Archiv: TEMPEST


14.05.2019 - 21:36 [ Radio Utopie ]

Während die IT-„Experten“ seit 20 Jahren Luftmaus spielen, gebt Ihr Euch jetzt mal sichere Passwörter

(6.5.2018)

Erklärung: wenn Ihr Passwörter direkt in einen Browser, Euer Mailprogramm, Anwenderprogramm, etc, eingebt, der eine sichere Verbindung hat (https), umgeht Ihr unserer Analyse zufolge die auslesbare Memory Eures Computer-Prozessors. Habt Ihr aber Euer Passwort irgendwo gespeichert, ist dieses mitlesbar sobald ihr es über die „Copy“-Funktion in den Speicher / die Memory ladet.

13.02.2019 - 13:02 [ Radio Utopie ]

Während die IT-„Experten“ seit 20 Jahren Luftmaus spielen, gebt Ihr Euch jetzt mal sichere Passwörter

(6.5.2018) Erklärung: wenn Ihr Passwörter direkt in einen Browser, Euer Mailprogramm, Anwenderprogramm, etc, eingebt, der eine sichere Verbindung hat (https), umgeht Ihr unserer Analyse zufolge die auslesbare Memory Eures Computer-Prozessors. Habt Ihr aber Euer Passwort irgendwo gespeichert, ist dieses mitlesbar sobald ihr es über die „Copy“-Funktion in den Speicher / die Memory ladet.

13.02.2019 - 12:56 [ National Security Agency ]

TEMPEST: A Signal Problem

(1972) Now, let´s go back to the beginning. During World War II, the backbone systems for Army und Navy secure teletypewriter communications were one-time tapes and the primitive crypto-equipment SIGTOT. For encrypting, the Services used a Bell-telephone mixing device, called 131-B2. When one of these mixers was being tested in a Bell laboratory, a researcher noticed, quite by accident, that each time the machine stepped, a spike appeared on an oscilloscope in a distant part of the lab. After he examined these spikes more carefully, he found that he could read the plain text of the message being enciphered by the machine.

13.02.2019 - 12:44 [ Wim van Eck / radio-utopie.de ]

Electromagnetic Radiation from Video Display Units: An Eavesdropping Risk?

(1985) In February, 1985, we carried out an eavesdropping experiment in London, in cooperation with the British Broadcasting Corporation. Part of the results were shown in the programme „Tomorrow’s World.“ A small van was equipped with a 10 metre high pump mast to which a VHF band III antenna was clamped (10 dB gain). The received signal was fed through an antenna, amplified (18 dB) and displayed on a television screen inside the van.

For obvious reasons we cannot give information on the data picked up during the experiment. The results can be
summarized as follows:

• It is possible to eavesdrop on the video display units or terminals in buildings from a large distance, using a car fitted up for the purpose.

• Although the experiment was carried out in broad daylight and many people watched us, nobody asked what we were doing.

13.02.2019 - 12:38 [ Universität Tel Aviv ]

Stealing Keys from PCs using a Radio: Cheap Electromagnetic Attacks on Windowed Exponentiation

(April 2015) Q1: What information is leaked by the electromagnetic emanations from computers?

This depends on the specific computer hardware. We have tested numerous laptop computers, and found the following:
In almost all machines, it is possible to tell, with sub-millisecond precision, whether the computer is idle or performing operations.
On many machines, it is moreover possible to distinguish different patterns of CPU operations and different programs.
Using GnuPG as our study case, we can, on some machines:
distinguish between the spectral signatures of different RSA secret keys (signing or decryption), and fully extract decryption keys, by measuring the laptop’s electromagnetic emanations during decryption of a chosen ciphertext.