Der „Transatlantische Datenschutzrahmen“ garantiert US-Konzernen wie Facebook, dass sie weiterhin Nutzer:innendaten aus Europa ungehindert in die USA übertragen können. Dass sie dort kaum rechtlichen Schutz vor dem anlasslosen wie massenhaften Zugriff der amerikanischen Behörden haben, daran ändert der neue Datenschutzrahmen ebenso wenig wie seine beiden gescheiterten Vorgänger Safe Harbor und Privacy Shield. Schon 2015 und 2020 erklärte der Europäische Gerichtshof diese Beschlüsse der EU-Kommission für ungültig, die eine Blankoerlaubnis für den Datentransfer in die USA geben. Doch allen Bedenken zum Trotz hat die EU-Kommission nun ein drittes Mal einen Blankoscheck ausgestellt – aus der Zusicherung Von der Leyens im Vorjahr wurde nun eine rechtsgültiger Beschluss.
Archiv: Executive Order 12333 (Ronald Reagan 04-12-1981)
US-Geheimdienste: Lizenz zur weltweiten Überwachung läuft aus
Dass besagte Section 702 verlängert wird, steht kaum außer Frage.
The FBI abused its surveillance of Americans 278,000 times in 18 months
Section 702 of the FISA Act allows agencies like the NSA to eavesdrop on foreign nationals overseas. It prohibits spying on US citizens or anyone who‘s within the United States. (…)
In practice, then, NSA maintains a huge database of information about the communications of US citizens. Agencies like the FBI are allowed to query this database, but only under strict rules. The primary rule is that queries can only be done if they are related to foreign intelligence or are likely to show evidence of a crime.
Citing cyber investigations, officials ask Congress to renew surveillance powers
(14.06.2023)
In a joint written testimony from the Biden administration witnesses, the NSA, FBI and CIA all cited Section 702’s usefulness for cybersecurity.
US intelligence community presses for FISA Section 702 reauthorization
(13.06.2023)
Officials from U.S. intelligence agencies backed reauthorization of Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act ahead of a U.S. Senate subcommittee hearing Tuesday. One official characterized a potential lapse or „unusable“ modifications to Section 702 as „grave national security risks.“ The support for full reauthorization came as 21 advocacy groups joined on a letter urging reform of Section 702. Meanwhile, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence issued a report regarding purchases of commercially available personal information by the U.S. intelligence community.
„Albtraumszenario“: US-Dienste kaufen massenhaft Handydaten für Überwachung
„Der Regierung wäre es nie erlaubt worden, Milliarden Menschen dazu zu verpflichten, jederzeit Geräte zur Standortüberwachung bei sich zu haben, ihre sozialen Interaktionen aufzuzeichnen oder lückenlose Aufzeichnungen ihrer Lesegewohnheiten vorzuhalten“, fasst das Office of the Director of National Intelligence zusammen. Doch Smartphones, vernetzte Fahrzeugen, Webtracking, das Internet der Dinge und „andere Innovationen“ hätten die gleichen Folgen, ohne dass die Regierung etwas tun müsse.
Bestätigt: US-Geheimdienste kaufen persönliche Daten – Datenschutzbedenken wachsen
Die Art und Weise, wie US-Geheimdienste Daten aus verbundenen Fahrzeugen, Webbrowser-Aktivitäten und Smartphones sammeln und nutzen, steht zunehmend im Fokus. Dabei besteht die Gefahr, dass die unregulierte Verbreitung und der Verkauf von privaten Informationen amerikanischer Bürgerinnen und Bürger deren Privatsphäre bedroht. Der Bericht wurde vom Büro des Direktors der nationalen Geheimdienste (ODNI) veröffentlicht.
In response to my request, DNI Haines has confirmed that the government is buying Americans‘ private data with no guardrails for when and how that data is used. If this isn‘t a wake up call for Congress to stop feds from buying up Americans‘ information, I don‘t know what is.
Office of the Director of National Intelligence Senior Advisory Group Panel on Commercially Available Information
(27 January 2022, approved for release by ODNI on 5 June 2023)
(U) EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
(U) There is today a large and growing amount of what the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) refers to as “Commercially Available Information” (CAI). As the acronym indicates, and as we use the term in this report, CAI is information that is available commercially to the general public, and as such, is a subset of publicly available information (PAI). We do not use the term CAI to include, and we do not address in this report, commercial information that is available exclusively to governments. The volume and sensitivity of CAI have expanded in recent years mainly due to the advancement of digital technology, including location-tracking and other features of smartphones and other electronic devices, and the advertising-based monetization models that underlie many commercial offerings available on the Internet. Although CAI may be “anonymized,” it is often possible (using other CAI) to deanonymize and identify individuals, including U.S. persons.
