Daily Archives: 21. September 2022


21.09.2022 - 21:55 [ Washington Post ]

Don’t let Putin bluff us. Russia is losing.

With defeat looming, Putin is trotting out a new strategy: He will annex Ukrainian territory and then threaten to use nuclear weapons if the Ukrainians and their allies in the West don’t let him get away with it. If the West were to give in to his nuclear blackmail, what would stop him from announcing tomorrow that Kyiv is also Russian territory (which he clearly believes)? Or Tallinn? Or Tbilisi? Or even Warsaw or Helsinki? We cannot live in a world where an evil dictator can redraw international borders at will with threats of nuclear annihilation. And we don’t have to.

21.09.2022 - 21:49 [ Robert van der Noordaa / Nitter ]

… didn‘t Putin say that he would have used nuclear weapons if the West would have interfered with Krim annexation?

(28 Oct 2016)

21.09.2022 - 21:12 [ White House ]

Remarks by President Biden Before the 77th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Putin’s own words make his true purpose unmistakable. Just before he invaded, Putin asserted — and I quote — Ukraine was “created by Russia” and never had, quote, “real statehood.”

And now we see attacks on schools, railway stations, hospitals, wa- — on centers of Ukrainian history and culture.

In the past, even more horrifying evidence of Russia’s atrocity and war crimes: mass graves uncovered in Izyum; bodies, according to those that excavated those bodies, showing signs of torture.

This war is about extinguishing Ukraine’s right to exist as a state, plain and simple, and Ukraine’s right to exist as a people. Whoever you are, wherever you live, whatever you believe, that should not — that should make your blood run cold.

21.09.2022 - 21:10 [ Independent.co.uk ]

UN General Assembly – live: Biden condemns Kremlin’s ‘overt nuclear threats against Europe’ in speech to UNGA

Mr Biden’s speech comes a day after Russian president Vladimir Putin announced a partial mobilisation of 300,000 reservists as his forces struggle to regain their footing after a series of Ukrainian victories on the battlefield.

Russia‘s war in Ukraine dominated the first day of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) as world leaders gathered for the summit in person after three years in New York.

21.09.2022 - 21:01 [ Democracy Now ]

At U.N., Germany’s Scholz Denounces Russian Invasion as “Imperialism”

Tuesday marked the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. Many world leaders condemned Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. This is German Chancellor Olaf Scholz.

21.09.2022 - 20:58 [ Newsweek ]

Ex-Putin Advisor Threatens Nuclear Weapons in First 20 Seconds of Interview

Show host Justin Webb interjected to ask Markov if he believes Putin‘s speech included „a clear threat“ to „start a general nuclear war that would kill everyone.“

„Not everyone,“ Markov replied, but it would „kill a lot of people in the Western countries.“

21.09.2022 - 20:52 [ theGuardian.com ]

‚I‘m not bluffing‘: Putin warns west over nuclear weapons – video

In a national address on Wednesday, President Vladimir Putin says Russia will be mobilising further troops for the war in Ukraine. He claims the west is using the threat of nuclear weapons to blackmail Russia, and that ‚those who try to blackmail us with nuclear weapons should know that the weathervane can turn and point towards them‘.

Putin also said Russia would give its full support to the referendums announced for this weekend in Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia to join the Russian Federation

21.09.2022 - 20:30 [ Washington Post ]

What does Putin’s partial military mobilization mean for Russia and Ukraine?

Russian President Vladimir Putin announced a “partial mobilization” of reservists as his country faces setbacks in its invasion of Ukraine. The move, announced in an address to his nation on Wednesday, marks Russia’s first military mobilization since World War II.

21.09.2022 - 12:45 [ Radio Utopie ]

„Selbst Forderung der Drei Westmächte könnte die verfassungswidrige Grundgesetzänderung nicht rechtfertigen“

(19. Februar 2017)

Artikelserie (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) zu den Verfassungsgerichtsbeschlüssen 2 BvE 5/15 (zur Nichtannahme der Verfassungsklage der G 10-Kommission auf Einsicht in die „N.S.A.-Selektorenliste“) und 2 BvE 2/15 (zur Geheimhaltung der „Selektorenliste“ auch vor dem „Untersuchungsausschuss“ von Bundesnachrichtendienst und National Security Agency). Und zu deren Vorgeschichte und Folgen.

