An open and Free DNS service for security and high privacy.
Block over 3.2M ads, tracking, malware, scam and phishing domains.
No Logging, dns0x20, No ECS, DNSSEC, DNS Cookies.
DNS IPv4: 174.138.21.128 / 188.166.206.224 – port 53 or port 5003
DNS IPv6: [2400:6180:0:d0::5f6e:4001] – port 53 or port 5003
DNS-over-HTTPS (DoH/DoH3 A+): How to
DNS-over-TLS (DoT): How to
Finlandiya‘da bulunan, hafif reklam engelleme ve zararlı alan adlarına karşı koruma sağlayan özyinelemeli bir DNS sunucusu. Çocuk sunucusu ayrıca çocuklar için zararlı olan siteleri de engeller. Kayıt verilerini 24 saat boyunca saklıyoruz. [ gizlilik politikası ]
خادم DNS تكراري موجود في فنلندا، يوفر حجبًا خفيفًا للإعلانات وحماية من النطاقات الضارة. كما يحجب خادم الأطفال المواقع الضارة بهم. نحتفظ بسجلات البيانات لمدة 24 ساعة. [ سياسة الخصوصية ]
A recursive DNS server located in Finland that offers lightweight ad blocking and protection against harmful domains. The Kids server also blocks sites that are harmful to children. We retain log data for 24 hours. [ privacy policy ]
PUBLIC
Filters ads and blocks access to phishing, spam, and malware sites.
DoH: https://public.ns.nwps.fi/dns-query
DoT: tls://public.ns.nwps.fi
DoQ: quic://public.ns.nwps.fi:853
IPv4: 95.217.11.63
IPv6: 2a01:4f9:c012:25a0::1
KIDS
Filters ads and blocks access to all adult, pornographic, and explicit websites. Malicious and phishing websites are also blocked.
DoH: https://kids.ns.nwps.fi/dns-query
DoT: tls://kids.ns.nwps.fi
DoQ: quic://kids.ns.nwps.fi:853
IPv4: 135.181.103.31
Pv6: 2a01:4f9:c011:aa31::1
PROTECTIVE
Protects against phishing and malware sites, but does not block ads.
DoH: https://protective.ns.nwps.fi/dns-query
DoT: tls://protective.ns.nwps.fi
DoQ: quic://protective.ns.nwps.fi:853
UNFILTERED
No filters. Allows all queries.
DoH: https://unfiltered.ns.nwps.fi/dns-query
DoT: tls://unfiltered.ns.nwps.fi
DoQ: quic://unfiltered.ns.nwps.fi:853
DoT (DNS over TLS) is a protocol that encrypts DNS queries using TLS (Transport Layer Security). It allows name service queries to travel over a separate, encrypted connection, preventing outsiders from seeing what websites a user is trying to access. DoT uses port 853 and provides strong privacy protection, especially on mobile devices and routers.
Your IP addresses: (…)
Your DNS resolvers: (…)
(Updated on March 12, 2022)
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(August 12, 2022)
By default, your home network likely relies on a DNS server provided by your internet provider. However, these servers aren’t always the fastest and, in some cases, may even allow your ISP to maliciously track your online behavior. To that end, if internet speed and privacy matter a lot, you should perhaps consider changing your DNS server.
The best way to change your DNS server is at the router level, which will affect every single device connected to it.
2026-04-05
04 (System) Document has expired
2025-10-02
04 周伯才 New version available: draft-zhou-tls-tls14-04.txt
2025-10-02
04 周伯才 New version accepted (logged-in submitter: 周伯才)
2025-10-02
04 周伯才 Uploaded new revision
2025-10-02
03 周伯才 Changed document external resources from:
(May 14, 2026)
Quantum processors can evaluate many possible solutions in parallel rather than sequentially. This capability has profound implications for cryptography. Today’s most widely deployed encryption schemes, RSA and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), can be broken and rendered obsolete by a quantum computer.
Everything from industrial IoT sensors and automotive control systems to cloud infrastructure and secure boot mechanisms relies on RSA or ECC for encryption today. When quantum computers reach the scale required to break these algorithms, that entire trust architecture collapses simultaneously.
Compounding the urgency is an attack vector already in use: Harvest now, decrypt later.
