Additionally, Katz says that his position, whereby officers who served in the Southern Command on October 7 will not be promoted, “remains unchanged.” This comes after Zamir ruled that there was no issue with the promotion of three senior officers, whose promotions were previously held up or canceled by Katz.
Archiv: Southern Command (Israel)
Israel’s army chief dismisses officers for ‘failure to prevent’ 7 October attack
(November 23, 2025)
Israeli chief of staff Eyal Zamir on Sunday dismissed senior officers in the military over „failure to prevent“ the 7 October 2023 attack by Hamas, local media reported.
Zamir ended the service of several retired generals, including the former Military Intelligence chief Aharon Haliva, former Southern Command chief Yaron Finkelman, and former Operations Directorate chief Oded Basyuk, according to the public broadcaster KAN.
The report said that Zamir also dismissed Gaza Division reserve commander Avi Rosenfeld, while the division’s intelligence officer was expelled from the army altogether.
Zum Völkermord gezwungen?
Der Vernichtungskrieg gegen die Hamas und Gaza sei alternativlos und aus Notwehr erfolgt, behauptet Israels Ministerpräsident Netanjahu. Was aber, wenn sich der Terroranschlag vom 7. Oktober 2023 hätte verhindern lassen? Vieles spricht dafür, dass seine rechtsgerichtete Regierung die Dinge hat geschehen lassen. Müsste die Geschichte dann nicht umgeschrieben werden, fragt sich Ralf Wurzbacher.
HRF and PCHR File ICC Complaint on the Nasser Hospital Massacre: Exposing the Command Chain Behind the Killing of 22 Civilians
(August 31, 2025)
Today, the Hind Rajab Foundation (HRF) and the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR) submitted a formal complaint to the International Criminal Court (ICC) regarding the massacre at Nasser Hospital in Khan Younis on 25 August 2025. The attack killed 22 civilians, including five journalists, three hospital staff, one doctor, a civil defense worker, and one child, 14-year-old Rayan Omar Mahmoud Abu Omar. More than fifty others were injured in what can only be described as a deliberate double-tap strike carried out with full knowledge of the civilian presence.
The Hunt for Anas Al-Sharif’s Killers: HRF and PCHR Bring Israel’s War on Journalists to the ICC
(August 12, 2025)
Following the Chain of Command
When HRF investigators began reconstructing the strike, they followed the trail from the moment a drone camera locked onto Al-Sharif’s position to the instant the missile hit.
Using operational patterns, signals intelligence reports, and expert military analysis, the foundation identified the chain of command behind the killing:
– Lt.-Gen. Eyal Zamir – IDF Chief of the General Staff
– Maj.-Gen. Tomer Bar – Commander of the Israeli Air Force
– Maj.-Gen. Yaniv Asor – Southern Command Commander
– Brig.-Gen. Yossi Sariel – Former Commander of Unit 8200 (Israel’s signals intelligence branch)
– General A. : Current Commander of Unit 8200
– Palmachim Airbase Commander – Name undisclosed
– “Black Snake” Squadron Commander – Name undisclosed
– Col. Avichay Adraee – IDF Spokesperson’s Unit, Arab Media Division, responsible for a sustained smear campaign against Al-Sharif
At the political summit stands Benjamin Netanyahu, the Prime Minister who presided over—and encouraged—a strategy to eliminate journalists as part of Israel’s assault on Gaza.
Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago
(November 30, 2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago
(November 30, 2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
‘Out of deep concern for the State of Israel’: Full text of Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar’s affidavit
– I authorized, following a request from the IDF Chief of Staff, the opening of an investigation into the theft of classified military documents and their transfer to media outlets.
– I refused to draft a legal opinion whose aim was effectively to prevent the possibility of the Prime Minister continuing to testify in his trial.
