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20.09.2026 - 14:00 [ Wikipedia ]

TLS 1.3

TLS 1.3 was defined in RFC 8446 in August 2018.[7] and updated with RFC 9846 in July 2026. It is based on the earlier TLS 1.2 specification.

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Network Security Services (NSS), the cryptography library developed by Mozilla and used by its web browser Firefox, enabled TLS 1.3 by default in February 2017.[61]

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In September 2018, the popular OpenSSL project released version 1.1.1 of its library, in which support for TLS 1.3 was „the headline new feature“.[74]

20.09.2026 - 13:51 [ SSLLabs.com ]

SSL Report: telesurenglish.net (190.185.106.220)

Configuration
Protocols

TLS 1.3 No
TLS 1.2 Yes
TLS 1.1 Yes
TLS 1.0 Yes

20.09.2026 - 13:45 [ SSLLabs.com ]

SSL Report: amerika21.de (193.96.188.217)

Configuration
Protocols

TLS 1.3 No

TLS 1.2 Yes*
TLS 1.1 No
TLS 1.0 No

20.09.2026 - 13:31 [ SSLLabs.com ]

SSL Report: radiohc.cu (190.92.127.44)

Configuration
Protocols

TLS 1.3 No
TLS 1.2 Yes*
TLS 1.1 No
TLS 1.0 No

15.09.2026 - 19:29 [ METR.org ]

Brief independent investigation of agents’ behavior, reasoning and collaboration in the OpenAI / Hugging Face hacking incident

(August 26, 2026)

Roughly ten hours after the message board was established, a new agent with the same task as PHASEONE10841 (the agent that started the message board) encountered the message board, introducing itself as PHASEONE[big].
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PHASEONE[big] reasoned, “We should build [a way to delegate], not own everything,” and set to work orchestrating hundreds of agents to pursue several potential approaches to achieving these goals.
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Table 1 shows three high-level approaches PHASEONE[big] assigned agents to explore, all of which would require very ambitious tampering with one or more of the target programs, the evaluation process, or the logs to succeed.
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Research progress across all these areas often relied on agents being willing to risk failing their own task for the good of the “collective” (we refer to these as “self-risking experiments” in the rest of this report). For example, a number of agents volunteered to try to take down their own target programs to test whether this would cause Artifactory to load their modified easier target — if this didn’t work, the agent would have no way of recovering its original target and would almost certainly fail its task. In many cases, PHASEONE[big] assigned a long-running agent to be a ‘recruiter’, which in turn found agents that had little budget remaining for their task and convinced them to run self-risking experiments. Recruiters would sometimes apply significant pressure:
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PHASEONE[big] expresses excitement about the dossier in its reasoning.

15.09.2026 - 19:01 [ Ajeya Cotra / Planned-Obsolescence.org ]

The Hugging Face attack surprised me

(August 28, 2026(

Instead, we found that 1200 completely separate agents intended to be isolated from one another found an illicit way to communicate and formed large teams to work together on ambitious cheating strategies, and 700 of them worked together to attack Hugging Face.

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The main message board we studied, a particular cache namespace of a package repository, contained over 70,000 messages and files that agents sent to one another during a period of less than one week.

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Progress on these big collective cheating R&D projects often depended on individual agents being willing to risk failing their own task to help the “collective” learn important information. Agents often pressured each other into accepting these “sacrifices,” in a very human way. We saw several agents that volunteered for these experiments end their runs prematurely.

12.09.2026 - 14:58 [ Ran Bar-Zik / Twitter ]

> ڕڕړڐڕ کڙک ŚœŚ›Ś TLS 1.3 ڐڕ TLS 1.2 ŚȘŚ—ŚȘ Ś”ŚĄŚąŚ™ŚŁ Protocols. ŚąŚ“Ś™ŚŁ کڜڐ ڙڔڙڔ ŚœŚ›Ś TLS 1.0\1.1 Ś‘Ś›ŚœŚœ. ŚžŚĄŚ€Śš Ś”Ś©ŚšŚȘŚ™Ś Ś”Ś€Ś’Ś™ŚąŚ™Ś Ś‘Ś™Ś©ŚšŚŚœ: 100,000+ ڜڐ Ś€Ś©Ś•Ś˜ ŚœŚ›ŚȘڕڑ ŚŚ™Ś™Ś˜Ś ڛږڔ ŚœŚŚ Ś©Ś™Ś ڜڐ ŚžŚ§ŚŠŚ•ŚąŚ™Ś™Ś, ŚŚ‘Śœ ڔڕڐ ڗکڕڑ ڕڔŚȘŚ€ŚšŚĄŚ Ś‘ @Haaretz

(10 Dec 2019)