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
American Samoa
Andorra
Angola
Anguilla
Antarctica
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bermuda
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Cayman Islands
Chile
China
Colombia
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
French Polynesia
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Greenland
Grenada
Guadeloupe
Guam
Guatemala
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macao
Macedonia
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Martinique
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Niue
North Korea
Norway
Pakistan
Palestine
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Qatar
Reunion
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Samoa
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Turks and Caicos Islands
U.S. Virgin Islands
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Wallis and Futuna
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
(Updated on March 12, 2022)
Change DNS Server on Linksys
Change DNS Server on a NetGear Router
Change DNS Server on D-Link
Change DNS Server on Asus
Change DNS Server on TP-Link
Change DNS Server on Cisco
Change DNS Server on TRENDnet
Change DNS Server on Belkin
Change DNS Server on Buffalo
Change DNS Server on Google Wifi
(20.01.2024)
A Domain Name System (DNS) matches human-friendly domain names to computer-friendly IP addresses.
When you type in a domain name like cyberghost.com, for example, your web browser sends the request to your ISP via your router. Your ISP refers the request to its default DNS server. The DNS server then supplies the relevant IP address so your browser can load the appropriate page.
A DNS also saves a local copy or cache of sites you’ve recently visited on your device for quick and easy reference.
It seems like a streamlined service; what could go wrong? Check the following reasons why you should change your DNS.
Incorrect network configurations or faulty VPN/proxy software can lead to your device sending DNS requests directly to your ISP‘s server, potentially enabling ISPs or other third parties to monitor your online activity.
The DNS Leak Test is a tool used to determine which DNS servers your browser is using to resolve domain names. This test attempts to resolve 50 randomly generated domain names, of which 25 are IPv4-only and 25 are IPv6-only.
Jan. 7, 1958 – President Eisenhower requested funds to start ARPA.
(…)
– Early 1967 – Meeting of ARPA’s principal investigators in Ann Arbor, Michigan. Roberts (the director of the IPTO) put forward the idea of a computer network. Wes Clark introduced the idea of a subnetwork: small, identical computers all interconnected – “interface message processors (IMPs).” Engelbert volunteered to the Network Information Center (NIC).
– 1967 – Roberts published paper on ARPANET.
– End of 1967 – The Association for Computing Machinery’s computer conference in Gatliburg, Tennessee. Roberts presented his first paper on ARPANET and heard of work done by Donald Davies’ team at NPL and Paul Baran at RAND.
(…)
Summer 1975 – The Defense Communications Agency (DCA) took over the management of ARPANET.
(…)
– November 1983 – The rapid growth of the internet caused massive problems in bookkeeping. To deal with this problem a group including Jon Postel, Paul Mockapetris and Craig Partrige published RFC 882 which created the domain name system (DNS) to make Internet navigation easier. With DNS, users can type host names such as “USC-ISIF” instead of “10.2.0.52.” Every Address would have information from specific to general.
(January 16, 2026)
Everyone is equal on the Internet; at least that’s what many people optimistically thought at the beginning of the millennium. When it gradually found its way in the late 1950s from military think tanks into academia and then initially a small public sphere, the Internet was considered a utopia. Hidden behind the mask of anonymity, all users would be equal and therefore would all have equal rights. There would be no hierarchies – not even among users in different countries.
Yet this hope that the Internet would be a non-discriminatory space remains an illusion to this day. Quite to the contrary, power structures are already firmly established in its technical infrastructure. They continue the history of colonialism in the virtual sphere in the form of “digital” or “electronic colonialism.”
(January 16, 2026)
Im Internet sind alle gleich, so dachten noch zu Beginn des Millenniums viele Menschen hoffnungsvoll. Als es Ende der 1950er-Jahre von militärischen Thinktanks aus nach und nach in die Wissenschaft und eine zunächst noch kleine Öffentlichkeit fand, glich das Internet einer Utopie. Hinter der Maske der Anonymität sollten alle Nutzer*innen gleich sein und somit alle die gleichen Rechte haben. Keine Hierarchien – auch nicht zwischen den User*innen in verschiedenen Ländern.
