Archiv: proliferation (en / de)


26.06.2019 - 11:21 [ Middle East Monitor ]

South Korea to establish joint nuclear research centre in Saudi Arabia

(16.05.2019)

The ministry expects the establishment of the Joint Research Centre to lay the foundation for long-term research cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the development of domestic nuclear energy technology.

During the meeting, the two countries agreed on technical cooperation to support the creation and licensing of a small smart nuclear reactor and the development of the next generation of SMART.

26.06.2019 - 11:15 [ Medium.com ]

Saudi Arabia, South Korea and the US- A Bid for a Nuclear Deal.

(05.05.2018)

Precisly for that reason, the enrichment provision in the 2011 Saudi-South Korean agreement is of vital: “Uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in any equipment so transferred shall not be enriched to twenty (20) percent or more in the isotope U-235 unless the Parties otherwise agree.” In other words, the agreement permits KSA to build enrichment facilities generally, and in particular the enrichment to 20% of uranium supplied. The reason this is worrying and eerily reminiscent of the Iran deal, is its counter intuitive nature. To go past 20% enrichment to a bomb explosive level, it takes one-tenth of the work it took to get to 20%. It is especially worrying when the Saudi prince states that if Iran got a bomb, the Kingdom would too, “as soon as possible.”

26.06.2019 - 11:09 [ Middle East Eye ]

‚Alarm bells‘: Saudi Arabia’s nuclear ambitions cast shadow over the region

(24.06.2019)

„There is a concern in the administration that if the Saudis don’t choose the United States as their supplier, they will turn to South Korea, Russia, or China, who tend to have weaker nonproliferation controls in their agreements,“ said Miller, the author of, Stopping the Bomb: The Sources and Effectiveness of US Nonproliferation Policy.

26.06.2019 - 11:05 [ theGuardian.com ]

Trump is provoking a nuclear arms race in the Middle East. What could go wrong?

(06.06.2019)

How grimly galling, as Donald Trump ostentatiously marks today’s 75th anniversary of one of the world’s biggest battles, that he is so ready to risk starting another one of potentially greater magnitude. What could possibly be that dangerous, you might ask. Answer: selling American nuclear knowhow to Saudi Arabia without radiation-proof guarantees that it will not be used to make atomic bombs.

26.06.2019 - 10:59 [ WorldPoliticsReview.com ]

Why Is the Trump Administration So Eager to See a Nuclear Saudi Arabia?

(05.06.2019)

The Trump administration twice approved the transfer of nuclear technical expertise to Saudi Arabia after last year’s murder of Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi, according to new revelations this week. The disclosures have fueled frustrations in Congress over the administration’s apparent eagerness to aid Riyadh and its nuclear ambitions, including repeatedly ignoring and blindsiding lawmakers.

26.06.2019 - 10:47 [ NPR.org ]

As Saudi Arabia Builds A Nuclear Reactor, Some Worry About Its Motives

(06.05.2019)

Saudi Arabia’s plans appear, on paper, to be entirely peaceful. But some arms control experts are concerned that its nuclear energy ambitions may also be part of its ongoing rivalry with Iran, which already possesses dual-use technology that could aid in the production of a nuclear bomb.

The U.S. and others such as South Korea and China are pushing ahead with plans to help Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear program.

09.05.2019 - 11:40 [ Radio Utopie ]

Ein möglicher Grund warum Nordkorea weiter auf seinen Nuklearwaffen hockt

(28.02.2019)

Ein möglicher Grund: dann würde deren Inspektion wohl Aufschlüsse darüber geben, welche Atommacht Pjöngjang bei dessen Aufrüstung geholfen hat. Denn ohne jedwede äußere Hilfe wäre der technologische Sprung in Nordkoreas entsprechenden militärisch-industriellen Anlagen, gerade in den letzten Jahren und auch noch zur Wasserstoffbombe, schwerlich erklärbar.

Wir stellten bereits vor anderthalb Jahren mal so eine kleine Liste von Staaten in den Raum deren militärisch-industrieller Komplex und Kriegslobby für eine solche klandestine Kollaboration bei der nuklearen Aufrüstung Nordkoreas in Frage käme.