“If you enter the Persian Gulf, first of all, we will give a tough, painful and unprecedented response and break the naval blockade,” he warned Washington.
“But more importantly, we may withdraw from the NPT. Do you know what will happen to you if we withdraw? So… don‘t commit suicide.”
Themen waren unter anderem die Atomprogramme des Irans und Nordkoreas.
Delivered by Stéphane Dujarric, Spokesman for the Secretary-General
The Secretary-General expresses his disappointment at the inability of the Eleventh Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) to reach consensus on a substantive outcome and to seize this critical opportunity to make our world safer.
There was no consensus among the 191 parties to the NPT, the third failure in a row at a conference reviewing the treaty
(…)
Britain’s Rebecca Johnson, founding executive director of the Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, had harsh criticism for both the US and Russia, the two largest nuclear powers, which she said “double down on nuclear threats, blame others and try to undermine or ignore the NPT’s nuclear disarmament commitments and related agreements”.
(…)
Masoud Pezeshkian says Tehran “enters into dialogue with dignity, authority, and the preservation of the nation’s rights”.
“And under no circumstances will it retreat from the legal rights of the people and the country,” the Iranian president wrote on X.
“We will serve the people with logic and with all our might, to the end, and safeguard the interests and honour of Iran.”
(3h ago (19:00 GMT)
The US president says he was asked by Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman and UAE President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan “to hold off on our planned Military attack” on Iran, “which was scheduled for tomorrow”.
Trump said the Gulf leaders had noted “that serious negotiations are now taking place, and that, in their opinion, as Great Leaders and Allies, a Deal will be made, which will be very acceptable to the United States of America, as well as all Countries in the Middle East, and beyond”.
“This Deal will include, importantly, NO NUCLEAR WEAPONS FOR IRAN!” he wrote on his Truth Social platform.
In 1957, France provided support and approval, supplying Israel with a heavy-water, pressurized reactor. Dimona entered operation around 1963, with a reported capacity of 26 megawatts.
At the heart of the facility’s significance is its role in handling nuclear fuel.
Dimona processes spent nuclear fuel, described as the first stage in producing the atomic bomb, with the fuel then transferred elsewhere to be stored or mounted on missiles.
By 1967, reports cited from the US State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research pointed to a reprocessing plant for uranium and production of weapons-usable plutonium, concluding that Israel possessed a nuclear bomb.
Es komme darauf an, ob man weiterhin erfolglos versuche, das endgültige Ziel der Denuklearisierung zu erreichen, oder ob man sich realistischere Ziele setze und davon einige auch erreiche, betonte er.
Lee sagte zudem, er halte es für möglich, dass US-Präsident Donald Trump und Nordkoreas Machthaber Kim Jong-un wieder zusammenkommen. Sollten sie als Notmaßnahme ein Einfrieren vereinbaren, würde er dem Deal zustimmen.
Zugleich betonte er, dass Nordkorea keinesfalls auf Atomwaffen verzichten werde.
Kim machte außerdem deutlich, dass Nordkorea jegliche Verhandlungen mit Südkorea ablehnt. Denn Südkorea werde als feindliches Land betrachtet.
Speaking to Pyongyang’s rubber-stamp parliament on Sunday, Kim stressed that he has no intention of ever resuming dialogue with rival South Korea, a key U.S. ally that helped broker Kim’s previous summits with Trump during the American president’s first term, according to a speech published by state media on Monday.
The minister further noted that Saudi Arabia has completed the essential administrative preparations to rescind the Small Quantities Protocol in cooperation with the IAEA and has fully implemented the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, as of early 2025.
(June 2, 2025)
Concerns about uranium-enrichment and related potential nuclear-weapons ambitions of both Iran and Saudi Arabia could be dealt with by a regional nuclear consortium within which enrichment-related activities would be spread across and shared among states, rather than be national nuclear programs.
We sketch here a possible regional multinational nuclear consortium whose initial core partners are Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
(December 17, 2024)
Saudi Arabia has the characteristics of a nuclear hedger: a state that lays the groundwork for the active pursuit of nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has stated the conditions under which it would pursue nuclear weapons. It already possesses dual-capable delivery systems and seeks reactors to produce weapons-grade uranium. Its inability to enrich nuclear material alone prevents Saudi Arabia from gaining nuclear latency that it can rapidly convert into nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia is best categorized as an insurance hedger that seeks to reduce the time needed to build a bomb. Regardless of the categorization of Saudi Arabia’s hedging, its interest in nuclear weapons has entered a new, acute stage.
(November 2023)
The Wall Street Journal reported in September that Netanyahu directed Israeli officials to work with the United States on an agreement that includes Saudi enrichment, but such a deal still would face criticism in Israel. (…)
Given Saudi Arabia’s public threats to develop nuclear weapons, it may be challenging for the Biden administration to gain support for any agreement that allows uranium enrichment, particularly if the kingdom does not have an additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement in place. Additional protocols to safeguards agreements were developed in the 1990s when it became clear from the cases of Iraq and North Korea that a comprehensive safeguard agreement alone was insufficient to prevent proliferation. An additional protocol gives the IAEA more access and information about a country’s nuclear activities.
