He now has the political capital for negotiations that could set the country‘s next budget and allow him to continue to call the shots for at least another year in the multi-front regional war Israel is fighting.
„He feels he is winning,“ one of Netanyahu‘s aides told Axios.
The six-time prime minister will outlast President Biden, who has largely failed in his attempts to contain the conflict in the Middle East and rein in Netanyahu.
Even more surprising is the Israeli public’s near-total embrace over the last three weeks of Netanyahu’s declared desire to prosecute a war for “total victory”. Prior to this, hundreds of thousands of people were out on the streets, demanding a “deal now” and accusing the prime minister of prolonging the war for his own ends.
Now, it seems the majority of Israel’s Jewish public, from Ben Gvir supporters to fans of the centre-left Zionist Yair Golan, wants a never-ending war. Even the first casualties from the ground invasion of Lebanon are not shifting this support – at least so far.
“Since October of last year, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq has carried out more than 160 operations targeting the Israeli interior and the occupied areas in the Golan Heights, most of which Israel has not acknowledged for various reasons,” Kadhim al-Fartousi, a leader of Kataeb Sayyid al-Shuhadaa and the group’s spokesman, told MEE.
“The resistance announces the operations it carries out as soon as they happen. The resistance did not announce this operation or claim responsibility for it as was reported,” he added.
“If we had carried it out, we would have announced it.”
(March 13, 1962)
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A „Remember the Maine“ incident could be arranged in several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to „evacuate“ remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
(November 30, 2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
(December 16, 2023)
Israeli leaders believed that Hamas was more interested in governing than fighting. By the time the agents discovered the ledgers in 2018, the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was encouraging the government of Qatar to deliver millions of dollars to the Gaza Strip. He gambled that the money would buy stability and peace.
Mr. Levy recalled briefing Mr. Netanyahu personally in 2015 about the Hamas portfolio.
Despite presiding over numerous failures – including Iran, the economy, the cost of living and October 7 – Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu is still worshipped by over a quarter of Israelis. The gap between his failings and his support has all the attributes of a cult
The Prime Minister‘s Office denied these allegations, saying: „Prime Minister Netanyahu did not receive a warning about the war in Gaza not on the date in question not before October 7. On the contrary, all security officials made it clear that Hamas is deterred and strives to reach an agreement. Also, a few days before October 7, the Shin Bet assessed that Gaza‘s stability is expected to be maintained for a long time.“
The Shin Bet did not comment on the Prime Minister Office‘s response.
In the weeks that followed, Lapid continued, he viewed classified intelligence provided to the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that indicated that deterrence had indeed eroded. He also viewed highly classified material made available to him as a former prime minister. On September 18, 2023, there was “a further warning. For me, what was written there was unmistakable: Israel’s deterrence has eroded dramatically; our enemies think they have a rare opportunity to harm us,” Lapid said.
“During the months leading up to the disaster, the prime minister and cabinet ministers received a series of serious, unprecedented warnings. From the middle of 2023 there were more and more voices within the terrorist organizations that said that the moment they had been waiting for had arrived,” he says.
Lapid recalls asking Bar “if these warnings were also brought before the prime minister and cabinet ministers, and the answer was: ‘Of course they were.‘”
„I want to refute the statement that is made time and time again by the current government that, somehow, the political echelon was not aware that Hamas was not deterred,“ Lapid told the paper.
„It was indeed informed. I was informed,“ he said, adding that the intelligence material he saw „was of course, also seen by the prime minister and ministers of the Cabinet.“
„It was clear what they [Hamas] wanted,“ he said.
In a heated exchange, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and opposition leader Yair Lapid clashed over the handling of Hamas’ October 7 attack. Lapid accused Netanyahu of ignoring critical warnings that eroded national security, claiming the PM failed to act despite knowing a violent eruption was looming. In response, Netanyahu fired back, accusing Lapid of ‚spreading lies.‘ Watch for more.
(16.12.2023)
Israeli leaders believed that Hamas was more interested in governing than fighting. By the time the agents discovered the ledgers in 2018, the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was encouraging the government of Qatar to deliver millions of dollars to the Gaza Strip. He gambled that the money would buy stability and peace.
Mr. Levy recalled briefing Mr. Netanyahu personally in 2015 about the Hamas portfolio.
(30.11.2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
(28.01.2024)
(16.12.2023)
Israeli leaders believed that Hamas was more interested in governing than fighting. By the time the agents discovered the ledgers in 2018, the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was encouraging the government of Qatar to deliver millions of dollars to the Gaza Strip. He gambled that the money would buy stability and peace.
