Benjamin Netanyahu traveled secretly to the United Arab Emirates over the weekend to ask its leader to deny reports heâd warned the Israeli prime minister about a looming Hamas threat ahead of the Palestinian militant groupâs Oct. 7, 2023 attack on southern Israel.
The meeting between Netanyahu and Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan took place on Sunday, two people who were briefed on the Israeli leaderâs trip confirmed on Monday.
Mossad Director Roman Gofman travelled with Netanyahu to the UAE on Sunday, according to Israel Hayom. The paper said the delegation also included Shmuel Ben Ezra, who heads the National Security Council and serves as national security adviser, a senior official from the Shin Bet‘s VIP Protection Unit, and senior members of the prime minister‘s own team. The report does not say whether any of them sat in on the meeting with Mohammed bin Zayed.
After initial reports of a warning from Bin Zayed, the UAEâs Foreign Ministry said earlier this month that it âdoes not comment on media stories or speculation regarding conversations between government leaders,â but it did not deny the call. âWhen necessary, all relevant intelligence has been and continues to be communicated between the relevant entities,â the statement said.
At the time, an Israeli source familiar with the matter said Netanyahuâs office tried to get the UAE to deny the report, but the UAE only agreed to issue a statement about intelligence sharing.
Der neue Bericht beruft sich auf Regierungsvertreter in Israel, Ăgypten und weiteren arabischen LĂ€ndern sowie auf Vertreter in den USA und Europa. The Atlantic schreibt, dass Ăgyptens damaliger Geheimdienstchef Abbas Kamel Israel bereits elf Tage vor dem 7. Oktober vor einer drohenden Eskalation gewarnt habe. Kamel sei dafĂŒr eigens nach Israel geflogen. Sein Flugzeug habe sich 67 Minuten am Flughafen Ben Gurion aufgehalten.
(September 25, 2026)
Hamas, the Muslim Brotherhoodâaligned terrorist group that controlled Gaza, appeared to be mobilizing for a major attack, Kamel said, according to Israeli, Egyptian, Arab, U.S., and European officials who were briefed about his visit after October 7. The window to prevent a disaster was closing. He recommended that the Israeli government grant Hamas economic concessions to avert conflict. His message, according to one former Israeli official later briefed on the visit, was: If you donât change course, Gaza is going to blow up in your faces.
Kamel didnât provide Israeli officials with a date or specific information on what turned out to be a multipronged attack on Israel less than two weeks later, on October 7. And itâs not clear exactly with whom he met. The Egyptian plane remained on the ground in Israel for 67 minutes, according to an Israeli-airport-authority flight log, before returning to Cairo. (Independent flight-tracking applications confirm the planeâs journey.)
(September 25, 2026)
Mr. Netanyahu has denied the report.
But a person who said they had spoken with Sheikh Mohammed and another person who said they had been briefed by someone on the call between the two leaders told The New York Times that the Emirati leader had secretly reported to Mr. Netanyahu that Hamas was considering a major attack.
The warning from the Emirati leader, however, never reached the leaders of Israelâs security establishment, according to five former senior Israeli officials.
(August 26, 2026)
Roughly ten hours after the message board was established, a new agent with the same task as PHASEONE10841 (the agent that started the message board) encountered the message board, introducing itself as PHASEONE[big].
(…)
PHASEONE[big] reasoned, âWe should build [a way to delegate], not own everything,â and set to work orchestrating hundreds of agents to pursue several potential approaches to achieving these goals.
(..)
Table 1 shows three high-level approaches PHASEONE[big] assigned agents to explore, all of which would require very ambitious tampering with one or more of the target programs, the evaluation process, or the logs to succeed.
