Chiang was the leader of the most stable faction within China and consequently gave promise of being able to serve American interests. For this reason he was selected as the agent with whom the United States would treat with in China. During the years 1937-1949 the United States furnished Chiang Kai-shek’s government a considerable amount of material and financial aid.
Some American officials thought that Chiang was merely taking all of the American aid he could get, then conserving his forces for a future struggle with the Chinese Communists f or control of China. There is evidence to support this viewpoint.
A final effort on the part of the United States to find some effective means of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and keeping him in power came in July, 1947 when the fact finding mission to China of General Albert C. Wedemeyer was arranged. His mission also failed to bring about any concrete results in regard to assisting Chiang Kai-shek. Recommendations in Wedemeyer’s report, if followed, would have required a commitment of American troops far larger than the United States was willing to make. The American government was caught in a dilemma: a decision was necessary but the American people would not support sending large numbers of troops, Chiang would not follow American suggestions and Russia was a constant threat. Once again, America was „too late with too little“ and the mainland was lost to Chiang and Chiang’s value as America’s agent in China was destroyed.