities only as a last resort, used only to prevent or investigate a specific act amounting to a serious threat to national security or a specific serious crime, and narrowly targeted at the person suspected of committing those acts; such measures should be subject to strict independent oversight and should require prior approval by a judicial body;

Encryption

(b) Promote and protect strong encryption and avoid all direct, or indirect, general and indiscriminate restrictions on the use of encryption, such as prohibitions, criminalization, the imposition of weak encryption standards or requirements for mandatory general client-side scanning; interference with the encryption of private communications of individuals should only be carried out when authorized by an independent judiciary body and on a case-by-case basis, targeting individuals if strictly necessary for the investigation of serious crimes or the prevention of serious crimes or
serious threats to public safety or national security;

Surveillance of public spaces and export control of surveillance technology

(c) Adopt adequate legal frameworks to govern the collection, analysis and sharing of social media intelligence that clearly define permissible grounds, prerequisites, authorization procedures and adequate oversight mechanisms;

(d) Avoid general privacy-intrusive monitoring of public spaces and ensure that all public surveillance measures are strictly necessary and proportionate for achieving important legitimate objectives, including by strictly limiting their location and time, as well as the duration of data storage, the purpose of data use and access to data; biometric recognition systems should only be used in public spaces to prevent or
investigate serious crimes or serious public safety threats and if all requirements under international human rights law are implemented with regard to public spaces;

(e) Establish robust well-tailored export control regimes applicable to surveillance technologies, the use of which carries high risks for the enjoyment of human rights; States should require transparent human rights impact assessments that take into account the capacities of the technologies at issue as well as the situation in the recipient State, including compliance with human rights, adherence to the rule of law,
the existence and effective enforcement of applicable laws regulating surveillance activities and the existence of independent oversight mechanisms;

(f) Ensure that, in the provision and use of surveillance technologies, public-private partnerships uphold and expressly incorporate human rights standards and do not result in an abdication of governmental accountability for human rights.

21.09.2022 - 11:47 [ Netzpolitik.org ]

Client-Side-Scanning: UN-Menschenrechtskommissar erteilt Chatkontrolle deutliche Absage

(19.09.2022)

Der UN-Menschenrechtskommissar hat sich in einem Bericht zum „Recht auf Privatsphäre im digitalen Zeitalter“ (PDF auf unserem Server), der sich mit Trojanern wie Pegasus, der Rolle von Verschlüsselung sowie der Überwachung öffentlicher Räume beschäftigt, kritisch gegenüber der Technologie des Client-Side-Scannings ausgesprochen. Diese ist im Rahmen der Einführung einer Chatkontrolle in der EU als Überwachungstechnologie im Gespräch.

11.09.2022 - 17:57 [ Browserleaks.com ]

SSL/TLS Client Test

The page shows the SSL/TLS capabilities of your web browser, determines supported TLS protocols and cipher suites and marks if any of them are weak or insecure, displays a list of supported TLS extensions and key exchange groups.

11.09.2022 - 17:57 [ itigic.com ]

So deaktivieren Sie alte TLS-Protokolle in Windows und Browsern

(01.02.2022)

Es gibt Internetprotokolle die vor ein paar Jahren sehr notwendig waren, um navigieren zu können, aber mit der Zeit unsicher und obsolet geworden sind. Dies geschieht mit den Protokollen SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 und TLS 1.1. Nach und nach haben die meisten Browser sie verworfen, aber einige sind immer noch standardmäßig in aktiviert Windows. In diesem Artikel erklären wir, wie wir sie sowohl in Browsern als auch im System selbst deaktivieren können.

30.06.2022 - 08:16 [ AVM.de ]

Filterlisten für Internetseiten erstellen

Tragen Sie die Adressen der Internetseiten, deren Aufruf Sie verbieten bzw. erlauben wollen, in der jeweiligen Filterliste ein:

1. Klicken Sie in der Benutzeroberfläche der FRITZ!Box auf „Internet“.
2. Klicken Sie im Menü „Internet“ auf „Filter“.
3. Klicken Sie auf die Registerkarte „Listen“.
4. Klicken Sie neben der benötigten Liste auf den Link „bearbeiten“.
5. Tragen Sie die Internetadressen ohne Präfix wie http, https oder www in das Eingabefeld ein. Drücken Sie nach Eingabe jeder Adresse die Leertaste.

Beispiel:
poker.com xxx.com aggro.tv
Klicken Sie zum Speichern der Liste auf „Übernehmen“.

Jetzt sind die Filterlisten eingerichtet.

27.06.2022 - 01:34 [ RedHuntLabs.com ]

Millions of Secrets Exposed via Web Application Frontend – An Internet-Wide Study

(14.06.2022)

A very interesting highlight to notice here is that Google services, viz. Google reCAPTCHA, Google Cloud, and Google OAuth consumed a major portion – totaling almost 70% of the services where the secret exposure was the highest.

An eye-opening perspective regarding Phase 1 was that in spite of these domains in scope belonging to the top 1 million domains of the internet, the secret exposure was massive.

(…)

Since we majorly focused on the front-end, we anticipated that a majority of the exposures would be through the JavaScript files. Analyzing the results, we found out that almost 77% of the exposures occurred through the JavaScript files being used in the frontend code.

Since most of the JavaScript was being served through content delivery networks, we decided to map the exposures to their sources and extract out insights from our data. The highest number of exposures came from Squarespace CDN leading to over 197k exposures.

30.04.2022 - 18:37 [ Browserleaks.com ]

SSL/TLS Client Test

The page shows the SSL/TLS capabilities of your web browser, determines supported TLS protocols and cipher suites and marks if any of them are weak or insecure, displays a list of supported TLS extensions and key exchange groups

30.04.2022 - 18:17 [ itigic.com ]

So deaktivieren Sie alte TLS-Protokolle in Windows und Browsern

(01.02.2022)

Es gibt Internetprotokolle die vor ein paar Jahren sehr notwendig waren, um navigieren zu können, aber mit der Zeit unsicher und obsolet geworden sind. Dies geschieht mit den Protokollen SSL 3.0, TLS 1.0 und TLS 1.1. Nach und nach haben die meisten Browser sie verworfen, aber einige sind immer noch standardmäßig in aktiviert Windows. In diesem Artikel erklären wir, wie wir sie sowohl in Browsern als auch im System selbst deaktivieren können.