Doch diese Hoffnung vom Internet als einem diskriminierungsfreien Raum bleibt bis heute eine Illusion. Im Gegenteil: Machtstrukturen sind schon in der technischen Infrastruktur fest angelegt. Sie führen die Geschichte des Kolonialismus auch in der virtuellen Sphäre fort: in Gestalt des „digitalen“ oder „elektronischen Kolonialismus“.
Das Programm (P20) [1] entwirft für die deutschen Polizeien eine „single digital network“-Architektur mit zentralem „data house“. Auf europäischer Ebene sind biometrische Interoperabilitätsdienste wie der Shared Biometric Matching Service (sBMS)[2], das Entry/Exit System (EES)[3] und das European Travel Information and Authorisation System (ETIAS)[4] Teil der Grenzverwaltung, das Identitäten, Reisen und Risiken schon vor der Bewegung selbst prüft (Interoperabilität ist die Fähigkeit unterschiedlicher IT-Systeme, Daten automatisiert, standardisiert und nahtlos auszutauschen sowie effektiv zusammenzuarbeiten). Parallel entstehen im zivilen Bereich Plattformen wie Telematikinfrastruktur (TI)[5], elektronische Patientenakte (ePA), Deutsches Elektronisches Melde- und Informationssystem für den Infektionsschutz (DEMIS) oder die Analyse- und Datenhaushalte der Bundesagentur für Arbeit (BA)[6]. Die operative Frage lautet deshalb nicht mehr, ob der Staat digital wird, sondern mit welcher Durchdringung er unser Leben überwacht, interpretiert und vorherzusagen versucht.
Afghanistan
Albania
Algeria
American Samoa
Andorra
Angola
Anguilla
Antarctica
Antigua and Barbuda
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahamas
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Barbados
Belarus
Belgium
Belize
Benin
Bermuda
Bhutan
Bolivia
Bosnia and Herzegovina
Botswana
Brazil
British Indian Ocean Territory
British Virgin Islands
Brunei
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Cape Verde
Cayman Islands
Chile
China
Colombia
Cook Islands
Costa Rica
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Djibouti
Dominica
Dominican Republic
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equatorial Guinea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
French Polynesia
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Greenland
Grenada
Guadeloupe
Guam
Guatemala
Guinea
Guyana
Haiti
Honduras
Hong Kong
Hungary
Iceland
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy
Ivory Coast
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lebanon
Liberia
Libya
Liechtenstein
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Macao
Macedonia
Malawi
Malaysia
Maldives
Mali
Malta
Marshall Islands
Martinique
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Micronesia
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Myanmar
Namibia
Nauru
Nepal
Netherlands
New Caledonia
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Nigeria
Niue
North Korea
Norway
Pakistan
Palestine
Panama
Papua New Guinea
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Puerto Rico
Qatar
Reunion
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
Saint Pierre and Miquelon
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines
Samoa
Sao Tome and Principe
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Seychelles
Singapore
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Suriname
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Taiwan
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Tonga
Trinidad and Tobago
Tunisia
Turkey
Turkmenistan
Turks and Caicos Islands
U.S. Virgin Islands
Uganda
Ukraine
United Arab Emirates
United Kingdom
United States
Uruguay
Uzbekistan
Vanuatu
Venezuela
Vietnam
Wallis and Futuna
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
(January 16, 2026)
Im Internet sind alle gleich, so dachten noch zu Beginn des Millenniums viele Menschen hoffnungsvoll. Als es Ende der 1950er-Jahre von militärischen Thinktanks aus nach und nach in die Wissenschaft und eine zunächst noch kleine Öffentlichkeit fand, glich das Internet einer Utopie. Hinter der Maske der Anonymität sollten alle Nutzer*innen gleich sein und somit alle die gleichen Rechte haben. Keine Hierarchien – auch nicht zwischen den User*innen in verschiedenen Ländern.
Doch diese Hoffnung vom Internet als einem diskriminierungsfreien Raum bleibt bis heute eine Illusion. Im Gegenteil: Machtstrukturen sind schon in der technischen Infrastruktur fest angelegt. Sie führen die Geschichte des Kolonialismus auch in der virtuellen Sphäre fort: in Gestalt des „digitalen“ oder „elektronischen Kolonialismus“.