– The draft of the internal Shin Bet review was submitted to the Prime Minister. It refers to the service’s failure to prevent the massacre, while also presenting the long-standing policy of the political leadership regarding the Gaza Strip and the exceptional and repeated warnings delivered by the Shin Bet to the political echelon throughout 2023 – which were ignored.
– A letter was attached to the review, addressed to the Prime Minister, explaining how Hamas’s military buildup occurred before the eyes of the State of Israel, funded by Qatar and enabled by a defensive policy, and highlighting the need for a state commission of inquiry to investigate all aspects of the road that led to October 7.
Israels Spionagechef erhebt schwere Vorwürfe gegen Premierminister Netanjahu
Ferner heißt es in der Erklärung, Bar habe es abgelehnt, Maßnahmen zu ergreifen, welche zu Verzögerungen in einem gegen Netanjahu laufenden Korruptionsprozess geführt hätten. Dies sei auch der wahre Grund für seine vom Obersten Gericht gestoppte Entlassung als Geheimdienstchef, ließ Bar verlautbaren. Zudem beschuldigte Bar den Premier, von ihm persönliche Loyalität verlangt zu haben. Es bestand keine Zweifel daran, dass Bar im Falle einer Verfassungskrise Netanjahu und nicht dem Obersten Gerichtshof hätte dienen müssen, heißt es in der Erklärung.
Die Generalstaatsanwaltschaft publizierte das brisante Dokument Bars.
Israel expects ‚significant crisis‘ in Gaza as it plans to continue total blockade
According to a report on Israeli news site Walla, the Israeli military is not concerned about the dire humanitarian situation in Gaza, which has been without any humanitarian aid for the last 51 days after Israel declared its total blockade.
Sources in Israel’s Southern Command, who spoke to Walla, estimated that “in two weeks, a significant crisis will begin in the Gaza Strip regarding food, medical equipment and medicines”.
IDF’s Oct. 7 probes show it misread Hamas for years, left southern Israel utterly vulnerable
The investigation into the decision-making process made by top officials on the eve of the attack found that the IDF identified five signs of unusual Hamas activity the night before the terror group’s October 7 onslaught, but believed they did not indicate an imminent attack.
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This investigation also found that the IDF’s conduct, decision-making, and intelligence assessments on the night between October 6 and 7 were based on the result of years of false assessments about Hamas.
As a result, intelligence officials on all levels failed to provide a warning for what would come.
Leaked IDF probe: Only one soldier was guarding Nahal Oz outpost on Oct. 7, Hamas had studied base layout for years
Hamas had studied Nahal Oz from afar for years prior to launching the deadly assault and was intimately familiar with the layout of the base, including “where every room was,” the report says. It adds that the terror group knew that the base would be operating at a reduced capacity due to the Jewish holiday of Simhat Torah, which fell on a Saturday that year.
(…)
The probe also reportedly addresses the impact that the incessant rocket fire had on the devastation inside the military outpost, as terrorists were able to easily kill large groups of soldiers who had gathered in bomb shelters.
Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago
(November 30, 2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago
(November 30, 2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
They were Israel‘s eyes on the border – but their Hamas warnings went unheard
(15.01.2024)
Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago
(30.11.2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
They were Israel‘s eyes on the border – but their Hamas warnings went unheard
Combative security cabinet meeting on post-war Gaza uncovers coalition‘s crisis
Israel‘s War Cabinet gathered overnight on Friday to discuss the future of the Gaza Strip after the nation‘s war against Hamas ends. The meeting was reportedly cut off after lawmakers clashed with the defense establishment over the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) investigation of the mistakes leading to the October 7 tragedy that had previously been promised to start after the Israel-Hamas war.
Miri Regev, Minister of Transport and Road Safety, pointed out that the decision over the probe had been made without lawmakers‘ knowledge and argued that the army should be fully focused on the combat in the moment.
Breaking: The IDF has begun investigating the 7.10 incident. Investigation teams have been established, including former Chief of Staff Shaul Mofaz, former head of Military Intelligence Zeevi Farkash, and former Southern Command chief Sami Turgeman.