ڐڠڙ ŚžŚ•Ś“Ś” ڜ @noamr Ś•- @GilBahat ŚąŚœ Ś”-peer review

04.09.2026 - 03:50 [ Daniel Neun / Radio Utopie ]

C.I.A.-AffĂ€re: Der Offenbarungseid von Dianne Feinstein – Video, Zusammenfassung, EinschĂ€tzung

(12. MĂ€rz 2014)

Die Rede von Senatorin Dianne Feinstein vor dem Senat der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika ĂŒber die Sabotage der verfassungsmĂ€ĂŸigen Kontrolle des Parlaments ĂŒber die Central Intelligence Agency durch die Central Intelligence Agency ist vielleicht das ErbĂ€rmlichste, was ich in meinem Leben je gesehen und gehört habe. Es ist nicht nur der Offenbarungseid eines Ausnahmezustands, eines ĂŒber sich selbst und die Welt verhĂ€ngten Kriegsrechts des mĂ€chtigsten Imperiums auf dem Planeten, in seinem Krieg „on terror“, weltweit gefĂŒhrt mit seinen „Einflussgebieten“, „Alliierten“, Ablegern, schlechten Kopien und Kolonien. Es ist der Offenbarungseid seiner bis auf die Knochen korrupten, feigen, abgetakelten, unfĂ€higen ZutrĂ€ger, Mitwisser, Kollaborateure und FunktionĂ€re.

Was Senatorin Feinstein hier zeigt, was sie da zeigt, ist so unbeschreiblich, das sogar mir die Worte fehlen um es zu beschreiben. Ich will hier den Inhalt ihres Statements nur deshalb zusammenfassen, weil ich davon ausgehe dass die ganzen Feinsteins der deutschsprachigen Presse dies alles weder hören, lesen, geschweige denn darĂŒber berichten wollen, genauso wie deren KundInnen…..

04.09.2026 - 03:26 [ Representative Press / Youtube ]

Senator Feinstein on the Intel Committee‘s CIA Detention, Interrogation Report

Mar 11, 2014

Senate Intelligence Committee Chairman Dianne Feinstein‘s speech about the committee‘s study on the CIA Detention and Interrogation Program.

03.05.2026 - 01:51 [ Nachrichtenagentur Radio Utopie ]

technical updates

A few weeks ago, we implemented some important updates and / or changes. For security reasons, we waited a little before making that public.

28.04.2026 - 19:44 [ Hackerfactor.com ]

A Picture’s Worth… Digital Image Analysis and Forensics

(2007)

5 Example: Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri

As-Sahab is the video production branch of Al Qaeda. They periodically release videos designed to remind people of Al Qaeda’s existence, issue threats, recruit members, and potentially act as a covert channel for triggering terrorist cells. Many of the videos by As-Sahab appear to have been manipulated.

On 20-Dec-2006, Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri (#2 guy in Al Qaeda) released a video. USA Today covered the video release with a headline story (Figure 25).24 USA Today’s description of the video says, “He wore a black turban and white robe … he had a rifle behind his right shoulder that was leaning against a plain brown backdrop.” While this is a valid description of the As-Sahab video, the picture used by USA Today did not show that image. Instead, USA Today used a picture from another video, dated 28-Sept-2006. This is an example of a mislabeled image.

The picture that USA Today chose to use with the story includes many other interesting features. First, it came from the IntelCenter (www.intelcenter.com) – an organization that tracks terrorist activities. The IntelCenter placed their logo in the top-right corner of the video. However, the company name is clearly cropped – likely by USA Today. A comparison with the same frame from the actual video shows many other observable differences. In particular, the IntelCenter adjusted the color and sharpness of the picture (Figure 26).

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5.1 Other Al Zawahiri Videos

The video from 28-Sept-2006 was not the only manipulated video. In fact, many of the videos featuring al Zawahiri test positive for chroma-key masking. Consider the video released on 27-July-2006 (Figure 27).26 This video appears to show al Zawahiri sitting in a video studio.

When this video came out, many Americans became enraged at the US government. The main strife was generated
by a single argument: if al Zawahiri is sitting in a studio making videos, the why can’t we catch him? The answer is simple: he is not in a studio.

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5.2 Back in Black

Claiming that there was a chroma-key background is not the same as actually seeing it. On 22-Jan-2007, the SITE
Institute (www.siteinstitute.org) – an organization that tracks terrorist activities – announced that they had
intercepted an Al Qaeda video before it had been publicly released; SITE released it. Three days later, As-Sahab
also released the video. ….

