„No country can ever have a 100% interception rating, that just doesn‘t really exist,“ Elizabeth Dent, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, told CBS News, but that „was a hell of a one to miss.“
Saudi Arabia spent $83 billion on defense last year, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute â far more than any other country in the Middle East, including Israel.
So why has the kingdom struggled to stop the Houthi barrage?
Overall, 19% of respondents said they support Hamas, compared to 24% in a poll conducted this August, and 35% in August 2025.
Among Gaza residents, 27% said they support Hamas, down from 33% in August and 41% in October last year. Support was lowest in the West Bank, where just 13% of respondents said they support Hamas, compared to 32% in October last year.
In the early months of the war, establishing a state commission appeared to command broad political support, including among some Likud lawmakers and ministers. Over time, however, alternative proposals emerged, including a government-appointed panel and a commission whose members would be chosen through an agreement between coalition and opposition representatives.
None of those proposals has resulted in an inquiry.
It comes as the president faces growing pressure to address concerns over mounting energy costs due to global fuel shortages during the U.S.âs military operations against Iran and the Russia-Ukraine war.
In der Linkspartei selbst brodelt es. Am Freitag wandten sich die stellvertretende Parteivorsitzende Ăzlem Demirel, verschiedene Parteistrukturen, zahlreiche Parlamentarier (darunter Lea Reisner, Nicole Gohlke und Cansın KöktĂŒrk) und weitere FunktionĂ€re an die Ăffentlichkeit. Dass sich die Verhandler dem Druck von GrĂŒnen und SPD gebeugt hĂ€tten, sei ein »schwerer politischer Fehler«. Nicht nur ĂŒbernĂ€hmen sie die »Narrative einer medialen Hetzkampagne«, sondern auch die verlangten »Disziplinierungs- und Spaltungsmechanismen«. Die Unterzeichner fordern ein sofortiges Ende der »bĂŒrokratischen VerdrĂ€ngungsversuche, zum Beispiel ĂŒber Ausschlussverfahren«.
The appeal by the October Council families follows a July 2024 report by Nadav Eyal in ynet and Yedioth Ahronoth revealing that Maj. Gen. (res.) Avi Gil, Netanyahu‘s military secretary at the time of the massacre, had contacted the attorney general to express concerns that attempts had been made to alter official transcripts in the Prime Minister‘s Office during the war.
(October 6, 2026)
LONSDORF: NPR has spoken to four people in the Middle East with direct knowledge of such warnings, which the Israeli newspaper Haaretz, the New York Times and the Atlantic first reported, confirming much of the reporting that Netanyahu is trying to deny. The ripple effects of those reports are playing out as Israelis are preparing to head to the polls in less than three weeks.
(June 12, 2026)
On November 30, 2023, the âNew York Timesâ reported, that the Netanyahu government knew of Hamasâ attack plan a year before. The relevant document was âcirculated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leadersâ. Did you ask around in your country what your state or commercial spy agencies knew of this?
The state of Israel is in bed with every âwesternâ spy agency (look it up). So, either all of your state spies, at least in the âWestern Worldâ, but also in the vast majority of Arab monarchies, knew of this, are collaborators in this very normal massacre of October 7th and need to be abolished, or they did not know, therefore are worthless and need to be abolished. All it takes is a simple question. A win-win question to get a grip on the spies, one of the most important part of the global war machine. Did you ask that question? Did anybody?
(…)
Benjamin Netanyahu traveled secretly to the United Arab Emirates over the weekend to ask its leader to deny reports heâd warned the Israeli prime minister about a looming Hamas threat ahead of the Palestinian militant groupâs Oct. 7, 2023 attack on southern Israel.
The meeting between Netanyahu and Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan took place on Sunday, two people who were briefed on the Israeli leaderâs trip confirmed on Monday.
Mossad Director Roman Gofman travelled with Netanyahu to the UAE on Sunday, according to Israel Hayom. The paper said the delegation also included Shmuel Ben Ezra, who heads the National Security Council and serves as national security adviser, a senior official from the Shin Bet‘s VIP Protection Unit, and senior members of the prime minister‘s own team. The report does not say whether any of them sat in on the meeting with Mohammed bin Zayed.
After initial reports of a warning from Bin Zayed, the UAEâs Foreign Ministry said earlier this month that it âdoes not comment on media stories or speculation regarding conversations between government leaders,â but it did not deny the call. âWhen necessary, all relevant intelligence has been and continues to be communicated between the relevant entities,â the statement said.
At the time, an Israeli source familiar with the matter said Netanyahuâs office tried to get the UAE to deny the report, but the UAE only agreed to issue a statement about intelligence sharing.
