An example of the kind of structural problems I have in mind, is in the Iranian economy. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an institution under the support and supervision of Ayatollah Khamenei, are thought to control about one third of Iran‘s economy through subsidiaries and trusts, whilst the religious foundations (Bonyads), also under direct control of Khamenei, control over 20% of the GDP. Such vast shares of the economy out of the control of the executive branch, means any elected president would have limited access to economic sources to bring the change promised during campaigns. Adding the widespread corruption and lack of accountability of economic entities raises the question: how much hope for a successful reform programme in the next four years is reality and how much is just a delusion? The same questions arise in talking about the power of executive branch in major foreign policy crises that Iran faces now, such as the Syrian civil war and relations with the US.