Archiv: War of Numbers (book / 1994)


13.04.2025 - 01:02 [ Penguin Random House ]

War of Numbers

In the fall of 1967, political and military leaders in Washington said the Vietnam War was approaching “the crossover point”: More Vietcong soldiers were dying in battle each week than could be recruited. CIA analyst Sam Adams, however, was insisting the good news was an illusion. His estimates of enemy ranks and morale varied wildly from those being released by military intelligence for public consumption, and for use by commanders in the field. Adams’ findings indicated the war was unwinnable, and when US leaders failed to acknowledge basic facts, he knew the intelligence was being politicized.

From inside the CIA and then after quitting the agency in 1973, Adams embarked on a one-man crusade to expose the truth.

13.04.2025 - 00:42 [ Seymour Hersh / TKP.at ]

Nur ein weiterer amerikanischer Präsident

Dementsprechend erließ Westmoreland 1966 eine neue Strategie, die Kommandeure anwies, weiterhin Such- und Zerstörungsmissionen in den Bergen durchzuführen, aber einen neuen Feind in die Truppenaufstellung und Einsatzregeln aufzunehmen: die „Infrastruktur“ der Vietcong. Damit waren sogenannte Basisdörfer gemeint, die angeblich von Vietcong-Unterstützern „verseucht“ waren, die Kämpfer beherbergten, versorgten und unterstützten.

(…)

Ein CIA-Analyst wie Adams bemerkte, dass die Zahlen nicht stimmten. Während Westmorelands Leichenzählung wuchs, blieb Adams’ Zählung der tatsächlich bewaffneten Kämpfer in lokalen und Haupteinheiten nahezu konstant. Er berichtete, dass die Armee offenbar Unbeteiligte tötete und als Vietcong deklarierte. „Menschen wurden nun danach angegriffen, wo sie lebten“, sagte mir Sams Kollege.

13.04.2025 - 00:41 [ Seymour Hersh ]

JUST ANOTHER AMERICAN PRESIDENT

Cooper was the quiet man at many of the most significant events in the postwar era, including the vastly misunderstood 1954 Geneva Conference, but the crucial story in his book is his inside account of Johnson’s refusal to respond to many offers for peace talks with Hanoi. Simply put, there were far more serious than publicly known offers of talks put forth by North Vietnam in the later Johnson years when bombing by US B-52s was at its peak.

Hanoi’s only condition, Cooper explains, was that America halt its bombing before the talks began, but Johnson believed any cessation would be a sign of weakness.