(05.01.2024)
IDF says troops fired warning shots at UN convoy on Friday due to miscommunication
Citing an investigation into Friday’s incident, the IDF Spokespersons Unit says in a statement to The Times of Israel that after the UN humanitarian convoy finished delivering aid to shelters in northern Gaza, it was asked by the military to go via a different route back south.
“This was to maintain its safety given the fighting that was taking place near the area,” the IDF says.
#Gaza – Israeli soldiers fired at an aid convoy as it returned from Northern Gaza along a route designated by the Israeli Army – our international convoy leader and his team were not injured but one vehicle sustained damage – aid workers should never be a target. @UNRWA
(29.12.2023)
Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago
(30.11.2023)
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
In Haifa, an Arab-Jewish pro-peace rally calls for a deal to ensure the release of all the hostages. „We want them home. With their families, with all of us. It‘s possible.“
Tel Aviv
Gantz and Eisenkot to meet with families of hostages
The Hostages and Missing Persons Families Forum says that at its request, war cabinet ministers Benny Gantz and Gadi Eisenkot will meet with representatives of the families at Tel Aviv’s Hostages Square at 8 p.m.
Gantz is then slated to take part in a joint press conference at 9 p.m. with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yoav Gallant.
ABC News’ @inesdLC reports from Tel Aviv where a protest broke out after the IDF announced it mistakenly killed three Israeli hostages during combat in Gaza.
A spontaneous protest took place in Tel Aviv tonight after the IDF reported the killing of three hostages in the Gaza Strip who were mistaken for Hamas militants by the Israeli military. Among the main demands of the protesters is the resignation of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
The Forum of Hostage Families announced a rally outside the IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv at 7:30 pm– and almost immediately after, PM Netanyahu announced he‘d be holding a press conference at the same place– but inside the building– at 8:30 pm. Please look shocked.
No Israeli government rep has called the families. Let that sink in.
Initial IDF probe: Hostages were shirtless, waving white flag when troops opened fire
Yotam Haim, Samar Talalka and Alon Lulu Shamriz managed to escape Hamas captivity before they were mistakenly shot dead by troops on Friday. (…)
Meanwhile, sounds of someone shouting “Help” in Hebrew were heard by troops in the area.
Moments later, the third man came out of the building to which he had fled, and another soldier opened fire at him, killing him.
IDF troops mistakenly open fire and kill 3 hostages in northern Gaza battlefield
Hagari said the IDF bears full responsibility for the “tragic incident,” which took place on Friday morning, “in an area where the soldiers encountered many terrorists, including suicide bombers.”
Hagari named the hostages as Yotam Haim, who was abducted by Hamas from Kibbutz Kfar Aza, and Samar Fouad Talalka, who was abducted from Nir Am. The third hostage was later named as Alon Shamriz, also from Kfar Aza.
Israel Knew Hamas’s Attack Plan More Than a Year Ago
The document circulated widely among Israeli military and intelligence leaders, but experts determined that an attack of that scale and ambition was beyond Hamas’s capabilities, according to documents and officials. It is unclear whether Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu or other top political leaders saw the document, as well.
(…)
Last year, shortly after the document was obtained, officials in the Israeli military’s Gaza division, which is responsible for defending the border with Gaza, said that Hamas’s intentions were unclear.
“It is not yet possible to determine whether the plan has been fully accepted and how it will be manifested,” read a military assessment reviewed by The Times.
New York Times zitiert Sicherheitspapier: Wusste Israel von Hamas-Angriffsplan?
(01.12.2023 16:29 Uhr)
Laut New York Times war der Bericht weiten Kreisen der israelischen Sicherheitskräfte zugänglich – neben den Angriffsplänen habe er auch geheime Informationen über die israelische Armee und deren Kommunikation enthalten. Wie die Hamas an solch sicherheitsrelevante Informationen kommen konnte, sei unklar.