(01.01.2007) The time of partition may come, however, and the U.S. position with regard to Iraq’s unity should not be dogmatic. The arguments about partition above represent a mixture of concerns in that it might escalate the violence and drag in Iraq’s neighbors. However, in the long-run much will depend on the strength and cohesion of the various parties involved. Should a Bosnia-like situation occur where the Kurds, Shi’ah, and Sunnis become unifi ed communities (probably through a long process of killing, conquest, and alliance-forging) and increasingly tired of continued bloodshed, then partition might become more feasible—though the problem of external meddling would have to be carefully managed.

Even outside powers may in the end see stable rump states as preferable to continued fi ghting for control over Iraq as a whole. Just as partition in the end proved necessary in the Balkans, so too may it be necessary in Iraq. Strife in Iraq may create de facto communal enclaves and has already lead to massive population movements. At some point, after enough killing, it may be more feasible to try to enforce these de facto boundaries than put the pieces of Iraq back together again.