Mr. Levy recalled briefing Mr. Netanyahu personally in 2015 about the Hamas portfolio.
(30.11.2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
However, the report says that even though the documents were shared in Jerusalem and Washington, nothing was done to disrupt the operations.
“Everyone is talking about failures of intelligence on Oct. 7, but no one is talking about the failure to stop the money,” Udi Levy, a former chief of Mossad’s economic warfare division, tells the paper “It’s the money — the money — that allowed this.”
The report says that the funds totaled some $500 million.
Levy says he briefed Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in 2015 about Hamas’s finances.
Israeli leaders believed that Hamas was more interested in governing than fighting. By the time the agents discovered the ledgers in 2018, the prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was encouraging the government of Qatar to deliver millions of dollars to the Gaza Strip. He gambled that the money would buy stability and peace.
Mr. Levy recalled briefing Mr. Netanyahu personally in 2015 about the Hamas portfolio.
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
(01.12.2023 16:29 Uhr)
Laut New York Times war der Bericht weiten Kreisen der israelischen Sicherheitskräfte zugänglich – neben den Angriffsplänen habe er auch geheime Informationen über die israelische Armee und deren Kommunikation enthalten. Wie die Hamas an solch sicherheitsrelevante Informationen kommen konnte, sei unklar.
(February 26, 2022)
Following the 2015 Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war, Israel set up a „deconfliction mechanism“ with the big power to prevent them clashing inadvertently during Israeli strikes against Iranian deployments and arms transfers in the neighbouring Arab state.
„Our military officials discuss the practical issues of this substantively on a daily basis. This mechanism has proven to be useful and will continue to work,“ the Russian embassy in Israel said in a statement.
(February 26, 2022)
Following the 2015 Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war, Israel set up a „deconfliction mechanism“ with the big power to prevent them clashing inadvertently during Israeli strikes against Iranian deployments and arms transfers in the neighbouring Arab state.
„Our military officials discuss the practical issues of this substantively on a daily basis. This mechanism has proven to be useful and will continue to work,“ the Russian embassy in Israel said in a statement.
(April 23, 2018)
McKenzie noted that the Russian owned and operated S-300V4 and S-400 systems stationed in Syria did not attempt to engage the incoming cruise missiles. “In the attack on Friday night, Russian air defenses were energized,” McKenzie said. “They were scanning, they had a [Beriev A-50] Mainstay air defense aircraft up. They did not choose to engage, so I can‘t speculate about why they did or didn‘t do that.”
(15. April 2018)
Der nun erfolgte erneute Luftangriff gegen Syrien repräsentiert die Wiederholung einer Seifenoper aus dem letzten Jahr (11.04.2017, Wag the Russki). Drehbuch wie folgt:
– U.S. Präsident Donald Trump äußert in etwa “es hat nach Hunderttausenden von Toten keinen Sinn mehr die Invasion in Syrien mit terroristischen Proxy-Truppen und regulären eigenen Einheiten weiter fortzusetzen”,
– im Gebiet der terroristischen Proxies und Invasoren bei Ghouta ereignet sich ein fiktiver oder tatsächlicher Einsatz von Chemiewaffen,
– Trump dreht sich um 180 Grad und kündigt einen Militärschlag auf Syrien an,
– dieser erfolgt, mit Ankündigung und laut der französischen Verteidigungsministerin und einem anonymen Politiker über “Reuters” abermals mit Vorwarnung durch die Westmächte,
– die russische Flugabwehr tut nichts, gibt auch noch damit an und die syrische, die genau wie die russischen Militärs noch jedem Massaker gegen die eigenen und verbündeten Truppen aus Irak, Iran und Libanon zugesehen hat wie die Karnickel auf der Fahrbahn, behauptet dies und das.
Einer der wenigen Unterschiede zum letzten Jahr ist, dass sich neben Donald Trump mit Emmanuel Macron und Theresa May nun zwei weitere in ihrem Land hoch umstrittene Staatsleiter vor die Presse stellen und sagen können, sehet her, das haben sie nun davon, diese Russkis. Und Putin, der arme Putin, zitiert das Völkerrecht.
