(Juni 21, 2024)
Im Garchinger Forschungsreaktor werden normalerweise wissenschaftliche Experimente – etwa im Bereich Quantentechnologie oder Archäologie – durchgeführt. Daneben produzieren Kunden aus der Industrie zum Beispiel Radioisotope und Radiopharmaka für die Krebsdiagnostik und -behandlung. Die TUM verweist aber etwa auch darauf, dass Forschende des späteren Corona-Impfstoffherstellers „Biontech“ in der Garchinger Neutronenquelle mRNA-Partikel untersucht hätten.
(December 17, 2024)
Saudi Arabia has the characteristics of a nuclear hedger: a state that lays the groundwork for the active pursuit of nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has stated the conditions under which it would pursue nuclear weapons. It already possesses dual-capable delivery systems and seeks reactors to produce weapons-grade uranium. Its inability to enrich nuclear material alone prevents Saudi Arabia from gaining nuclear latency that it can rapidly convert into nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia is best categorized as an insurance hedger that seeks to reduce the time needed to build a bomb. Regardless of the categorization of Saudi Arabia’s hedging, its interest in nuclear weapons has entered a new, acute stage.
(November 2023)
The Wall Street Journal reported in September that Netanyahu directed Israeli officials to work with the United States on an agreement that includes Saudi enrichment, but such a deal still would face criticism in Israel. (…)
Given Saudi Arabia’s public threats to develop nuclear weapons, it may be challenging for the Biden administration to gain support for any agreement that allows uranium enrichment, particularly if the kingdom does not have an additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement in place. Additional protocols to safeguards agreements were developed in the 1990s when it became clear from the cases of Iraq and North Korea that a comprehensive safeguard agreement alone was insufficient to prevent proliferation. An additional protocol gives the IAEA more access and information about a country’s nuclear activities.
(Juni 2024)
Der Forschungsreaktor war im Jahr 2004 als eine der wichtigsten
Neutronenquellen Europas für Forschung, Medizin und Industrie in
Betrieb gegangen. Der Betrieb mit bis zu 93 Prozent angereichertem
Uran war bis Ende 2010 genehmigt, dann sollte auf maximal 50 Prozent
umgestellt werden. Mangels dieses Brennstoffs wurde der Betrieb bis
jetzt aber von den Behörden weiter genehmigt.
«Es geht hier um extrem wichtige Forschungsinfrastruktur für Bayern,
Deutschland und Europa», betonte Minister Blume. Die in Garching
gewonnene kerntechnische Expertise sei beispielsweise entscheidend
für medizinischen Fortschritt.
(Juni 21, 2024)
Im Garchinger Forschungsreaktor werden normalerweise wissenschaftliche Experimente – etwa im Bereich Quantentechnologie oder Archäologie – durchgeführt. Daneben produzieren Kunden aus der Industrie zum Beispiel Radioisotope und Radiopharmaka für die Krebsdiagnostik und -behandlung. Die TUM verweist aber etwa auch darauf, dass Forschende des späteren Corona-Impfstoffherstellers „Biontech“ in der Garchinger Neutronenquelle mRNA-Partikel untersucht hätten.
In a post on its official account on the social platform X, the AEOI declared: „Iran stands firm… Relying on the determination of our nuclear scientists, we will continue the path of developing peaceful nuclear technology with strength and resolve. The cowardly attacks by enemies are no match for the will of this nation.“
(August 10, 2020)
From reactor to patients
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To get 99mTc, the irradiated uranium-235 targets are moved to a processing installation, usually near a research reactor, to separate 99Mo from the other fission products and purify it. The purified 99Mo is then transported to a production facility for 99Mo/99mTc generators — devices used to safely hold, transport and chemically extract 99mTc from 99Mo directly on site at a hospital or other medical facility.
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The United States has been claiming that Iran can import nuclear fuel for its reactors. However, the Leader said the United States is not trustworthy, saying the U.S. refused to sell 20-percent enriched uranium to Iran to power its medical reactor in the 2000s.
“In the 2000s, we experienced firsthand how unreliable the U.S. was when it came to supplying 20% enriched fuel,” Ayatollah Khamenei pointed out, indirectly referring to Iran‘s need to nuclear fuel to power its Tehran medical reactor.
He said, “The core demand of the U.S. is that Iran should not have a nuclear industry and should remain dependent on them. Our response to America’s nonsense is clear: they can’t do a damn thing about it.”
„The proposal that the Americans have presented is 100% against our interests … The rude and arrogant leaders of America repeatedly demand that we should not have a nuclear programme. Who are you to decide whether Iran should have enrichment?,“ he added.
