The New York Times found that the broad contours of the plan were first discussed in late 2023, at private meetings of like-minded officials, military officers and business people with close ties to the Israeli government.
The group called itself the Mikveh Yisrael Forum, after a college where members convened in December 2023. Its leading figures gradually settled on the idea of hiring private contractors to distribute food in Gaza, circumventing the United Nations.
The planning documents anticipated public skepticism and preemptively prepared talking points in case the GHF encountered allegations likening its food distribution hubs and residential compounds to “‘concentration camps’ with biometrics” or comparing the organization to Blackwater, a former U.S. mercenary firm implicated in violence against civilians in Iraq.
(…)
In mid-2024, Israeli officials shared their plans with a group of private-sector American consultants led by Phil Reilly, a retired CIA paramilitary officer and former agency station chief in Afghanistan. Reilly’s group, said five of the Israeli and American individuals, took over the planning and determined that a new company led by Reilly, named Safe Reach Solutions, would be the future subcontractor that would provide security and logistics for the hubs.
(November 30, 2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
The investigation into the decision-making process made by top officials on the eve of the attack found that the IDF identified five signs of unusual Hamas activity the night before the terror group’s October 7 onslaught, but believed they did not indicate an imminent attack.
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This investigation also found that the IDF’s conduct, decision-making, and intelligence assessments on the night between October 6 and 7 were based on the result of years of false assessments about Hamas.
As a result, intelligence officials on all levels failed to provide a warning for what would come.
Hamas had studied Nahal Oz from afar for years prior to launching the deadly assault and was intimately familiar with the layout of the base, including “where every room was,” the report says. It adds that the terror group knew that the base would be operating at a reduced capacity due to the Jewish holiday of Simhat Torah, which fell on a Saturday that year.
(…)
The probe also reportedly addresses the impact that the incessant rocket fire had on the devastation inside the military outpost, as terrorists were able to easily kill large groups of soldiers who had gathered in bomb shelters.
(November 30, 2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
Six medical humanitarian groups, whose emergency medical missions in Gaza have collectively treated over 15,000 patients since October 2023 have been informed this week that their medical missions will hereafter be denied entry into Gaza.
The notice was delivered to these organisations via text message from the World Health Organisation (WHO) following an order issued by the Israeli military via Israel’s ‘Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories’ (COGAT). The reasons behind Israel’s order remain unclear; no information has been provided on the reason or process behind the order to halt life-saving medical missions to Gaza.
This is a death sentence for thousands of patients in Gaza.
(November 30, 2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
(15.01.2024)
(30.11.2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
(30.11.2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
(01.12.2023 16:29 Uhr)
Laut New York Times war der Bericht weiten Kreisen der israelischen Sicherheitskräfte zugänglich – neben den Angriffsplänen habe er auch geheime Informationen über die israelische Armee und deren Kommunikation enthalten. Wie die Hamas an solch sicherheitsrelevante Informationen kommen konnte, sei unklar.
(Oct. 15, 2023)
Consider what some in the Israeli defense establishment have said.
“The State of Israel has no choice but to turn Gaza into a place that is temporarily or permanently impossible to live in,” a reservist major general, Giora Eiland, wrote in Yedioth Ahronoth, an Israeli newspaper. “Creating a severe humanitarian crisis in Gaza is a necessary means to achieve the goal.” He added, “Gaza will become a place where no human being can exist.” Defense Minister Yoav Gallant said, “We are fighting human animals, and we are acting accordingly.” Maj. Gen. Ghassan Alian declared that in Gaza, “there will be no electricity and no water. There will only be destruction. You wanted hell; you will get hell.”
(9 October 2023)
However, Israel was not only reportedly ignoring clear warnings from its allies.
For Palestinians in Gaza, Israel’s eyes are never very far away. Surveillance drones buzz constantly in the skies. The highly secured border is awash with security cameras and soldiers on guard. Intelligence agencies work sources and cyber capabilities to draw out information.
But Israel’s eyes appeared to have been closed in the lead-up to the surprise onslaught by the Hamas terror group, which broke through Israeli border barriers and sent hundreds of terrorists into Israel to carry out a brazen attack that killed over 700 people and wounded over 2,000.
(July 19, 2021)
NSO Group’s spyware has been used to facilitate human rights violations around the world on a massive scale, according to a major investigation into the leak of 50,000 phone numbers of potential surveillance targets. These include heads of state, activists and journalists, including Jamal Khashoggi’s family.
Er kündigte eine tiefgreifende Untersuchung der Vorfälle an. Dann werde man die Konsequenzen ziehen. „Aber im Moment haben wir nur eine Aufgabe vor Augen – zurückschlagen und im Krieg siegen!“ Er stößt damit ins gleiche Horn wie der Chef des Inlandsgeheimdienstes Shin Bet, Ronen Bar. Der hatte bereits am Montag Verantwortung für den Fehlschlag übernommen und für die Zeit nach dem Krieg eine Untersuchung angekündigt.
Der Chef des israelischen Militärgeheimdienstes, Aharon Chaliva, hat nach dem verheerenden Hamas-Terroranschlag in Israel eine persönliche Verantwortung eingeräumt. (…)
Auch der Chef des Inlandsgeheimdienstes Schin Bet, Ronen Bar, hatte gestern Versäumnisse eingeräumt.
Halevi says a time will come to investigate how Hamas managed to carry out the attack.
Hamas took advantage of that weakness by sending aerial drones to attack the cellular towers that transmitted signals to and from the surveillance system, according to the officials and also drone footage circulated by Hamas on Saturday and analyzed by The New York Times. (…)
The second operational failure was the clustering of leaders from the army’s Gaza division in a single location along the border. Once the base was overrun, most of the senior officers were killed, injured or taken hostage, according to two of the Israeli officials.
In a video statement, Maj. Gen. Ghassan Alian, head of COGAT, says: “Kidnapping, abusing and murdering children, women and elderly people is not human. There is no justification for that. Hamas has turned into ISIS, and the residents of Gaza, instead of being appalled, are celebrating.
“Human animals must be treated as such. There will be no electricity and no water [in Gaza], there will only be destruction. You wanted hell, you will get hell.”