(January 16, 2026)
Everyone is equal on the Internet; at least that’s what many people optimistically thought at the beginning of the millennium. When it gradually found its way in the late 1950s from military think tanks into academia and then initially a small public sphere, the Internet was considered a utopia. Hidden behind the mask of anonymity, all users would be equal and therefore would all have equal rights. There would be no hierarchies – not even among users in different countries.
Yet this hope that the Internet would be a non-discriminatory space remains an illusion to this day. Quite to the contrary, power structures are already firmly established in its technical infrastructure. They continue the history of colonialism in the virtual sphere in the form of “digital” or “electronic colonialism.”
(March 9, 2020)
Look at setting in panel.ini
rsa-key-size = 4096
here Managing Let’s Encrypt Settings
I hope it will help.
(February 4, 2026)
The National Security Agency’s CNSA 2.0 sets a compressed timeline for National Security Systems to adopt quantum–resistant cryptography, with key transition milestones beginning in 2027 and a full migration targeted by 2035. However, the “harvest now, decrypt later” threat makes immediate preparation critical. Adversaries can collect encrypted data today and decrypt it once quantum computers become capable.
(February 3, 2026)
This technical vulnerability facilitates „harvest now, decrypt later“ attacks. In these scenarios, malicious actors capture encrypted communications in the present to decrypt them once quantum hardware achieves the necessary stability and processing power.
The cybersecurity landscape faces a critical convergence between artificial intelligence and quantum computing. Nikesh Arora, CEO, Palo Alto Networks, says during the Quantum-Safe Summit that quantum technology is no longer a theoretical scientific project but an operational reality with documented success in stable computing tasks. The integration of these capabilities accelerates the decryption of traditional security protocols, which compromises sensitive government and industrial information.
Ein rekursiver DNS-Server in Finnland bietet einfachen Werbeblocker und Schutz vor schädlichen Domains. Der Kids-Server blockiert zudem Seiten, die für Kinder schädlich sind. Wir speichern die Protokolldaten 24 Stunden lang. [ Datenschutzerklärung ]
öffentlich
Filtert Anzeigen und blockiert den Zugriff auf Phishing-, Spam- und Malware-Sites.
DoH: https://public.ns.nwps.fi/dns-query
DoT: public.ns.nwps.fi
IPv4: 95.217.11.63
IPv6: 2a01:4f9:c012:25a0::1
Kinder
Filtert Werbung und blockiert den Zugriff auf alle Websites mit Erwachsenenunterhaltung, pornografischen und expliziten Inhalten. Auch schädliche und Phishing-Websites werden blockiert.
DoH: https://kids.ns.nwps.fi/dns-query
DoT: kids.ns.nwps.fi
IPv4: 135.181.103.31
IPv6: 2a01:4f9:c011:aa31::1
A recursive DNS server located in Finland that offers lightweight ad blocking and protection against harmful domains. The Kids server also blocks sites that are harmful to children. We retain log data for 24 hours. [ privacy policy ]
public
Filters ads and blocks access to phishing, spam, and malware sites.
DoH: https://public.ns.nwps.fi/dns-query
DoT: public.ns.nwps.fi
IPv4: 95.217.11.63
IPv6: 2a01:4f9:c012:25a0::1
children
Filters ads and blocks access to all adult entertainment, pornographic and explicit sites. Malicious and phishing sites are also blocked.
DoH: https://kids.ns.nwps.fi/dns-query
DoT: kids.ns.nwps.fi
IPv4: 135.181.103.31
IPv6: 2a01:4f9:c011:aa31
(2025-03-15) Information importante pour l’utilisation de nos serveurs DNS : renforcement des protections des serveurs DNS récursifs ouverts de FDN
Pour lutter contre la censure sur Internet, FDN fait le choix de mettre à disposition de toutes et tous des résolveurs DNS récursifs ouverts.
Ils sont disponibles aux adresses IPv4 et IPv6 suivantes :
ns0.fdn.fr : 80.67.169.12 ou 2001:910:800::12 (validation DNSSEC)
ns1.fdn.fr : 80.67.169.40 ou 2001:910:800::40 (validation DNSSEC)
DoT et DoH sont désormais également disponibles :
DoT : ns0.fdn.fr et ns1.fdn.fr sur le port TCP/853