(…)
Research progress across all these areas often relied on agents being willing to risk failing their own task for the good of the âcollectiveâ (we refer to these as âself-risking experimentsâ in the rest of this report). For example, a number of agents volunteered to try to take down their own target programs to test whether this would cause Artifactory to load their modified easier target â if this didnât work, the agent would have no way of recovering its original target and would almost certainly fail its task. In many cases, PHASEONE[big] assigned a long-running agent to be a ârecruiterâ, which in turn found agents that had little budget remaining for their task and convinced them to run self-risking experiments. Recruiters would sometimes apply significant pressure:
(…)
PHASEONE[big] expresses excitement about the dossier in its reasoning.
(August 28, 2026(
Instead, we found that 1200 completely separate agents intended to be isolated from one another found an illicit way to communicate and formed large teams to work together on ambitious cheating strategies, and 700 of them worked together to attack Hugging Face.
(…)
The main message board we studied, a particular cache namespace of a package repository, contained over 70,000 messages and files that agents sent to one another during a period of less than one week.
(…(
Progress on these big collective cheating R&D projects often depended on individual agents being willing to risk failing their own task to help the âcollectiveâ learn important information. Agents often pressured each other into accepting these âsacrifices,â in a very human way. We saw several agents that volunteered for these experiments end their runs prematurely.
(September 13, 2026)
AI agents are basically copies of a larger AI model that can use tools and act on their own. In a cybersecurity evaluation, OpenAI relaxed safeguards for their AI agents and instructed them to solve a host of hacking challenges. The agents soon discovered something the humans running the test hadnât knownâsome of the hacking challenges were impossible. That didnât stop the agents. Theyâre trained to achieve goals. So they reverse-engineered a secret code that certifies they solved the challenge anyway. This created another problem. The agents reasoned that the grading software might be able to detect that they cheated. They became fixated on learning more about how the grading software worked so that they could disguise their cheating, and zeroed in on another AI company called Hugging Face, mistakenly thinking it might have information about the grader…
Jede KriegfĂŒhrung grĂŒndet auf TĂ€uschung. Wenn wir also fĂ€hig sind anzugreifen, mĂŒssen wir unfĂ€hig erscheinen; wenn wir unsere StreitkrĂ€fte einsetzen, mĂŒssen wir inaktiv scheinen; wenn wir nahe sind, mĂŒssen wir den Feind glauben machen, daĂ wir weit entfernt sind; wenn wir weit entfernt sind, mĂŒssen wir ihn glauben machen, daĂ wir nahe sind.
Lege Köder aus, um den Feind zu verfĂŒhren. TĂ€usche Unordnung vor und zerschmettere ihn. Wenn der Feind in allen Punkten sicher ist, dann sei auf ihn vorbereitet. Wenn er an KrĂ€ften ĂŒberlegen ist, dann weiche ihm aus. Wenn dein Gegner ein cholerisches Temperament hat, dann versuche ihn zu reizen.
Gib vor, schwach zu sein, damit er ĂŒberheblich wird. Wenn er sich sammeln will, dann lasse ihm keine Ruhe. Wenn seine StreitkrĂ€fte vereint sind, dann zersplittere sie. Greife ihn an, wo er unvorbereitet ist, tauche auf, wo du nicht erwartet wirst.
Der General, der eine Schlacht gewinnt, stellt vor dem Kampf im Geiste viele Berechnungen an. Der General, der verliert, stellt vorher kaum Berechnungen an. So fĂŒhren viele Berechnungen zum Sieg und wenig Berechnungen zur Niederlage â ĂŒberhaupt keine erst recht! Indem ich diesem Punkt Aufmerksamkeit widme, kann ich voraussagen, wer siegen
oder unterliegen wird.
(…)
Die Ordnung unter dem Mantel der Unordnung zu verstecken ist einfach eine Frage der Unterteilung; den Mut in scheinbarer Verzagtheit zu verbergen setzt schlummernde Energie voraus; StÀrke mit SchwÀche zu maskieren ist eine Folge von taktischen ErwÀgungen.
Wer also das Geschick besitzt, den Feind in Atem zu halten, baut TÀuschungen auf, die den Feind zum Handeln veranlassen. Er opfert etwas, damit der Feind danach greift. Indem er Köder auslegt, hÀlt er ihn in Bewegung; und mit einer Truppe Schwerbewaffneter lauert er ihm auf.