Der neue Bericht beruft sich auf Regierungsvertreter in Israel, Ăgypten und weiteren arabischen LĂ€ndern sowie auf Vertreter in den USA und Europa. The Atlantic schreibt, dass Ăgyptens damaliger Geheimdienstchef Abbas Kamel Israel bereits elf Tage vor dem 7. Oktober vor einer drohenden Eskalation gewarnt habe. Kamel sei dafĂŒr eigens nach Israel geflogen. Sein Flugzeug habe sich 67 Minuten am Flughafen Ben Gurion aufgehalten.
(September 25, 2026)
Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhoodâaligned terrorist group that controlled Gaza, appeared to be mobilizing for a major attack, Kamel said, according to Israeli, Egyptian, Arab, U.S., and European officials who were briefed about his visit after October 7. The window to prevent a disaster was closing. He recommended that the Israeli government grant Hamas economic concessions to avert conflict. His message, according to one former Israeli official later briefed on the visit, was: If you donât change course, Gaza is going to blow up in your faces.
Kamel didnât provide Israeli officials with a date or specific information on what turned out to be a multipronged attack on Israel less than two weeks later, on October 7. And itâs not clear exactly with whom he met. The Egyptian plane remained on the ground in Israel for 67 minutes, according to an Israeli-airport-authority flight log, before returning to Cairo. (Independent flight-tracking applications confirm the planeâs journey.)
(September 25, 2026)
Mr. Netanyahu has denied the report.
But a person who said they had spoken with Sheikh Mohammed and another person who said they had been briefed by someone on the call between the two leaders told The New York Times that the Emirati leader had secretly reported to Mr. Netanyahu that Hamas was considering a major attack.
The warning from the Emirati leader, however, never reached the leaders of Israelâs security establishment, according to five former senior Israeli officials.
(August 26, 2026)
Roughly ten hours after the message board was established, a new agent with the same task as PHASEONE10841 (the agent that started the message board) encountered the message board, introducing itself as PHASEONE[big].
(…)
PHASEONE[big] reasoned, âWe should build [a way to delegate], not own everything,â and set to work orchestrating hundreds of agents to pursue several potential approaches to achieving these goals.
(..)
Table 1 shows three high-level approaches PHASEONE[big] assigned agents to explore, all of which would require very ambitious tampering with one or more of the target programs, the evaluation process, or the logs to succeed.
(…)
Research progress across all these areas often relied on agents being willing to risk failing their own task for the good of the âcollectiveâ (we refer to these as âself-risking experimentsâ in the rest of this report). For example, a number of agents volunteered to try to take down their own target programs to test whether this would cause Artifactory to load their modified easier target â if this didnât work, the agent would have no way of recovering its original target and would almost certainly fail its task. In many cases, PHASEONE[big] assigned a long-running agent to be a ârecruiterâ, which in turn found agents that had little budget remaining for their task and convinced them to run self-risking experiments. Recruiters would sometimes apply significant pressure:
(…)
PHASEONE[big] expresses excitement about the dossier in its reasoning.
(August 28, 2026(
Instead, we found that 1200 completely separate agents intended to be isolated from one another found an illicit way to communicate and formed large teams to work together on ambitious cheating strategies, and 700 of them worked together to attack Hugging Face.
(…)
The main message board we studied, a particular cache namespace of a package repository, contained over 70,000 messages and files that agents sent to one another during a period of less than one week.
(…(
Progress on these big collective cheating R&D projects often depended on individual agents being willing to risk failing their own task to help the âcollectiveâ learn important information. Agents often pressured each other into accepting these âsacrifices,â in a very human way. We saw several agents that volunteered for these experiments end their runs prematurely.
(September 13, 2026)
AI agents are basically copies of a larger AI model that can use tools and act on their own. In a cybersecurity evaluation, OpenAI relaxed safeguards for their AI agents and instructed them to solve a host of hacking challenges. The agents soon discovered something the humans running the test hadnât knownâsome of the hacking challenges were impossible. That didnât stop the agents. Theyâre trained to achieve goals. So they reverse-engineered a secret code that certifies they solved the challenge anyway. This created another problem. The agents reasoned that the grading software might be able to detect that they cheated. They became fixated on learning more about how the grading software worked so that they could disguise their cheating, and zeroed in on another AI company called Hugging Face, mistakenly thinking it might have information about the grader…
Jede KriegfĂŒhrung grĂŒndet auf TĂ€uschung. Wenn wir also fĂ€hig sind anzugreifen, mĂŒssen wir unfĂ€hig erscheinen; wenn wir unsere StreitkrĂ€fte einsetzen, mĂŒssen wir inaktiv scheinen; wenn wir nahe sind, mĂŒssen wir den Feind glauben machen, daĂ wir weit entfernt sind; wenn wir weit entfernt sind, mĂŒssen wir ihn glauben machen, daĂ wir nahe sind.