(…)
Today, in a way that far fewer Americans seem to understand, and even fewer of them can avoid, CAI includes information on nearly everyone that is of a type and level of sensitivity that historically could have been obtained, if at all, only through targeted (and predicated) collection, and that could be used to cause harm to an individual’s reputation, emotional well-being, or physical safety.
(…)
(U) A May 2014 report from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) provides a similar account:
(U) Data brokers collect data from commercial, government, and other publicly available sources. Data collected could include bankruptcy information, voting registration, consumer purchase data, web browsing activities, warranty registrations, and other details of consumers’ everyday interactions.
(…)
1.3. (U) Examples of CAI. We do not attempt a comprehensive description of the scope and scale of data that are available as CAI, or the relevant markets, in part because they are so large and so dynamic. However, a few examples of CAI offerings will illustrate the current nature of available offerings:
• (U) “Thomson Reuters CLEAR is powered by billions of data points and leverages cutting-edge public records technology to bring all key content together in a customizable dashboard.”
• (U) LexisNexis offers more than “84B records from 10,000+ sources, including alternative data that helps surface more of the 63M unbanked/underbanked U.S. adults.”
• (U) Exactis has “over 3.5 billion records (updated monthly)” in its “universal data warehouse.”
• (U) PeekYou “collects and combines scattered content from social sites, news sources, homepages, and blog platforms to present comprehensive online identities.”
(…)
As the FTC explained in its May 2014 report:
(U) Data brokers rely on websites with registration features and cookies to find consumers online and target Internet advertisements to them based on their offline activities. Once a data broker locates a consumer online and places a cookie on the consumer’s browser, the data broker’s client can advertise to that consumer across the Internet for as long as the cookie stays on the consumer’s browser. Consumers may not be aware that data brokers are providing companies with products to allow them to advertise to consumers online based on their offline activities. Some data brokers are using similar technology to serve targeted advertisements to consumers on mobile devices.
(…)
2.2. (U) Examples of CAI Contracts. The IC currently acquires a large amount of CAI. Unclassified IC and other contracts for CAI can be found at Sam.Gov, a U.S. government website that allows searching by agency or sub-agency and by keywords, among other things. By way of example only, this website shows that the following agencies have, have had, have considered, or are considering the following contracts or proposals related to CAI:
• (U) The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) with ZeroFox for social media alerting (15F06721P0002431)
• (censored)
• U) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) for social media reports on individuals who are seeking a security clearance (HHM402-16-SM-CHECKS), and with LexisNexis for “retrieval of comprehensive on-line search results related to commercial due diligence from a maximum number of sources (news, company, public records, legal, regulatory financial, and industry information),” among other things (HHM402-21-Q-0094)
• (U) The U.S. Navy with Sayari Analytics, Inc. for access to its database that “contains tens of thousands of previously-unidentified specific nodes, facilities and key people related to US sanctioned actors including ‘2+3’ threats to national security” (N0001518PR11212)
• (U) Various offices within the Treasury Department for access to Banker’s Almanac (RFQ-FIN-55100-21-0010)
• (U) The Department of Defense (DOD) for access to Jane’s online (W31P4Q17T0009)
• (U) The Coast Guard with Babel Street for “Open Source Data Collection, Translation, Analysis Application” (70Z08419QVA044).
(U) In addition, DIA has provided the following information about a CAI contract in an unclassified and publicly-available paper sent to Congress on January 15, 2021:
(U) DIA currently provides funding to another agency that purchases commercially available geolocation metadata aggregated from smartphones.
……………………………………
US intelligence agencies buy Americans’ personal data, new report says
The report was completed in January 2022 but only recently declassified. Democratic Sen. Ron Wyden of Oregon asked the ODNI for the report.
“Congress needs to pass legislation to put guardrails around government purchases, to rein in private companies that collect and sell this data, and keep Americans’ personal information out of the hands of our adversaries,” Wyden said in a statement Monday in response to the report.
To @POTUS and @TheJusticeDept: Stop the extradition of Assange. I am as indictable as he is on the exact same charges. I will plead „not guilty“ on grounds of your blatantly unconstitutional use of the Espionage Act. Let‘s take this to the Supreme Court.