(April 16, 2025)
Apparently concerned about the potential risk of Saudi nuclear proliferation, Wright also stated, “There will definitely be a 123 agreement.” This was a reference to the eponymous section of the 1954 U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which mandates that formal proliferation safeguards must be put in place before American agencies or companies can help a country start up a civil nuclear industry. The “gold standard” version of a 123 agreement explicitly prohibits enriching or reprocessing nuclear material—a limitation that only the United Arab Emirates and Taiwan have accepted in the past. Countries must instead agree to import reactor fuel rather than producing it themselves, and allow international inspections as well.
After taking office on January 20, Trump sent multiple signals about his willingness to discuss the subject, but has so far put forward no concrete proposals. Among other things, Moscow and Washington need to discuss whether they are ready to forge a deal to replace the New START treaty on the reduction of strategic offensive arms, which expires in 2026.
(March 6, 2025)
„It would be fantastic if everyone got rid of their nuclear weapons. I know that Russia and us have by far the most nuclear weapons. China will have a similar amount in four or five years. It would be great if we could all denuclearize, because the power of nuclear weapons is madness,“ Trump said in a video later posted on the social network X.
The comment comes three weeks after a statement made in the Oval Office, where he emphasized the importance of restarting discussions on nuclear arms control, particularly with Russia and China.
(June 7, 2017)
The established pattern of constraints on Iran’s nuclear program could be held as the gold standard for the rest of the international community. This option is readily available to the United States and the partners with which it negotiated the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA): China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the European Union. The international community should draw on that agreement and turn its standards into general, global ones, applying them to all countries seeking to enrich uranium or attempting to use plutonium for any purpose.
“At some point, when things settle down, I’m going to meet with China and I’m going to meet with Russia, in particular those two, and I’m going to say there’s no reason for us to be spending almost $1 trillion on the military … and I’m going to say we can spend this on other things,” Trump said.
“When we straighten it all out, then one of the first meetings I want to have is with President Xi of China and President Putin of Russia, and I want to say let’s cut our military budget in half. And we can do that, and I think we’ll be able to do that,” he added.
(December 17, 2024)
Rosemary DiCarlo briefed the Security Council on developments surrounding the 2015 accord, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), and implementation of Council resolution 2231 (2015) which endorsed it.
The JCPOA set out rigorous mechanisms for monitoring restrictions placed on Iran’s nuclear programme, while paving the way for lifting sanctions against the country.
It was signed between Iran and the Council’s five permanent members – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States – plus Germany and the European Union. The US withdrew in May 2018 under the Trump administration.
(December 17, 2024)
Saudi Arabia has the characteristics of a nuclear hedger: a state that lays the groundwork for the active pursuit of nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia has stated the conditions under which it would pursue nuclear weapons. It already possesses dual-capable delivery systems and seeks reactors to produce weapons-grade uranium. Its inability to enrich nuclear material alone prevents Saudi Arabia from gaining nuclear latency that it can rapidly convert into nuclear weapons. Saudi Arabia is best categorized as an insurance hedger that seeks to reduce the time needed to build a bomb. Regardless of the categorization of Saudi Arabia’s hedging, its interest in nuclear weapons has entered a new, acute stage.
(June 7, 2017)
The established pattern of constraints on Iran’s nuclear program could be held as the gold standard for the rest of the international community. This option is readily available to the United States and the partners with which it negotiated the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA): China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the European Union. The international community should draw on that agreement and turn its standards into general, global ones, applying them to all countries seeking to enrich uranium or attempting to use plutonium for any purpose.
Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin said Wednesday that there is evidence North Korean troops are in Russia, branding their presence a „very serious“ escalation in the war that started with Russia‘s unprovoked invasion in 2022 and has left tens of thousands dead.
(January 5, 2024)
In 1988, the Central Intelligence Agency did discover that Riyadh bought SS-2 medium-range missiles from China but only after the deal was sealed. In 2003, when China exported DF-21 ballistic missiles to the Kingdom, the CIA again found out and was even allowed to verify the missiles were not nuclear-capable, but only after the missiles were delivered.
Several years later, when intelligence finally leaked out that China secretly built missile factories for the Saudis, the Trump administration was mum on whether there was an intelligence failure and allowed speculation that it had blessed the transaction. Then, in 2020, when US intelligence confirmed China was helping the Kingdom mill uranium domestically, it did so, again only after the mining and milling were well underway.
This track record of studied inadvertence, then, brings us to the next worry: MBS wants Washington to green-light the Kingdom enriching uranium…
(March 19, 2023)
In general, the Saudis wish to present themselves as Iran’s equals, and if Iran can enrich uranium, say the Saudis, then so can we. In addition, the Saudis want to keep all their nuclear options open, even if they are not intending to work on the development of nuclear weapons immediately.
(September 14, 2023)
Top Israeli sources have told the Jerusalem Post that there are secret technological ways to ensure that the Saudis do not misuse civilian nuclear items, which the US may give them as part of a three-way normalization deal, for military purposes.
Although there are no guarantees, because the issue is highly technical and there are issues to address regarding the Palestinians and highly complex politics, these technological fixes could be key to locking in a normalization deal between Riyadh and Jerusalem, under Washington’s auspices.