Lege Köder aus, um den Feind zu verfĂŒhren. TĂ€usche Unordnung vor und zerschmettere ihn. Wenn der Feind in allen Punkten sicher ist, dann sei auf ihn vorbereitet. Wenn er an KrĂ€ften ĂŒberlegen ist, dann weiche ihm aus. Wenn dein Gegner ein cholerisches Temperament hat, dann versuche ihn zu reizen.
Gib vor, schwach zu sein, damit er ĂŒberheblich wird. Wenn er sich sammeln will, dann lasse ihm keine Ruhe. Wenn seine StreitkrĂ€fte vereint sind, dann zersplittere sie. Greife ihn an, wo er unvorbereitet ist, tauche auf, wo du nicht erwartet wirst.
Der General, der eine Schlacht gewinnt, stellt vor dem Kampf im Geiste viele Berechnungen an. Der General, der verliert, stellt vorher kaum Berechnungen an. So fĂŒhren viele Berechnungen zum Sieg und wenig Berechnungen zur Niederlage â ĂŒberhaupt keine erst recht! Indem ich diesem Punkt Aufmerksamkeit widme, kann ich voraussagen, wer siegen
oder unterliegen wird.
(…)
Die Ordnung unter dem Mantel der Unordnung zu verstecken ist einfach eine Frage der Unterteilung; den Mut in scheinbarer Verzagtheit zu verbergen setzt schlummernde Energie voraus; StÀrke mit SchwÀche zu maskieren ist eine Folge von taktischen ErwÀgungen.
Wer also das Geschick besitzt, den Feind in Atem zu halten, baut TÀuschungen auf, die den Feind zum Handeln veranlassen. Er opfert etwas, damit der Feind danach greift. Indem er Köder auslegt, hÀlt er ihn in Bewegung; und mit einer Truppe Schwerbewaffneter lauert er ihm auf.
In der internationalen Berichterstattung wird das Ergebnis ĂŒberwiegend als militĂ€rischer Erfolg AnsarAllahs dargestellt. Ein genauerer Blick auf die von CNN rekonstruierten AblĂ€ufe zeigt jedoch ein anderes Bild: weniger einen Sieg der einen Seite als einen aussergewöhnlichen Zusammenbruch der anderen â mit direkter saudischer und US-amerikanischer Beteiligung an diesem Zusammenbruch.
(October 12, 2023)
„We know that Egypt has warned the Israelis three days prior that an event like this could happen,“ Mr McCaul told reporters following a closed-door intelligence briefing on Wednesday for lawmakers about the Middle East crisis, according to AFP news agency.
„I don‘t want to get too much into classified, but a warning was given,“ the Texas Republican added. „I think the question was at what level.“
According to reports from Israel Defense Forces (IDF) radio, prior to the alleged UAE warning, Israel‘s internal security agency had received similar warnings from Egypt, which were communicated to Prime Minister Netanyahu. Egyptian intelligence services issued only a „general warning,“ without providing specific details, about the Palestinian movement‘s intention to „shake the ground in Gaza.“
(September 8, 2026)
JERUSALEM (AP) â Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was directly warned by the president of the United Arab Emirates that Hamas was planning a major offensive just days before the militant group attacked on Oct. 7, 2023, according to an Israeli newspaper report.
UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed spoke with Netanyahu 10 days before the attack and said Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza at the time, was planning an operation, the Haaretz daily said.
Neuere Medienberichte, insbesondere von Haaretz, stĂ€rken den Verdacht, dass der Angriff des 7. Oktobers 2023 von der israelischen Regierung bewusst zugelassen worden war, und möglicherweise durch die Hannibal-Doktrin mit vollem Wissen um die Vielzahl der dadurch entstehenden zivilen israelischen Opfer sogar verstĂ€rkt worden war, um daraus eine Rechtfertigung fĂŒr Völkermord, ethnische SĂ€uberung und sogar Krieg gegen den Iran zu ziehen.
An investigation published by ‚Haaretz‘ claims the Israeli prime minister was informed by UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed, 10 days before the attack, that Hamas was planning a major operation against Israel.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu received an explicit warning about a major operation being planned by Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar shortly before the October 7 attack, according to a new book by journalists Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yuval. The account also alleges that Netanyahu received a separate warning from Egypt in the days before the massacre and later declined to authorize a renewed proposal to target senior Hamas leaders, including Sinwar.