Dass die russische Staatsführung Syrien nie beabsichtigt hat Syrien gegen Luftangriffe zu verteidigen, sagte sie schon im letzten Jahr. Dass der russische Präsident jetzt von einer Verletzung der Souveränität Syriens redet, spricht Bände über dessen auch im Humor zum Ausdruck kommenden Grausamkeit. Der ganze Luftraum Syriens quillt über von irgendwelchen Kampfjets von Vancouver bis Wladivostok, seit Jahren. Noch einmal – hätte die Russische Föderation vor Beginn der Syrien-Invasion oder vor Beginn der Libyen-Invasion den dortigen Regimen eine Garantieerklärung gegeben, wie sie China letzten Sommer unter viel Gewimmer und Gebrumm endlich gegenüber Nordkorea abgab, wären Hunderttausende Menschen heute noch am Leben.
(11. April 2017)
Am Abend des 6. April streut die U.S.-Regierung höchstselbst Gerüchte über mögliche Luftangriffe gegen die syrische Regierung und ihr Militär.
Offensichtlich für diese ein Grund von den nun kommenden Ereignissen total überrascht zu werden, genauso wie die Russische Föderation.
Noch in der Nacht zum 7. April starten U.S.-Luftangriffe von Kriegsschiffen im Mittelmeer aus gegen den syrischen Luftwaffenstützpunkt Al-Shayrat. (Luftangriff: U.S.-Imperium nimmt Einladung Russlands und Syriens dankend an)
Von den vom Pentagon vermeldeten 59 Marschflugkörpern treffen bemerkenswerterweise angeblich nur 23 das Ziel und haben bei ihrem Einschlag nach Angaben vom russischen Verteidigungsministerium eine “extrem niedrige” Effektivität, was Landebahnen, Zubringer und Stellplätze des syrischen Luftwaffenstützpunktes in Takt lassen.
Vor dem Angriff informierte das Pentagon den russischen Generalstab. Nach Angaben des syrischen Generalstabes, der nichts darüber sagt ob auch er vom Angriff vorab informiert wurde, sterben bei dem U.S.-Angriff sechs syrische Soldaten.
Anschließend sondern die Propagandaschleudern “Sputnik” und “RT” allerlei Erklärungen für ihre offensichtlich irritierte Kundschaft ab, was es denn mit der Vorabinformation vom “massiven” Angriff der vermeintlichen Gegner im U.S.-Militär so auf sich hatte, warum keine russischen Soldaten getötet wurden, warum auf dem syrischen Luftwaffenstützpunkt nichts von Bedeutung zerstört wurde, warum von 59 Marschflukörpern nur 23 ihr Ziel getroffen haben sollen, etc, etc.
Nach viel Gewimmer und Gebrumm rückt die russische Staatspresse endlich damit heraus:
Es gibt schlicht keine Vereinbarungen über eine Verteidigung syrischer “Militärobjekte” durch die russischen Streitkräfte – also weder so etwas wie einen Verteidigungs-, noch einen Bündnispakt zwischen Syrien und Russland.
Und noch viel “besser”:
Russland weigert sich auch zukünftig einen syrischen Stützpunkt oder gar Syrien insgesamt zu verteidigen, ausdrücklich auch im Falle von neuen U.S.-Luftangriffen. Das bestätigte gestern der Vize vom Auswärtigen Ausschuss des Föderationsrates.
Nur die eigenen Stützpunkte in Syrien, die werde man natürlich verteidigen.
(28.09.2022)
Die Satellitenaufnahmen, sogenannte IMINT-Daten, stammen vom SAR Lupe System der Bundeswehr, das diese faktisch gemeinsam mit dem BND betreibt. Das System besteht aus Kleinsatelliten, die unabhängig von Tageszeit und Wetter hochauflösende Bilder erstellen können, dies auch bei dichter Wolkendecke.
(20.09.2023)
Presidential chief of staff Andrii Yermak and Kharkiv Gov. Oleh Syniehubov say Russian forces shelled a shop and a cafe in the village of Hroza, in the Kharkiv region, around 1 p.m.
(29.09.2023)
Balochistan’s Police Chief Abdul Khaliq Shaikh says the explosion near the procession of Eid Mawlid an-Nabi in Mastung was a suicide attack.
Shaikh said in a statement that a police official, Nawaz Gishkori, sacrificed his life trying to stop the suicide attacker.