(06.12.2022)
We can ‘neither confirm nor deny’ we’re spying on Congress
(16.05.2022)
Government attorneys assert it is legal for their agencies to simply open the government purse and buy our data scraped from apps and social media, no warrant needed. When further challenged, the government’s ultimate fallback is a claim that a Reagan-era executive order, known as E.O. 12333, means that it needs no statutory authority to look at whatever it wants.
It wasn’t supposed to be like this. Congress created the Freedom of Information Act in 1967 at a time when lawless surveillance of Americans by the FBI and CIA was rampant.
C.I.A. Is Collecting in Bulk Certain Data Affecting Americans, Senators Warn
(Feb. 10, 2022)
The C.I.A. kept censored the nature of the data when it declassified the letter.
US-Aufsicht: CIA betreibt eigenes Programm zur Massenüberwachung
(12.02.2022)
Das nun zum Teil publik gemacht Big-Data-Programm stützt sich auf die seit Jahren umstrittene Anordnung 12333, die der frühere US-Präsident Ronald Reagan ursprünglich 1981 erlassen hatte. Sie lässt unter anderem zu, dass Unternehmen und andere Einrichtungen überwacht werden, solange diese eine „irgendwie geartete Beziehung zu ausländischen Organisationen oder Mitarbeitern haben“. Dies kann im Fall einer US-Firma schon gelten, wenn dort ein Ausländer angestellt ist.
Assassination in the Law of War
In 1977, following revelations of U.S. lethal targeting operations and ensuing Church (Senate) and the Pike (House) Committee hearings, President Gerald Ford issued Executive Order 11,905. The order prohibited Executive Branch personnel from engaging in, or conspiring to engage in, political assassination. Subsequent administrations continued the ban. Four years later, President Regan issued Executive Order 12,333, which, as amended, remains in effect today. It contains the same prohibition, although it limits application to individuals “acting on behalf of” the U.S. government.
DER 11. SEPTEMBER: Langer Marsch eines Molochs
(10. September 2014)
Entgegen der heutigen Wahrnehmung rauschte die Regierung der USA Anfang des 21. Jahrhunderts keineswegs unvorbereitet in die Attentate des 11. Septembers. Im Gegenteil waren über Jahrzehnte umfangreichste, weit verzweigte „Sicherheits“-Strukturen aufgebaut worden, bereits damals in enger Symbiose mit dem „privaten“, also internationalen kommerziellen Sektor. Sie dienten primär der Informationsgewinnung, innerstaatlich wie international. Legitimation und teils geheime, durch abermals geheime Interpretationen bzw „Rechtsmeinungen“ („legal opinions“) zusätzlich ausgelegte „Executive Orders“ der Präsidenten, bildeten die Rechtfertigung für den Aufbau eines Molochs, eines „lebenden, atmenden Organismus“, der, „jeder Kontrolle entwachsen“, von genau denjenigen finanziert wurde, gegen die er einmal marschieren sollte.
Senators demand answers on expired surveillance programs
Sens. Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Mike Lee (R-Ut.) on Thursday pressed the Trump administration on whether and how mass surveillance programs authorized by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act have been halted since the act‘s expiration.
The letter to Attorney General William Barr and Director of National Intelligence John Ratcliffe raises concerns that the administration may be be continuing to conduct surveillance operations by relying on Executive Order 12333.
The NSA‘s ‚Time Machines‘ Make It Incredibly Easy To Violate Section 702 Restrictions
Marcy Wheeler has a fascinating post about NSA collection activities under Section 702 and Executive Order 12333.
Meet Executive Order 12333: The Reagan rule that lets the NSA spy on Americans
(18.7.2014) Public debate about the bulk collection of U.S. citizens’ data by the NSA has focused largely on Section 215 of the Patriot Act, through which the government obtains court orders to compel American telecommunications companies to turn over phone data. But Section 215 is a small part of the picture and does not include the universe of collection and storage of communications by U.S. persons authorized under Executive Order 12333.
Senator Wyden Wants To Know How Many Times Americans Have Been Targeted By Executive Order 12333
Ever persistent, Wyden has returned with another set of questions [PDF] regarding NSA surveillance. This one pertains to the least-discussed surveillance authorization and the one almost everyone — including members of oversight committees — knows nearly nothing about: Executive Order 12333.