Tehran says it wants to master nuclear technology for peaceful purposes and has long denied accusations by Western powers that it is seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
(May 17, 2025)
Reports claiming that the U.S. has asked Iran to cease uranium enrichment for a couple of years are also false, a second source said. „From the outset, the negotiating team tasked with discussing a potential new agreement with the United States has made it clear that a cessation of uranium enrichment is not an option, even temporarily.“ Iran also maintained this position throughout the diplomatic process that led to the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) in 2015, the source added.
(May 16, 2025)
Iran’s lead negotiator, Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi, said in a post on X later Friday that the country hasn’t received a written proposal.
“In the meantime, the messaging we — and the world — continue to receive is confusing and contradictory,” he wrote. Earlier, Araghchi had said, “What the parties to the negotiations say in the media is not the same as what they say behind closed doors.”
Araghchi also repeated his insistence that Iran retain some enrichment capacity, which has been a major sticking point. U.S. officials have given conflicting messages on the levels of uranium enrichment they would accept.
(January 6, 2ß25)
Riyadh has been very clear on the kind of nuclear partnership it expects, and it is no secret that its favored option is cooperation with South Korea, similar under a 123 agreement (a nuclear cooperation document that establishes the legal basis and prerequisites for nuclear deals with the United States) allowing it to enrich uranium domestically. The problem, however, lies in the last bit of the sentence. The United States currently insists on an agreement that requires the Saudis forgo enrichment and reprocessing capabilities—two pathways to building a bomb. The reelection of Trump might be the Saudis’ chance to tip the balance in their favor.
(January 12, 2025)
The hype about Iran’s nuclear program is focused on the enrichment of some uranium at 60% purity, which is still below the 90% needed for weapons-grade. Iran took the step to enrich at 60% in response to an Israeli covert attack on its Natanz nuclear facility in 2021.
Iran is also a signatory to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, unlike Israel, which never signed the NPT and has a covert nuclear stockpile that’s not officially acknowledged by the US.
(January 10, 2025)
Kelly: Iran, which had a pretty lousy 2024, weakened internally, mounting pressures externally. We interviewed Jake Sullivan, the national security, the national security adviser at the White House the other day. He told me the big question on his mind is, given the losses Iran has sustained, will it make it more likely, more likely that Iran tries to go for a nuclear weapon? Director Burns, will it?
Burns: It‘s something we watch very intently, because you‘re right, Iran has it‘s strategic position has suffered considerably over the course of the last six or seven months. You know, two failed efforts to launch significant ballistic missile strikes against Israel, the collapse of its leading proxy, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the severe degradation of Hamas in Gaza, and then the fall of the Assad regime in Syria. All of that, I think, strategically puts the Iranian regime in a much weaker position. And so Jake Sullivan was right to express the concern that, you know, the Iranian regime could decide in the face of that weakness that it needs to restore its deterrence as it sees it and, you know, reverse the decision made at the end of 2003 to suspend their weaponization program. We do not see any sign today that any such decision has been made, but we obviously watch it intently.
(December 17, 2024)
Rosemary DiCarlo briefed the Security Council on developments surrounding the 2015 accord, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and implementation of Council resolution 2231 (2015) which endorsed it.
The JCPOA set out rigorous mechanisms for monitoring restrictions placed on Iran’s nuclear programme, while paving the way for lifting sanctions against the country.
It was signed between Iran and the Council’s five permanent members – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States – plus Germany and the European Union. The US withdrew in May 2018 under the Trump administration.
(December 17, 2024)
Saudi Arabia has the characteristics of a nuclear hedger: a state that lays the groundwork for the active pursuit of nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has stated the conditions under which it would pursue nuclear weapons. It already possesses dual-capable delivery systems and seeks reactors to produce weapons-grade uranium. Its inability to enrich nuclear material alone prevents Saudi Arabia from gaining nuclear latency that it can rapidly convert into nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia is best categorized as an insurance hedger that seeks to reduce the time needed to build a bomb. Regardless of the categorization of Saudi Arabia’s hedging, its interest in nuclear weapons has entered a new, acute stage.
(January 5, 2024)
In 1988, the Central Intelligence Agency did discover that Riyadh bought SS-2 medium-range missiles from China but only after the deal was sealed. In 2003, when China exported DF-21 ballistic missiles to the Kingdom, the CIA again found out and was even allowed to verify the missiles were not nuclear-capable, but only after the missiles were delivered.
Several years later, when intelligence finally leaked out that China secretly built missile factories for the Saudis, the Trump administration was mum on whether there was an intelligence failure and allowed speculation that it had blessed the transaction. Then, in 2020, when US intelligence confirmed China was helping the Kingdom mill uranium domestically, it did so, again only after the mining and milling were well underway.
