The minister further noted that Saudi Arabia has completed the essential administrative preparations to rescind the Small Quantities Protocol in cooperation with the IAEA and has fully implemented the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, as of early 2025.
Archiv: Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) (outdated 1970 IAEA nuclear supervision procedure) / Revised Small Quantities Protocol (Additional Protocol / 2005)
A nuclear consortium in the Persian Gulf as a basis for a new nuclear deal between the United States and Iran
(June 2, 2025)
Concerns about uranium-enrichment and related potential nuclear-weapons ambitions of both Iran and Saudi Arabia could be dealt with by a regional nuclear consortium within which enrichment-related activities would be spread across and shared among states, rather than be national nuclear programs.
We sketch here a possible regional multinational nuclear consortium whose initial core partners are Iran, Oman, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
Saudi Push for Enrichment Raises Concerns
(November 2023)
The Wall Street Journal reported in September that Netanyahu directed Israeli officials to work with the United States on an agreement that includes Saudi enrichment, but such a deal still would face criticism in Israel. (…)
Given Saudi Arabia’s public threats to develop nuclear weapons, it may be challenging for the Biden administration to gain support for any agreement that allows uranium enrichment, particularly if the kingdom does not have an additional protocol to its comprehensive safeguards agreement in place. Additional protocols to safeguards agreements were developed in the 1990s when it became clear from the cases of Iraq and North Korea that a comprehensive safeguard agreement alone was insufficient to prevent proliferation. An additional protocol gives the IAEA more access and information about a country’s nuclear activities.
The coming US-Saudi nuclear deal: Keep it honest
(January 5, 2024)
In 1988, the Central Intelligence Agency did discover that Riyadh bought SS-2 medium-range missiles from China but only after the deal was sealed. In 2003, when China exported DF-21 ballistic missiles to the Kingdom, the CIA again found out and was even allowed to verify the missiles were not nuclear-capable, but only after the missiles were delivered.
Several years later, when intelligence finally leaked out that China secretly built missile factories for the Saudis, the Trump administration was mum on whether there was an intelligence failure and allowed speculation that it had blessed the transaction. Then, in 2020, when US intelligence confirmed China was helping the Kingdom mill uranium domestically, it did so, again only after the mining and milling were well underway.
This track record of studied inadvertence, then, brings us to the next worry: MBS wants Washington to green-light the Kingdom enriching uranium…
Normalization for Proliferation? The Saudi Nuclear Strategy and the Price of Peace with Israel
(March 19, 2023)
In general, the Saudis wish to present themselves as Iran’s equals, and if Iran can enrich uranium, say the Saudis, then so can we. In addition, the Saudis want to keep all their nuclear options open, even if they are not intending to work on the development of nuclear weapons immediately.
The coming US-Saudi nuclear deal: Keep it honest
(January 5, 2024)
In 1988, the Central Intelligence Agency did discover that Riyadh bought SS-2 medium-range missiles from China but only after the deal was sealed. In 2003, when China exported DF-21 ballistic missiles to the Kingdom, the CIA again found out and was even allowed to verify the missiles were not nuclear-capable, but only after the missiles were delivered.
Several years later, when intelligence finally leaked out that China secretly built missile factories for the Saudis, the Trump administration was mum on whether there was an intelligence failure and allowed speculation that it had blessed the transaction. Then, in 2020, when US intelligence confirmed China was helping the Kingdom mill uranium domestically, it did so, again only after the mining and milling were well underway.
This track record of studied inadvertence, then, brings us to the next worry: MBS wants Washington to green-light the Kingdom enriching uranium…
Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol is not a stand-alone agreement, but rather a protocol to a safeguards agreement that provides additional tools for verification. In particular, it significantly increases the IAEA’s ability to verify the peaceful use of all nuclear material in States with comprehensive safeguards agreements.
More on Safeguards agreements
Voluntary offer agreements…
Item-specific safeguards agreements…
Additional Protocol
The Additional Protocol is designed for States that have any type of safeguards agreement with the IAEA. States with CSAs that decide to conclude additional protocols must accept all provisions of the Model Protocol Additional, which was approved by the Board of Governors in 1997. States with item-specific or voluntary offer agreements may accept and implement those measures of the Model Additional Protocol that they are prepared to accept.
Small Quantities Protocols
The small quantities protocol is a protocol that may be concluded in conjunction with a comprehensive safeguards agreement. It has been available since 1971 and its text was standardized in 1974 (original small quantities protocol).
The original small quantities protocol was made available to States with minimal or no nuclear material and no nuclear material in a “facility.”
Saudis commit to full UN atomic agency inspection of nuclear activities
Saudi Energy Minister Prince Abdulaziz bin Salman told a meeting of the IAEA annual General Conference in Vienna that his country is ready to adopt the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement, which has stricter inspections and monitoring.
Saudi crown prince says in rare interview ‚every day we get closer‘ to normalization with Israel
National Security Council spokesman John Kirby told reporters before the interview was shown that it was best for the leaders of Israel and Saudi Arabia „to speak to how close they think they are, and where they think they are“ in the process.
„Obviously, we encourage normalization. We think it‘s good not just for Israel and Saudi Arabia, we think it‘s good for the whole region,“ Kirby said.
Saudi Arabia weighs nuclear power offers from China and France in bid to sway US
(August 26, 2023)
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Opposition Leader Lapid: Israel Must Not Agree to Saudi Enrichment
Amid reports that Netanyahu directed top Israeli nuclear experts to partake in negotiations over a U.S.-Saudi deal, Lapid says a stance allowing Saudi enrichment is ‚reckless,‘ and warns it will trigger a ‚Middle East nuclear arms race‘
The US Position on Saudi Arabia’s Civilian Nuclear Program
(Aug 16, 2023)
Riyadh’s ambitions to secure American nuclear cooperation date to the George W. Bush administration. However, negotiations have stalled over the US demand that Saudi Arabia forgo domestic uranium enrichment because of the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation. Saudi Arabia has resisted this protocol, asserting sovereignty over its uranium resources and apprehension toward Iran’s increased enrichment in recent years.
Why does Saudi Arabia want to acquire the nuclear fuel cycle?
(March 3, 2023)
For example, the Kingdom maintains the old version of the so-called Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), which exempts the country from extensive verification and monitoring by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The Saudis have so far been unwilling to adopt the IAEA’s revised SQP or the Model Additional Protocol, which allows intrusive inspections on short notice.
IAEA Supporting the Enhancement of Saudi Arabia’s National Nuclear Legal Framework
(11 Jan 2023)
“The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enacted the nuclear law, developed in cooperation with the IAEA, in 2018,” said Bandar E. M. Alharbi, NRRC’s General Director of Legal Affairs and International Relations. “This three-day national workshop on nuclear law organized by the NRRC, provided a very useful platform for outreach and discussion of several aspects of national nuclear law in correlation with international legal instruments”.
Saudi Arabia is party to all the main instruments adopted under IAEA auspices in the field of nuclear safety and security.