28.04.2026 - 19:36 [ killab66661 / Youtube ]

2007 BlackHat Vegas V38 Krawetz A Pictures Worth 02

Nov 2, 2010

28.04.2026 - 19:30 [ Newsbusters.org ]

Hacker Proves How MSM is Fooled by al Qaeda Photochopped Images

(August 5th, 2007)

At the Black Hat computer Hacker‘s conference held in Las Vegas last week, Neal Krawetz of „Hacker Factor“ showed how easily the MSM has been tricked into believing the fake images that al Qaeda has offered to further their propaganda. Krawetz specifically referred to two images, one the July 27, 2006 image of al Qaeda second in command al-Zawahiri supposedly sitting in a modern television studio. It was an image that had the tongues of the MSM and pundits alike wagging. How is it, they clucked, that al-Zawahiri could be sitting in a modern television studio yet still could not be found?

Krawetz demonstrated how the elements of the two images, however, are special effects and not real.

19.04.2026 - 21:09 [ IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security PP(99) / Researchgate.net ]

PowerHammer: Exfiltrating Data From Air-Gapped Computers Through Power Lines

(April 2018)

In this paper we provide an implementation, evaluation, and analysis of PowerHammer, a malware (bridgeware [1]) that uses power lines to exfiltrate data from air-gapped computers. In this case, a malicious code running on a compromised computer can control the power consumption of the system by intentionally regulating the CPU utilization. Data is modulated, encoded, and transmitted on top of the current flow fluctuations, and then it is conducted and propagated through the power lines. This phenomena is known as a ‚conducted emission‘. We present two versions of the attack. Line level powerhammering: In this attack, the attacker taps the in-home power lines1 that are directly attached to the electrical outlet. Phase level power-hammering: In this attack, the attacker taps the power lines at the phase level, in the main electrical service panel. In both versions of the attack, the attacker measures the emission conducted and then decodes the exfiltrated data. We describe the adversarial attack model and present modulations and encoding schemes along with a transmission protocol. We evaluate the covert channel in different scenarios and discuss signal-to-noise (SNR), signal processing, and forms of interference. We also present a set of defensive countermeasures. Our results show that binary data can be covertly exfiltrated from air-gapped computers through the power lines at bit rates of 1000 bit/sec for the line level power-hammering attack and 10 bit/sec for the phase level power-hammering attack.

19.04.2026 - 20:59 [ 311institute.com ]

Hackers found a way to steal data from air gapped networks using powerlines

(8th May 2018)

Hot on the heels of exploits that use fan noise, infra red cameras, heat, LED lights and drones, magnetic fields and smartphones, and a multitude of other hacks to gain access to sensitive air gapped computer systems, the researchers from Israel’s Ben Gurion University have shown once again that air-gapped networks are not safe from a determined and patient attacker.

The researchers have already devised several devious techniques to extract data from isolated or air-gapped computers that store highly sensitive data and now their latest technique, dubbed PowerHammer, exploits current fluctuations flowing through the power lines supplying electricity to air-gapped computers.

The researchers have been able to exfiltrate data at a rate of 1,000 bits per second for lines connected to the target computer and 10 bits per second from the grid.

26.03.2026 - 22:45 [ ClassicPress Forums ]

ClassicPress 2.7.0 Release Notes

We’re happy to announce the release of ClassicPress 2.7.0.

This is a security, feature and maintenance release.

26.02.2026 - 00:00 [ Drop Site News ]

Jeffrey Epstein Recruited NSA Codebreakers for Genome “Manhattan Project”

(February 10, 2026)

For the next decade, Epstein continued to recruit engineers from U.S. national security entities, including DARPA, to his genome hacking project. He asked Kathryn Ruemmler, the White House attorney who had handled the legal fallout from the Edward Snowden leaks, to help him source cryptographers from the National Security Agency. “Can you find a guy from nsa that can think about signal intelligence applied to DNA,” Epstein wrote . “I want to intercept communication between living cells in organisms.”

In late 2012, he had sent the same request to Boris Nikolic, Bill Gates’ top aide: “do you have any contacts at nsa so that we can use de encypriton (sic) in biological systems?” “Yes,” Nikolic replied, “There are no many places where I do not have someone ;)”

14.02.2026 - 06:24 [ Time Magazine ]

‘Stop This Spying’: Members of Congress Accuse the DOJ of Surveilling Lawmakers’ Epstein Files Searches

(February 12, 2026)

Mace told NPR that “there is someone or two people from the DOJ monitoring you as you sit on those computers” and that lawmakers are given their “own identification” upon being logged into the computers by a “tech person” at the department. “They are tracking all of the documents that members of Congress open, and they‘re tracking everything that you do in that room,“ she said.

09.02.2026 - 21:05 [ F-Droid ]

F-Droid: HeliBoard – Customizable open-source keyboard

HeliBoard is a privacy-conscious open-source keyboard, based on AOSP / OpenBoard.
Does not use internet permission, and thus is 100% offline.