In der internationalen Berichterstattung wird das Ergebnis ĂŒberwiegend als militĂ€rischer Erfolg AnsarAllahs dargestellt. Ein genauerer Blick auf die von CNN rekonstruierten AblĂ€ufe zeigt jedoch ein anderes Bild: weniger einen Sieg der einen Seite als einen aussergewöhnlichen Zusammenbruch der anderen â mit direkter saudischer und US-amerikanischer Beteiligung an diesem Zusammenbruch.
(October 12, 2023)
„We know that Egypt has warned the Israelis three days prior that an event like this could happen,“ Mr McCaul told reporters following a closed-door intelligence briefing on Wednesday for lawmakers about the Middle East crisis, according to AFP news agency.
„I don‘t want to get too much into classified, but a warning was given,“ the Texas Republican added. „I think the question was at what level.“
According to reports from Israel Defense Forces (IDF) radio, prior to the alleged UAE warning, Israel‘s internal security agency had received similar warnings from Egypt, which were communicated to Prime Minister Netanyahu. Egyptian intelligence services issued only a „general warning,“ without providing specific details, about the Palestinian movement‘s intention to „shake the ground in Gaza.“
(September 8, 2026)
JERUSALEM (AP) â Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu was directly warned by the president of the United Arab Emirates that Hamas was planning a major offensive just days before the militant group attacked on Oct. 7, 2023, according to an Israeli newspaper report.
UAE President Mohammed bin Zayed spoke with Netanyahu 10 days before the attack and said Yahya Sinwar, the leader of Hamas in Gaza at the time, was planning an operation, the Haaretz daily said.
Neuere Medienberichte, insbesondere von Haaretz, stĂ€rken den Verdacht, dass der Angriff des 7. Oktobers 2023 von der israelischen Regierung bewusst zugelassen worden war, und möglicherweise durch die Hannibal-Doktrin mit vollem Wissen um die Vielzahl der dadurch entstehenden zivilen israelischen Opfer sogar verstĂ€rkt worden war, um daraus eine Rechtfertigung fĂŒr Völkermord, ethnische SĂ€uberung und sogar Krieg gegen den Iran zu ziehen.
An investigation published by ‚Haaretz‘ claims the Israeli prime minister was informed by UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed, 10 days before the attack, that Hamas was planning a major operation against Israel.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu received an explicit warning about a major operation being planned by Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar shortly before the October 7 attack, according to a new book by journalists Shlomi Eldar and Ruth Yuval. The account also alleges that Netanyahu received a separate warning from Egypt in the days before the massacre and later declined to authorize a renewed proposal to target senior Hamas leaders, including Sinwar.
Der Inhalt des Berichts hat es in sich: 45 Minuten lang soll der PrĂ€sident der Vereinigten Arabischen Emirate, Mohammed bin Zayed, Ende September 2023 mit Israels Premierminister Benjamin Netanjahu telefoniert haben. Eindringlich habe er in dem GesprĂ€ch vor einem bevorstehenden GroĂangriff der Hamas gewarnt – und das nur anderthalb Wochen vor dem 7. Oktober 2023. Also vor dem Tag, an dem die Hamas Israel ĂŒberfiel, fast 1.200 Menschen tötete und etwa 250 als Geiseln nahm.
(March 13, 1962)
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A „Remember the Maine“ incident could be arranged in several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to „evacuate“ remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
(19. November 1997)
âWe could blow up a US warship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba,â the memorandum said.
âWe could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington,â it continued. âThe terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated).â
The records show that on March 13, 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed these ideas as âsuitable for planning purposes.â No evidence exists that they were carried out.