Wie zuvor von uns dokumentiert, hob im Sommer 1968 das „siebzehnte Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Grundgesetzes“ („Notstandsgesetze“) die Gewaltenteilung bezüglich des Brief- Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses auf und schrieb zudem in das Grundgesetz ein Recht des Staates, den betroffenen Bürgerinnen und Bürgern die Verletzung ihres Brief- Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses durch den Staat nicht einmal mitzuteilen.

Über nachfolgend eingereichte Verfassungsklagen gegen dieses „siebzehnte Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Grundgesetzes“ vom 24. Juni 1968, sowie gegen das anschließend von „S.P.D.“, „C.D.U.“ und „C.S.U.“ ebenfalls beschlossene ausführende erste Artikel 10-Gesetz vom 13. August 1968, entschied das westdeutsche Verfassungsgericht in Karlsruhe am 12. Dezember 1970 im Verfahren 2 BvF 1/69; 2 BvR 629/68; 2 BvR 308/69, auch „Abhörurteil“ genannt und heute zumeist zitiert als BVerfGE 30, 1. (Quelle 1, Quelle 2)

Mit 5 zu 3 Stimmen beurteilte der zweite Senat die „Notstandsgesetze“ als verfassungsgemäß. Aufgehoben wurde lediglich ein kleiner Abschnitt im ausführenden Artikel 10-Gesetz.

Für die „Notstandsgesetze“ der „großen Koalition“ stimmten die Richter Seuffert, Dr. Leibholz, Dr. Geiger, Dr. Kutscher und Dr. Rinck.

Dagegen stimmten die Richter Geller, Dr. v.Schlabrendorff und Dr. Rupp. Hier Auszüge ihrer abweichenden Meinung zum Urteil vom 15. Dezember 1970 (der Link zu den „Großer Lauschangriff“ genannten Verfassungsänderungen der „großen Koalition“ dreißig Jahre später in 1998, wiederum Grundlage für das B.K.A.-Gesetz der „großen Koalition“ in 2008, wurde hinzugefügt):

…………..

21.09.2022 - 12:30 [ Radio Utopie ]

13. August 1968: Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses (Gesetz zu Artikel 10 Grundgesetz) (G10)

(10.6.2015)

Anm. der Red.: Da der Öffentlichkeit der Republik das „Gesetz zur Beschränkung des Brief-, Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnisses (Gesetz zu Artikel 10 Grundgesetz) (G10)“ vom 13. August 1968 bis heute offensichtlich weder zur Kenntnis gebracht wurde, noch im Internet in Textform vorliegt, sowie die Verwendung einer PDF des Bundesanzeigers über den privaten Gebrauch hinaus „nicht statthaft ist“, haben wir das gesamte Gesetz abgetippt. Es dürfte unter einer Bevölkerung von 80 Millionen Menschen rund 200 Personen bekannt sein.

21.09.2022 - 12:20 [ Documentarchiv.de ]

Siebzehntes Gesetz zur Ergänzung des Grundgesetzes [„Notstandsgesetze“] Vom 24. Juni 1968

2. Artikel 10 erhält folgende Fassung:

„Artikel 10

(1) Das Briefgeheimnis sowie das Post- und Fernmeldegeheimnis sind unverletzlich.
(2) Beschränkungen dürfen nur auf Grund eines Gesetzes angeordnet werden. Dient die Beschränkung dem Schutze der freiheitlichen demokratischen Grundordnung oder des Bestandes oder der Sicherung des Bundes oder eines Landes, so kann das Gesetz bestimmen, daß sie dem Betroffenen nicht mitgeteilt wird und daß an die Stelle des Rechtsweges die Nachprüfung durch von der Volksvertretung bestellte Organe und Hilfsorgane tritt.“

(…)

6. Artikel 19 Abs. 4 wird durch folgenden Satz ergänzt:

„Artikel 10 Abs. 2 Satz 2 bleibt unberührt.“

21.09.2022 - 12:05 [ UN.org ]

The right to privacy in the digital age – Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights

56. With this in mind, OHCHR recommends that States:

(a) Ensure that any interference with the right to privacy, including hacking, restrictions to access and use of encryption technology and surveillance of the public, complies with international human rights law, including the principles of legality, legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality and non-discrimination, and does not impair the essence of that right;