This track record of studied inadvertence, then, brings us to the next worry: MBS wants Washington to green-light the Kingdom enriching uranium…
(March 19, 2023)
In general, the Saudis wish to present themselves as Iran’s equals, and if Iran can enrich uranium, say the Saudis, then so can we. In addition, the Saudis want to keep all their nuclear options open, even if they are not intending to work on the development of nuclear weapons immediately.
Following reports of alleged Israeli strikes inside Iran near a nuclear power station early Friday, the UN Secretary-General António Guterres issued a new appeal to all parties to “stop the dangerous cycle of retaliation in the Middle East”.
“The Secretary-General condemns any act of retaliation and appeals to the international community to work together to prevent any further development that could lead to devastating consequences for the entire region and beyond,” he said in a statement issued by his Office.
The Natanz uranium enrichment plant is located close to the region where the strikes are understood to have taken place.
A separate uranium conversion plant is located in Zerdenjan, a southwestern region of Isfahan. The site has been previously targeted by suspected Israeli sabotage attacks.
(January 5, 2024)
In 1988, the Central Intelligence Agency did discover that Riyadh bought SS-2 medium-range missiles from China but only after the deal was sealed. In 2003, when China exported DF-21 ballistic missiles to the Kingdom, the CIA again found out and was even allowed to verify the missiles were not nuclear-capable, but only after the missiles were delivered.
Several years later, when intelligence finally leaked out that China secretly built missile factories for the Saudis, the Trump administration was mum on whether there was an intelligence failure and allowed speculation that it had blessed the transaction. Then, in 2020, when US intelligence confirmed China was helping the Kingdom mill uranium domestically, it did so, again only after the mining and milling were well underway.
This track record of studied inadvertence, then, brings us to the next worry: MBS wants Washington to green-light the Kingdom enriching uranium…
(November 2023)
In talks with the United States, Saudi Arabia is pushing for the right to produce nuclear fuel, a move that poses a greater proliferation risk given Riyadh’s threats to develop nuclear weapons.
(June 17, 2023 Updated June 20, 2023)
For Mr. Netanyahu, Saudi Arabia’s recognition of Israel would be a significant political victory for the embattled leader, whose hard-right coalition government faces fierce domestic opposition.
For his part, Prince Mohammed is seeking a strengthened security relationship with the United States, access to more American weapons and U.S. consent for the kingdom to enrich uranium as part of a civilian nuclear program — something that Washington has long resisted.
Switching to a broader inspection regime will enable the kingdom to access fissile material and start running its small nuclear reactor.
The developments come amid increasing concern among nuclear nonproliferation experts and lawmakers about Saudi Arabia‘s intentions with the technology, and the potential for a Middle Eastern arms race.
A senior Palestinian official Hussein al-Sheikh confirmed that al-Sudairi would be visiting Ramallah.
“We welcome His Excellency the Ambassador of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the State of Palestine, who will present his official credentials to His Excellency President Mahmoud Abbas within a few days,” al-Sheikh tweeted Monday.
Israeli sources speaking to the WSJ acknowledged concerns about nonproliferation safeguards and the potential for a regional nuclear-arms race. But the one expert who was reported as thinking “the idea is worth exploring,” is an executive at an organization that depends heavily on Saudi funding, a potential financial conflict of interest that wasn’t disclosed by the WSJ to its readers.
The WSJ quoted Brian Katulis, described as “vice president of policy at the Middle East Institute think tank in Washington,” supporting the controversial idea.
(21.09.2023)
“The question is whether the U.S. sitting on the sidelines, crossing its arms and scolding countries in the region for pursuing civilian nuclear energy is a more effective strategy than starting a discussion that aims to build trust and confidence among key actors in the region like Israel and Saudi Arabia.”
Katulis said, “The risk of some hostile leader getting these capacities is one we’ve seen and managed in a number of places around the world, including Pakistan.”
“It’s not an ideal situation in those instances,” he said, “but the risks can be managed.”
National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told reporters before the interview was shown that it was best for the leaders of Israel and Saudi Arabia „to speak to how close they think they are, and where they think they are“ in the process.
„Obviously, we encourage normalization. We think it‘s good not just for Israel and Saudi Arabia, we think it‘s good for the whole region,“ Kirby said.
(August 26, 2023)
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Amid reports that Netanyahu directed top Israeli nuclear experts to partake in negotiations over a U.S.-Saudi deal, Lapid says a stance allowing Saudi enrichment is ‚reckless,‘ and warns it will trigger a ‚Middle East nuclear arms race‘