Like Section 702, there‘s a good probability intelligence gathered under this authority is being used by domestic agencies. Backdoor searches of NSA intel have been unofficial common knowledge for years now, so there‘s very little reason to believe the NSA‘s most mysterious authority doesn‘t have its own built-in peepholes for the FBI and other federal agencies.
Executive Order 12333 The Root of Today’s Surveillance State
Way back on December 4, 1981 before the internet, smart phones and smart televisions were even thought of and when computers took up entire rooms and telephones were attached to walls with cords, then President Ronald Reagan signed an Executive Order that would change the face of spying by the United States and its massive intelligence network. The Executive Order, entitled “United States Intelligence Activities“, also known as Executive Order 12333, laid out the goals, directions, duties and responsibilities of the American global intelligence effort. While the U.S. intelligence community had the right to conduct surveillance prior to EO 12333, the community’s original mandate was considerably extended and detailed under EO 12333.
16 Geheimdienste dürfen NSA-Daten einsehen: Obama erlaubt Daten-Analyse
(17.1.2017) Die Anordnung 12333 besagt, dass die NSA Telefon- und E-Mail- Kommunikation von Nicht-US-Bürgern ohne richterlichen Beschluss eingesehen werden dürfen. Zudem erlaube sie das „unabsichtliche“ Sammeln von Daten von US-Bürgern.
Feds may have listened in on candidate Trump via „backdoor searches“
(13.3.2017) Another less common legal proceeding, known as 12333, or “twelve triple-three,” manages U.S. intelligence-gathering offshore. It authorizes the attorney general to permit searches „of communications to or from an American for the purposes of targeting that American – again, as long as the attorney general determines that person is an agent of a foreign power,“ according to The Hill.
Further, the National Security Agency can upload that intercepted intelligence to an online repository through which other intel agencies can search.
Chronologie zum “Patriot Act” (II): „Jedwede greifbaren Dinge“
(Juni 2015) Der “Patriot Act” verändert in seiner (derzeit bis zur Unterschrift des U.S.-Präsidenten stillgelegten) Section 215 den “Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978″ (F.I.S.A. Act) und ermächtigt so zunächst einmal die Bundespolizei F.B.I., zwecks einer „Untersuchung“ zur Abwehr von „internationalem Terrorismus“ und Spionage „jedwede greifbaren Dinge“ („any tangible things“) an sich zu bringen bzw zu „produzieren“, also zu rauben oder zu kopieren (wie Daten zum Beispiel) – ohne Gerichtsbeschluss.
Die entsprechende Rechtsformulierung
„may make an application for an order requiring the production of any tangible things (including books, records, papers, documents, and other items) for an investigation“
ist nicht an Individuen gebunden, kann also durch entsprechende Interpretation als Vollmacht über das gesamte (In-)Land ausgelegt werden.
Des Weiteren ermächtigt Section 215 den Justizminister, der auch oberster Staatsanwalt (“Attorney General”) der U.S.A. ist, für diese “Untersuchung“ des F.B.I. “Handlungsanweisungen” (“guidelines”) nach dem Präsidentenbefehl (“Executive Order”) 12333 von Ronald Reagan vom 4. Dezember 1981 zu erlassen.
Damit kann nicht nur die „National Security Agency“ (N.S.A.), sondern auch die Bundespolizei „Federal Bureau of Investigation“ (F.B.I.) ihre unter Berufung auf Section 215 betriebene Inlands-Spionage ( deren tatsächlicher Umfang geheim ist) wieder aufnehmen.
Trump camp could have fallen into ‚backdoor‘ surveillance
Another, less well-understood surveillance authority comes from a Reagan-era executive order known as 12333, or “twelve triple-three.”
EO 12333 — much of which is redacted — governs U.S. intelligence gathering overseas. It has come under fire from civil liberties advocates, who say it gives the intelligence community a blank check to regulate its own spying.
The Ironies of the EO 12333 Sharing Expansion for Obama and Trump
(30.1.2017) So it is ironic that, with one of his final acts as President, Obama completed the process of normalizing and expanding Stellar Wind with the expansion of EO 12333 information sharing.
As I laid out some weeks ago, on January 3, Loretta Lynch signed procedures that permit the NSA to share its data with any of America’s other 16 intelligence agencies. This gives CIA direct access to NSA data, including on Americans. It gives all agencies who jump through some hoops that ability to access US person metadata available overseas for the kind of analysis allegedly shut down under USA Freedom Act, with far fewer limits in place than existed under the old Section 215 dragnet exposed by Edward Snowden.