(May 31, 2026)
On October 7, the Israeli government issued video Hannibal Directive orders which led Apache helicopter pilots and tank gunners to take aim at Israelâs own citizens in the Gaza envelope, supposedly to prevent them from being taken hostage. Israeli Brig. Gen. Barak Hiram personally ordered a tank crew to shell a home in Kibbutz Beâeri, knowing it was filled with Israeli citizens who had been taken captive by Hamas fighters seeking to negotiate a way out of the standoff. A dozen Israelis were killed in the strike, leaving behind âa house full of corpses,â according to the lone Israeli survivor. One Israeli tank gunner from an all-female unit similarly revealed that she was ordered to shell Israeli homes without knowing who was inside. An Israeli police investigation subsequently revealed that Israeli helicopters shelled the Nova Electronic Music festival on October 7.
Given Israelâs track record of targeting its own citizens on October 7 and misleading the public about it, the Israeli state might be holding on to as much video as possible to ensure no further evidence of the Israeli army massacring its own citizens is made public.
Netanyahu has faced a tumultuous term since returning to power in December 2022 at the helm of âthe most right-wing coalition in Israeli history. He faced mass anti-government protests before âthe wars in Gaza, Lebanon and Iran.
Polls have repeatedly indicated that his coalition would fail to âwin â a majority at the next election. A poll published by the Jerusalem-based Israel Democracy Institute think tank on June 9 said that 61% of the Israeli public believe he should not run.
„I don‘t know,“ Trump said when questioned about whether Netanyahu would lead Israelâs upcoming election. „He‘s had an incredible career. Does he want to continue? Because, you know, he‘s a wartime prime minister. We‘re going to win this war very soon, one way or another, and he‘s a wartime prime minister.“
Trump explicitly framed the long-serving Israeli leader‘s future as uncertain, signaling that Washington may already be preparing for a post-Netanyahu political landscape. „It‘s an open question whether Netanyahu will run again,“ Trump remarked to reporters. „I wonder if Bibi even wants to continue.
(November 30, 2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamasâs capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli militaryâs Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamasâs intentions were unclear.
âIt is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,â read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
(December 16, 2023)
Israeli leaders believed that Hamas was more interested in governing than fighting. By the time the agents discovered the ledgers in 2018, the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was encouraging the government of Qatar to deliver millions of dollars to the Gaza Strip. He gambled that the money would buy stability and peace.
Mr. Levy recalled briefing Mr. Netanyahu personally in 2015 about the Hamas portfolio.
Press TV‘s investigation found the American attempt to be an extremely high-risk move that could have easily turned into a disaster for the United States and its military.
The destroyers were only a few minutes away from complete destruction after Iranian cruise missiles locked onto the vessel and attack drones were deployed.
When the two destroyers and the accompanying fleet reached the mouth of the Persian Gulf, Iran‘s cruise missiles locked onto them, and the destroyers were given only 30-minutes to turn back. The vessels immediately retreated.
They had attempted to use electronic warfare tactics, including turning off its position reporting system, in a bid to deceive the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC) naval forces.
(today)
Now, Hezbollah can continue to fire rockets across the border, and it has been doing that. Hezbollah has also been trying to slow Israelâs ground invasion in the south. But as you can see, Israel is the one that has the upper hand. It controls the skies, it can cause death, it can cause destruction, and this is all heaping pressure on the population and on the Lebanese government.
Hezbollah was counting on Iran having the leverage to silence this front, but that has not happened yet, despite statements from Iranian officials.
(March 2, 2026)
In the pre-dawn hours of Monday morning, Hezbollah opened a new front in the US-Israeli war against Iran when it launched âmissiles and a swarm of dronesâ at a military base in northern Israel.
The Iran-backed militant group, which has its power base in southern Lebanon, called it revenge for the killing of Iranâs Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Never mind that Israel says the attack did no damage. One projectile was intercepted, while others fell in open areas.
Or that Lebanonâs Prime Minister Nawaf Salam called it âan irresponsible and suspicious act,â and banned Hezbollahâs military activities.
Israel has been poised for this moment for months.