(b) Conduct human rights due diligencesystematically, including regular
comprehensive human rights impact assessments, when designing, developing, purchasing, deploying and operating surveillance systems;

(c) Take into account, when conducting human rights due diligence and
assessing the necessity and proportionality of new surveillance systems and powers, the entire legal and technological environment in which those systems or powers are or would be embedded; States should also consider risks of abuse, function creep and repurposing, including risks as a result of future political changes;

(d) Adopt and effectively enforce, through independent, impartial and well-resourced authorities, data privacy legislation for the public and private sectors that complies with international human rights law, including safeguards, oversight and remedies to effectively protect the right to privacy;

(e) Take immediate measures to effectively increase the transparency of the use of surveillance technologies, including by appropriately informing the public and affected individuals and communities and regularly providing data relevant for the public to assess their efficacy and impact on human rights;

(f) Promote public debate of the use of surveillance technologies and ensure meaningful participation of all stakeholders in decisions on the acquisition, transfer, sale, development, deployment and use of surveillance technologies, including the elaboration of public policies and their implementation;

(g) Implement moratoriums on the domestic and transnational sale and use of surveillance systems, such as hacking tools and biometric systems that can be used for the identification or classification of individuals in public places, until adequate safeguards to protect human rights are in place; such safeguards should include domestic and export control measures, in line with the recommendations made herein
and in previous reports to the Human Rights Council;

(h) Ensure that victims of human rights violations and abuses linked to the use of surveillance systems have access to effective remedies. In relation to the specific issues raised in the present report, OHCHR
recommends that States:

Hacking

(a) Ensure that the hacking of personal devices is employed by authorities only as a last resort, used only to prevent or investigate a specific act amounting to a serious threat to national security or a specific serious crime, and narrowly targeted at the person suspected of committing those acts; such measures should be subject to strict independent oversight and should require prior approval by a judicial body;

Encryption

(b) Promote and protect strong encryption and avoid all direct, or indirect, general and indiscriminate restrictions on the use of encryption, such as prohibitions, criminalization, the imposition of weak encryption standards or requirements for mandatory general client-side scanning; interference with the encryption of private communications of individuals should only be carried out when authorized by an independent judiciary body and on a case-by-case basis, targeting individuals if strictly necessary for the investigation of serious crimes or the prevention of serious crimes or
serious threats to public safety or national security;

Surveillance of public spaces and export control of surveillance technology

(c) Adopt adequate legal frameworks to govern the collection, analysis and sharing of social media intelligence that clearly define permissible grounds, prerequisites, authorization procedures and adequate oversight mechanisms;

(d) Avoid general privacy-intrusive monitoring of public spaces and ensure that all public surveillance measures are strictly necessary and proportionate for achieving important legitimate objectives, including by strictly limiting their location and time, as well as the duration of data storage, the purpose of data use and access to data; biometric recognition systems should only be used in public spaces to prevent or
investigate serious crimes or serious public safety threats and if all requirements under international human rights law are implemented with regard to public spaces;

(e) Establish robust well-tailored export control regimes applicable to surveillance technologies, the use of which carries high risks for the enjoyment of human rights; States should require transparent human rights impact assessments that take into account the capacities of the technologies at issue as well as the situation in the recipient State, including compliance with human rights, adherence to the rule of law,
the existence and effective enforcement of applicable laws regulating surveillance activities and the existence of independent oversight mechanisms;

(f) Ensure that, in the provision and use of surveillance technologies, public-private partnerships uphold and expressly incorporate human rights standards and do not result in an abdication of governmental accountability for human rights.

21.09.2022 - 11:47 [ Netzpolitik.org ]

Client-Side-Scanning: UN-Menschenrechtskommissar erteilt Chatkontrolle deutliche Absage

(19.09.2022)

Der UN-Menschenrechtskommissar hat sich in einem Bericht zum „Recht auf Privatsphäre im digitalen Zeitalter“ (PDF auf unserem Server), der sich mit Trojanern wie Pegasus, der Rolle von Verschlüsselung sowie der Überwachung öffentlicher Räume beschäftigt, kritisch gegenüber der Technologie des Client-Side-Scannings ausgesprochen. Diese ist im Rahmen der Einführung einer Chatkontrolle in der EU als Überwachungstechnologie im Gespräch.