And it did so just as an obvious authoritarian took over the White House.
Obama Expands Surveillance Powers on His Way Out
New rules issued by the Obama administration under Executive Order 12333 will let the NSA—which collects information under that authority with little oversight, transparency, or concern for privacy—share the raw streams of communications it intercepts directly with agencies including the FBI, the DEA, and the Department of Homeland Security, according to a report today by the New York Times.
US-Regierung erleichtert NSA die Weitergabe von Überwachungsdaten
(12.1.2017) Die öffentlich gemachte Anordnung passt das berüchtigte präsidiale Dekret 12333 aus der Amtszeit Ronald Reagans an…
DER 11. SEPTEMBER: Langer Marsch eines Molochs
(10.9.2014) Am 29. August 2014 veröffentlichten, angeführt von der „American Civil Liberties Union“ und der „Electronic Frontier Foundation“, über 40 Organisationen, 4 Kongressabgeordnete, sowie ehemalige Regierungsbeamte der Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika über accessnow.org einen offenen Brief an ihren amtierenden Präsidenten Barack Obama:
„Wir rufen den Präsidenten dazu auf, alle gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Rechtsmeinungen („legal opinion“) oder Interpretationen betreffend der Überwachung unter Executive Order 12333 und den darunter erlassenen überwachungsbezogenen Regulatorien zu deklassifizieren (Anm: die Geheimhaltung aufzuheben) und öffentlich zu machen. Geheimes Gesetz ist eine Bedrohung für die Demokratie.
Wir fordern sowohl den Präsidenten, als auch das Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board dazu auf, eine untersuchende Prüfung der Überwachung unter E.O. 12333 durchzuführen, auf der Deklassifizierung von Information zu bestehen die der Öffentlichkeit helfen würde das Wesen und das Ausmaß dieser Überwachung zu verstehen, und so schnell wie möglich Mechanismen und spezifische Schritte vorzuschlagen um oben gemachte Empfehlungen umzusetzen.“
Rund 32 Jahre nach ihrem Erlass am 4. Dezember 1981 war in den USA Executive Order 12333 als eine zentrale Ermächtigung der US-Regierung bei ihrer willkürlichen Massenspionage von Geheimdiensten und assoziierten Konsortien gegen die eigene Bevölkerung („Totalüberwachung“) begriffen worden.
Achten Sie auf die Zahl 12333.
(5. November 2013)
Obama Administration Releases Long Awaited New E.O. 12333 Rules on Sharing of Raw Signals Intelligence Information Within IC
The New York Times reported this morning that the Obama administration has put into place new rules allowing the NSA to disseminate “raw signals intelligence information.” According to a 23-page, mostly declassified copy of the procedures, released today, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper signed the rules on Dec. 15 and Attorney General Loretta Lynch signed them on Jan. 3.
The changes have been a long time coming. On February 25, 2016, Charlie Savage reported for the Times that the Obama administration would soon be implementing a new system, years in the making, to provide more intelligence agencies across the federal government direct access to raw information collected by the NSA.
DoD Releases Update of Manual Governing Defense Intelligence Activities
The effort to update the 1982 DoD manual’s procedures was an interagency process, Mahar explained.
“We went line by line, procedure by procedure,” he said, working with senior representatives of all defense intelligence components as the updated guidelines were finalized.
DoD officials included representatives from the military services, the Joint Staff and several defense and combat support agencies, including the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, the National Security Agency, and the Joint Improvised-Threat Defeat Agency.
“We worked closely with the Justice Department and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence because EO 12333 requires approval by the attorney general after consultation with the DNI,” he said, noting that the process was a good example of interagency collaboration.
“We took a very complex set of procedures and effectively updated them to deal with current and near-future operating practices and capabilities,” he said
Lawmakers say NSA plan to expand sharing data ‘unconstitutional’
Our country has always drawn a line between our military and intelligence services, and domestic policing and spying,” the lawmakers wrote. “We do not — and should not — use U.S. Army Apache helicopters to quell domestic riots; Navy Seal teams to take down counterfeiting rings; or the NSA to conduct surveillance on domestic street gangs.”
The executive branch is able to change its rules for some surveillance programs without congressional approval. Without a law from Congress, the government relies on executive order 12333, which was signed by President Ronald Reagan in 1981 and later modified by President George W. Bush.