(19. September 2023)
Unter dem Titel „Beweise legen nahe, dass ukrainische Rakete die Markttragödie verursacht hat“ legt die NYT unter anderem dar:
„Die von der New York Times gesammelten und analysierten Beweise, darunter Raketensplitter, Satellitenbilder, Zeugenaussagen und Beiträge in den sozialen Medien, deuten jedoch stark darauf hin, dass der katastrophale Einschlag das Ergebnis einer fehlgeleiteten ukrainischen Luftabwehrrakete war, die von einem Buk-Raketensystem abgefeuert wurde.“
Weiter führt das Blatt aus:
„Die ukrainischen Behörden versuchten zunächst, Journalisten der Times den Zugang zu den Raketentrümmern und dem Einschlagsgebiet unmittelbar nach dem Einschlag zu verwehren. Doch schließlich gelang es den Reportern, an den Ort des Geschehens zu gelangen, Zeugen zu befragen und Überreste der eingesetzten Waffe zu sammeln.“
(Sept. 18, 2023)
But evidence collected and analyzed by The New York Times, including missile fragments, satellite imagery, witness accounts and social media posts, strongly suggests the catastrophic strike was the result of an errant Ukrainian air defense missile fired by a Buk launch system.
The attack appears to have been a tragic mishap.
(12. September 2014)
Bereits vor Jahrzehnten entwickelte das Militär der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika den Plan ein eigenes ziviles Passagierflugzeug in der Luft gegen eine unbemannte „Drone“ auszutauschen, um diese dann selbst zur Explosion zu bringen und einen Abschuss vorzutäuschen. Ebenso wurde der Plan einer „Terrorkampagne“ in der eigenen Hauptstadt Washington, sowie die Versenkung eines US-Kriegsschiffes autorisiert. Ziel war es, diese Vorfälle einer feindlichen Macht zu unterstellen, vor der Weltöffentlichkeit das Opfer zu spielen und nachfolgend eine Invasion starten zu können.
Jahr der Entwicklung des Plans: 1962. Zielobjekt: Kuba.
(March 13, 1962)
c. Commence large scale United States military operations.
3. A „Remember the Maine“ incident could be arranged in several forms:
a. We could blow up a US ship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba.
b. We could blow up a drone (unmanned) vessel anywhere in the Cuban waters. We could arrange to cause such incident in the vicinity of Havana or Santiago as a spectacular result of Cuban attack from the air or sea, or both. The presence of Cuban planes or ships merely investigating the intent of the vessel could be fairly compelling evidence that the ship was taken under attack. The nearness to Havana or Santiago would add credibility especially to those people that might have heard the blast or have seen the fire. The US could follow up with an air/sea rescue operation covered by US fighters to „evacuate“ remaining members of the non-existent crew. Casualty lists in US newspapers would cause a helpful wave of national indignation.
4. We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington.
The terror campaign could be pointed at refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans en route to Florida (real or simulated). We could foster attempts on lives of Cuban refugees in the United States even to the extent of wounding in instances to be widely publicized. Exploding a few plastic bombs in carefully chosen spots, the arrest of Cuban agents and the release of prepared documents substantiating Cuban involvement, also would be helpful in projecting the idea of an irresponsible government.
(19. November 1997)
“We could blow up a US warship in Guantanamo Bay and blame Cuba,“ the memorandum said.
“We could develop a Communist Cuban terror campaign in the Miami area, in other Florida cities and even in Washington,“ it continued. “The terror campaign could be pointed at Cuban refugees seeking haven in the United States. We could sink a boatload of Cubans enroute to Florida (real or simulated).“
The records show that on March 13, 1962, the Joint Chiefs of Staff endorsed these ideas as “suitable for planning purposes.“ No evidence exists that they were carried out.
Tel Aviv municipal security officer Chen Amir, 42, was shot and killed by a member of the Palestinian Islamic Jihad terror group after the terrorist raised officers’ suspicion in the bustling Nachalat Binyamin neighborhood. The terrorist was shot dead by Amir’s colleague, and a senior police source was later quoted by the Ynet news site as saying the gunman had possibly planned to target the anti-overhaul protesters at Kaplan.
„The charges demonstrate [China‘s] determination to obtain information that is critical to our national defense by any means so it can be used to their advantage,“ Olsen continued. „The alleged conduct also represents a violation of the solemn obligation of members of our military to defend our country to safeguard our secrets and to protect their fellow service members.“
It was not immediately clear if either Wei or Zhao had retained attorneys who could comment on their behalf. They have not yet entered pleas.
Both Wei and Zhao had their initial court appearances later on Thursday:
(February 26, 2022)
Following the 2015 Russian intervention in the Syrian civil war, Israel set up a „deconfliction mechanism“ with the big power to prevent them clashing inadvertently during Israeli strikes against Iranian deployments and arms transfers in the neighbouring Arab state.
„Our military officials discuss the practical issues of this substantively on a daily basis. This mechanism has proven to be useful and will continue to work,“ the Russian embassy in Israel said in a statement.
This is the latest strike in Syria, the third since Thursday and only a day after another attack on Friday